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I. THE PROJECT, IN GENERAL
"THE LAW" IS REGULARLY ADMONISHED to run
faster because technology is outpacing it. Whatever this means,'
it is a confused call and leaves out important aspects of the idea
of law and of the relationships between techno-cultural changes
and law. Some technological developments require, if anything,
only modest changes in the substance, procedures and institutions of law, 2 and do not require rethinking the foundations of
our empirical beliefs and moral attitudes. (Think of the move
from steam to diesel locomotives.) Other changes, however,
press law and moral theory to recognize and deal with previously hidden or under-recognized issues-although even here,
foundations, or what passes for them, can (and should) often be
avoided, depending on the circumstances. (Human cloning may
strain our ideas of procreation, but there is no basis for thinking
that it shreds our core notion of human personhood.) 3 They cannot be avoided indefinitely, however, and here I suggest that
some important problems in constitutional theory require attention because of the nature of certain fields of science and technology. These developments change the world enough to require re-inspection and perhaps even reconstruction of some
constitutional argument structures.
Canvassing a wide range of these technological changes
and prospects all at once would be overwhelming. I will rely
instead on certain examples and try to show why they inspire
intensified probing of some areas of constitutional law. What
follows is part of a larger work in progress that investigates
these matters more extensively. In the interest of promoting informed consent to reading, I should say now that I am more
concerned in this work with what we might learn about consti-

1See generally, Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of
Ethicsand Law "Catching Up" With Technology, 33 IND. L. Rnv. 17 (1999).
2 Such changes may be far less needed or useful than is commonly thought,
but this can't be assessed here. See generally ROGER B. DwoRKIN, LimITs: THE ROLE
OF THE LAW IN BIoETHIcAL DECISION MAKING 2, 18, 169-71 (1996) (expressing res-

ervations on the need to change law to accommodate technological developments, but
observing that it must play a role in dealing with biomedical changes); Carl E.
Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of the Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug.
1994, at 16 (arguing that the law's language is inept for discussing bioethical disputes).
3 See generally Michael H. Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl
(Boy) That Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J.
5 (1999) (discussing public opposition to human cloning).
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tutional law when it confronts these problems, rather than the
other way around.
My use of technological disputes as probes into the nature
of constitutional adjudication involves a somewhat less-traveled
path: the focus is on (gasp) the nature, application and future
evolution of standards of review.4 Properly understood and used
(I doubt this is an overly heroic goal), they are very far from
being-as some seem to think-misleading constitutional artifacts that conceal their circularity with fusty formalism, thereby
masking the Real Issues. They are in fact a-perhaps the-principal adjudicatory mechanism through which our constitutional
hierarchy of values is recognized and implemented. These ruling standards often do their work silently as part of the infrastructure of constitutional argumentation, but they are "there"
nonetheless. Resolving constitutional disputes involving biological technologies that sharply revise basic life processes will
require us to survey the standard and their links to each other,
and to make them more responsive to the added pressures
placed upon them. As I will argue, the more we know about
standards of review, the more we know about the Constitution
and how it embeds critical values. This defining aspect of standards of review in our constitutional system is frequently overlooked, which is quite unfortunate, for they are far from mindless incantations: they serve as indispensable filters for constitutional analysis precisely because they implement a hierarchy
of constitutional values derived from standard forms of interpretation. (For present purposes, I take the idea of "constitutional value" as primitive. Complete analysis of standards of
review would clearly require a serious attempt at explication,
but the task here is not meant to be that comprehensive.)
Because this less-traveled road is crooked and bumpy (as
most lines of constitutional analysis are), a map seems called
for. I start with assuming that we indeed have a constitutional
text, then briefly outline the principal interpretive trails we fol4 For present purposes, I do not draw sharp distinctions among the processes
of constitutional theorizing, analysis, and interpretation, although they bear different,
if overlapping, meanings. "Constitutional adjudication" of course refers to a formalized endeavor that resorts to all these processes and is examined within those processes. I mention this set of terms simply to record the point that, although standards
of review are ubiquitous (because necessary) in constitutional decision making, their
operational content varies from decision-maker (say, a legislator) to decisionmaker
(say, a court).
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low in working with that text. I next suggest (without presenting
detailed arguments) that most or all of these routes converge in
establishing a hierarchy among constitutional legal relations-a
hierarchy that reflects and embodies constitutional values. The
exact membership and ordering of the hierarchy, and whether
we think it fixed or variable, may rest on the interpretive
scheme used. (By "legal relations" I mean the rights, powers,
privileges and immunities associated under the Constitution
with individuals and governmental entities and branches. 5) I
then link the hierarchy to its "operational meaning"-which depends heavily, if not entirely, on the use of constitutional standards of review. 6 In doing so, I attend to the ambiguities of
meaning of "standards of review," and, by referring to several
notable cases involving applied biological technologies, I go on
to urge the need to push the idea of standards of review-and
thus of constitutional value itself-to enhanced levels of specificity.
Once again, the point of this presentation is to use some
modern biotechnological disputes to highlight limitations in our
understanding of constitutional values and of how they are recognized and implemented. These limitations, although not entirely ignored in the "pre-bioethics" age, are now more vivid
and pressing and thus harder (though not impossible) to ignore.
In later sections, I will refer to several cases involving both
simple and advanced technologies for controlling physiological
functions that shape thought and behavior. First, however, I
refer to the elements of constitutional interpretation generally;
when applied, they soon yield the inevitable idea of a standard
of review, in both its global and particular senses.

5 This interpretation of "legal relations" draws on the familiar Hohfeldian
account, which I will not examine. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER

LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). The term "constitutional value" is
vague and is especially beset by level-of-generality problems, but clarifying it here is
unnecessary. As I say in the text, the phrase as used here is primitive, without further
direct explication.
6 For a still-informative overview of standards of review, see generally Scott
H. Bice, Standards of JudicialReview Under the Equal Protectionand Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 689 (1977). For a careful look at the nature and operation of such standards, see Roy G. Spece, Jr., A PurposiveAnalysis of Constitutional
Standards of JudicialReview and a PracticalAssessment of the Constitutionalityof
Regulating Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1281 (1978).
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H. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION,
HIERARCHY, AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
THE LOGIC OF RANKING LEGAL RELATIONS
INTER SE
A. Converging interpretive paths lead to hierarchy
1. Remarks on interpretation
There are defining aspects of interpretation that are well
worth exploring in a more extended work, but are only mentioned here in greatly simplified outline. I do not claim that this
outline gathers and links the strands of interpretation in the best
way possible; it is simply one way to capture the complexity of
interpretive processes.
The main axes of interpretation seem to coalesce into variables dealing with characteristics of a text's author(s) or "senders" (their intentions, motivations, and circumstances); with the
(generally intersubjective) nature of the linguistic or other symbolic entities used to "carry" the message; and with the responses of the message's recipients, based on their own characteristics. Other lists of criteria seem to fit within one or more
of these larger interpretive trails, including temporal variables.
"Tradition," for example, straddles all of them: it might help to
determine an author's understandings and purposes, or to fix the
lexical meaning of some symbolic entity, or to gauge a recipient's likely understanding of a message. If another system of
abstractions seems more illuminating than the preceding threeaxis structure, fine; for present purposes, this general scheme
will do.
A few points made for the sake of completeness: First, at
the highest level of abstraction relevant here (when all we know
is that we have a text), all these axes, separately or in any combination, must at least be considered as possible interpretive
paths. This is part of the logic of interpretation: "interpretation"
has these interweaved threads of meaning.
Second, beyond this threshold, I am not claiming that the
full set of axes must be seriously applied across the board for all
texts. Nor am I claiming, at the start, that any particular axis or
combination of axes is excluded from consideration across the
board or for any given text. There is no unique path or set of
paths that is universally required or permitted, or is licit or il-
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licit, for all texts. There is, however, the possibility that a given
axis or set of axes is required or excluded for a given kind of
text. I don't pursue this very large topic here.
Third, as suggested, these interpretive paths overlap considerably, bearing connections that are required by the very nature of these aspects of interpretation. Authors generally have
intentions and hopes concerning the effect and impact of a message, and, more specifically, about the likely ways in which the
linguistic entities will be grasped. Moreover, the supposedly
intersubjective meanings contained within the language used
have manifest limitations and cannot always stand as independently sufficient tools of interpretation; they may require reference to variables concerning authors and audiences and perhaps
to some aspects of moral analysis. And audiences puzzling over
a message will themselves often consider author-variables and
inquire into intricacies of lexical meaning. (This is, however,
far from saying that with every text, its readers should regularly
hit the history books and the Oxford English Dictionary or its
non-English-language relatives.) The sets of interpretive variables thus cross-reference each other in complex ways.
Fourth (and very closely connected to "Third"), certain basic terms used in commentaries about interpretation are hugely
ambiguous, partly because they bestride these interpretive lines.
Think, for example, of "originalism," which might refer to
Framers' intentions about an enormous variety of matters: the
values they wished to implement; the general or specific nearand long-term goals they had in mind (or would have had in
mind had anyone asked them?); their rationales, motivations
and purposes generally; their understandings of the nature and
purposes of the social, economic and political institutions
around them; their expectations concerning how their text(s)
would be understood; and-not of least importance-about the
intersubjective meanings of the very words, phrases and structural devices they placed in the Constitution. "Original meaning" can thus refer to matters of lexical understanding, or to
various other far-flung aspects of the Framers' states of mind.
"What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for
in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.",7 "Originalism" insofar as it rests on
7 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW

38 (1997). It is possible of course, that "the original meaning of the text" is
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intersubjective meanings at a particular time and "originalism"
insofar as it refers to an assortment of intentions and purposes
(etc.) of the Framers are radically different (even if overlapping) notions.
Finally, a comment on the well-known ambiguities of
"text." I deal with this because of the risk of conflating the idea
of a text with that of a particular text-interpretive path-intersubjective linguistic meaning. 8 (There are other examples of
difficulty in understanding the relationship between concepts
and their "criteria"-e.g., between death and "irreversible cessation of all brain function."9) There is also a particular wellknown ambiguity in putting this question in a constitutional
context. Is "the Constitution" a certain sequence of symbols (including its organization and structure)? Or is it that plus-what?
Our common understandings of its language? The body of Supreme Court precedent? (And so on.) I avoid this issue, and I
think I can get away with that here. At least for present purposes, the simplest alternative is to use "text" to refer to a sequence of marks and their structural interconnections, understood to be an array of symbols, even though we might not understand their meanings.' 0 Of course, one can raise serious
questions about the phrase "understood to be symbols," but I
will raise none of them.
sufficiently unclear that an interpreter might have to look into what the Framers or
drafters "had in mind" more generally.
sThis axis of interpretation seems to be similar to "textualism." See generally
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PER-

SPECTIVES 65-95 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing textualism). See also SCALIA, supra note
7, at 23-25, 37-41 (discussing textualism in statutory and constitutional contexts).
9 On whether this definition blends "the thing itself' with one of its criteria,
see DOUGLAS N. WALTON, BRAIN DEATH: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 51-56 (1980).
Walton states that brain death is "a bridge concept between the concept of death and
the diagnostic criteria for the determination of death, so it is hard to know where to
locate it in the usual concepts/criteria dichotomy." Id. at 53. He also describes brain
death as "more of a technical concept of medical science than the concept of death
simpliciter." Id.
1oIt's not entirely clear whether this differs from some usages by others. See,
e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTER-

PRETIVE COMMuNITIEs at vii (1980) (stating that "there is a text in this and every class
if one means by text the structure of meanings that is obvious and inescapable from
the perspective of whatever interpretive assumptions happen to be in force"). This
might refer to interpretive assumptions indicating that something is indeed a text
because the marks or sounds or movements are known to be symbols--communicative entities. It might also refer, more comprehensively, to particular interpretive
assumptions that suggest specific meanings or ranges of meaning.
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2. What "hierarchy" means here; one ambiguity

(among others) of "standard of review"
There is a crucial distinction concerning the inferential path
from interpretation to hierarchy to standards of review. The critique of standards of review (see also Part I.C., infra) could be

taken most broadly to deny that any ordering-rather than any
given one--can be derived for constitutional rights, interests,
and other legal relationships. But this position makes little or
no sense. There must be at least one specification of hierarchy,
however simple. For example, we could say that in disputes
between individuals and governments where the former accuses
the latter of unconstitutionally infringing on their interests, the
government always wins." While this simple but potent rule
(one might hesitate to call it a "standard of review") reflects an
obvious ranking of sorts, it certainly does not overprotect "fundamental liberty interests" or equalitarian interests in not being
classified in certain ways. Even with the qualification that government action must be taken "in good faith for a public purpose," the standard of review comes close to being an automatic
preference for any government action (possibly including porcine legislation). The opposing "standard of review" is equally

1 This was never formally the case in constitutional law. The usual qualification in older formulations of constitutional standards of review was that the government had to be acting in good faith-i.e., for a public purpose (a rather large assumption, to be sure). Cf. Howard Gillman, The Antinomy of Public Purposes and Private
Rights in the American ConstitutionalTradition, or Why CommunitarianismIs Not
Necessarily Exogenous to Liberal Constitutionalism, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 67, 71
(1996) (stating that "even at this time [the Lochner era] the doctrine of police powers
and the concept of the public interest played a central role in determining when legislatures could interfere with liberty and property.").
In fact, the constitutional test used by the Supreme Court in evaluating
whether the state was to be permitted to "interpose its authority on behalf
of the public" was not whether the government was interfering too much
with liberty or property but rather whether "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference." It is no exaggeration to say that the central question in constitutional law during this period was over the meaning of 'the public interest'....When the justices believed that an interference with liberty or property promoted the health, safety, or morality of the community, then the
laws were upheld .... Regulations were struck down if the justices believed
that they did not in fact promote the general welfare or that their purpose
was to illegitimately privilege the interests of certain market competitors at
the expense of others....
Id. at 71-72.
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simple and potent: government can't do much of anything because individuals always prevail in constitutional adjudication.
There are indeed domains of constitutional adjudication that
suggest these slam dunk standards-for example: "economic"
regulation tested under substantive due process standards (always upheld) as compared with content regulation of political
speech in a public forum (perhaps never upheld, but the point is
arguable). Foraging in all the domains of constitutional legal
relations will indeed yield standards of review of sharply varying structures-but all are bent on the same overarching task:
directing the decisionmaker to appraise the disputes in constitutional coin and to state at least the ordinal (and possibly the cardinal) rankings of competing claims by specifying who must
show what, and how.
But if ordering is acknowledged, the road then forks: one
might think that there is a virtually continuous ascension in
value from the least important to the most important interests
(individual or governmental/societal), yielding a "unitary" standard of review that says something of the form-"Find the interest, see how much it's worth under the circumstances, determine how seriously it is burdened, think about the government's
interests (part of "under the circumstances"), and act accordingly." This is not incoherent, but-as far as appearanceis concerned-it is not generally the way business is done in constitutional adjudication (though some may prefer it). 12 Our present
conceptual system of standards of review is articulated in quite
different terms. We sort rights and interests into separate categories ("tiers") that bear particular characterizations ("fundamental rights/liberty interests," "suspect/semi-suspect classifications") that mark the separate tiers (and their sub-tiers, if
any). Because particular characterizations generally mark separate tiers, standards of review are often given particular
names-"strict scrutiny" (a.k.a. "the compelling governmental
interest test"), "intermediate scrutiny," "the rational basis test,"
12

It may also seem so vague that it presses the limits of the rule of law, at

least in certain senses of that idea, but I do not press the point, which was suggested
to me by Professor Roy G. Spece, Jr. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 S. CT. REV. 75, 80 (1960) (stating that "to remove candor
from one's description of the decisional process is to strike at the heart of the rule of
law"). Of course, critics of standards of review would hold that their use obfuscates
what is "really" going on and thus reflects the reverse of candor. The formulation in
the text, however, is too vague to be a standard of review. See infra note 19
(explaining that standards of review must refer to hierarchy).
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and several others indigenous to special areas (e.g., the undue
burden "standard" for abortion regulations announced in
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey13).
It is hard to know exactly how to assess this situation even
in a preliminary way. Some may think that the first path mentioned above-recognizing a finely calibrated ascension of constitutional value (perhaps not a "continuum," but the term
comes to mind)-is preferable to the arguably ham-fisted identification and naming of sharply divided categories marking increments in value along the same ascension line(s). (One would
also think there is a continuum that captures varying degrees of
burden on a given constitutional value at any point along the
value ascension line.) Attacks on recognizing discrete standards
of review do not deny that there is an ascension in "constitutional value"; they complain of excessively sharp, discontinuous
categories that do not reflect constitutional reality. These clunky
categories, of course, are part of what is designated by specific
standards of review bearing labels ("strict scrutiny") such as
those mentioned above.
To make matters worse (in the eyes of critics of tiered standards of review), there is yet another "discontinuous" line-the
triggering points for particular standards of review: however
important the interest in question, no serious scrutiny is drawn
unless its impairment has reached some threshold. At that point,
there is an instantaneous constitutional "phase change," and we
move from little or no judicial scrutiny to what, again, seems to
be an all-or-nothing leap to a much higher level of scrutiny.
This system of discrete bins and their associated standards of
review gives some observers the vapors, as evidenced by Justice
Marshall's (and later Justice White's)
endorsement of a "spec14
trum" or sliding scale of standards.

510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (holding there is a liberty interest in abortion that
cannot be unduly burdened by government).
14 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Courts sometimes seem to pursue this spectrum approach
without much explanation of how it fits into the prevailing official formulations of
standards of review. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.
1999) (upholding Proposition 198, a California initiative measure that changed the
primary election system from closed to blanket, where any voter could vote for any
candidate, without regard to party affiliation), rev'd, California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). The Ninth Circuit opinion (adopting the District Court's
opinion) stated:
'3
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Determining which is the better conceptual system-and on
what standards of betterness-is outside the rough borders of
this article, although I hope to address the task in another work.
Some may argue that the two systems are not extensionally
equivalent-that is, they will lead to different results in different cases, partly by "rescuing" some claims of right from the
rigorously minimalist (nihilist?) versions of the rational basis
test, and partly by bumping some countervailing governmental
claims down from the set of compelling or important interests.
These shifts are thought to avoid "distortions" generated by a
mistaken view of sharp boundaries separating one kind of constitutional claim from another and separating different sorts of
government interests offered to justify the constitutional intrusion.
Perhaps there will indeed be some shift in outcomes, but
this is not a logical or doctrinal necessity. Switching from separate bins to continua doesn't formally demand changes in outcome because marginal adjustments can be made (often not explicitly) within the bins. The change in conceptual systems,
however, may have an effect because of the different rhetorical,
emotional, and educative effects of the different systems. 15 In
[T]he court finds that the parties have succeeded in showing that the blanket primary imposes a significant but not severe burden on their associational rights. To survive the challenge mounted by plaintiffs, Proposition
198 must be supported by interests that are sufficient to outweigh the burdens identified above. Those interests need not be compelling, given that
the burdens are not crushing, but they must be important.
CaliforniaDemocraticParty, 169 F.3d at 659-60. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
and Justice Scalia's majority opinion seems to use the dominant mode of formulating
standards of review. It recognized the special importance of political association:
"Unsurprisingly, our cases vigorously affirm the special place the First Amendment
reserves for, and the special protection it accords, the process by which a political
party 'select[s] a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences."' CaliforniaDemocratic Party, 530 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted). It then
announced: "Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. at 582.
Justice Stevens's dissent, however, seems more consistent with a "less categorical" approach: "As District Judge Levi correctly observed in an opinion adopted
by the Ninth Circuit... the associational rights of political parties are neither absolute nor as comprehensive as the rights enjoyed by wholly private associations." Id.
at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 442 U.S. 441, 458 (1973)
(White, J., concurring) (commenting favorably on Justice Marshall's preferred conceptual system for standards of review).
15 See the brief remarks on choice of conceptual systems in Michael H. Shapiro, Fragmenting and Reassembling the World: Of Flying Squirrels, Augmented
Persons,and Other Monsters, 51 OHiO ST. L.J. 331, 345 n.73 (1990).
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any case, the fact that one cannot hold circumstances, judges
and their respective views constant makes ,it difficult to tell
whether a switch in standards of review in any given case, or in
a class of cases, would generate a different outcome.16
Although I am not dealing with choice of conceptual systems comprehensively, I want to say enough to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding. I already noted that, as used
loosely here, "hierarchy" comprehends various orderings of
constitutional value. This holds whether we give names to certain ranked or graded regions of the scale, or view it as finely
calibrated, bearing no clear internal boundaries or gaps that
would mark a series of demarcated bins. This choice-of-conceptual systems issue suggests the need
for a terminological clarification. The term "level [or degree] of
scrutiny" might be thought to refer only to a tiered system of
supposed discontinuities, or to tiered and continuous systems
both. For present theoretical purposes, nothing turns on this, and
it should be clear in context (here or elsewhere) what formulations are in use. In the broad sense of "levels of scrutiny," a
system of levels of some sort, discrete or continuous, is dictated
by our interpretive exercises insofar as they yield a constitutional value hierarchy. "Tier" will be taken to designate the discontinuous-appearing system of categories generating specific,
usually named standards of review.
I also think that, whatever the merits of these competing
constitutional visions of ordering, the battle is not about "using
abstractions" as against some other process. There is no other
possible process: every conceivable conceptual system will involve abstractions-that's what a conceptual system is about.
The issues concern which abstractions are arrayed in which
structures, and how these
abstractions are constructed, recog17
nized and implemented.
16 See

supra note 14 (discussing CaliforniaDemocratic Party v. Jones, 530

U.S. 567 (2000)).
17 Cf. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of
the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Oaio ST. L.J. 161, 174 (1984) (arguing that "[ainother deficiency of the multi-tier approach is that it hampers legal analysis by focusing the
inquiry toward abstractions that are divorced from the specific merits of a case").
But if the abstraction is constitutionally relevant at all, it cannot be completely
"divorced" from the particulars of a case. And the "specific merits of a case" cannot
even be known to be "merits" without abstractions. Human thought generally, and
perforce constitutional thought in particular, require abstractions-which we can then
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A final question concerning how we describe these varying
conceptual systems: Should the term "standards of review" apply only to the multi-tiered array or also to the (supposedly)
"unitary" sliding scale of the sort urged by Justice Marshall?
For present purposes, the important considerations are the recognition of hierarchy or ascension in the constitutional value of
legal relations, and the tracing of operational differences in intensity of scrutiny that depend both on the legal relation's position in the hierarchy and on the nature of the burden placed on
it. I will use "standard of review" to cover any system of implementing or accommodating ascensions of constitutional

value, whether continuous, fine-tiered, or clunky. When necessary to address the differences, it can be done easily enough.
assess for their accuracy, utility, coherence with "neighboring" abstractions and conceptual systems, and their emotive impacts and learning effects.
Much the same applies to the comment that "[a]dditionally, the multi-level
system impedes legal analysis, in a most serious way, by imposing categories upon
the constitutional balancing process." Id. But we cannot always deal with even a
determinate and clear continuum without categories. We would be driven to say
something like: "This site-and its (immediately adjacent) (neighboring) sites-represent (greater) (lesser) constitutional value than that other site (down) (up) there."
That claim also involves abstractions. Whether it is advisable, however, to move
from highly reified (perhaps hallowed) categories to apparently less "rigid" ones, I
leave aside, except for noting the risks of increasingly imprecise general concepts
that take one still further from particularized situations. Consider whether the unitary
standard articulated by Justice Marshall, and strongly endorsed by Professor Shaman,
can do the work we want it to do (assuming we can even say what this work is). Professor Shaman states that:
While intermediate scrutiny was in an incipient stage, Justice Marshall
authored a majority opinion for the Court in Chicago Police Department v.
Mosley [408 U.S. 92 (1972)], which offered a single standard of review as
an alternative to the multi-tier approach. Marshall's opinion stated that the
crucial question in all equal protection cases is whether there is "an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered" by the government regulation in question. This comprehensive inquiry consolidates the levels (or, as
may be the case, the degrees) of scrutiny into a unified formula for all
cases.
Id. at 164 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
I suppose this is a battle involving (among other things), lumping versus
splitting. One might wonder whether the unitary standard loses too much valuereinforcing potential because of its greater neutrality-and perhaps vapidity. Recall
that Mosley came down (for reasons not fully explained) as an equal protection case,
rather than a first amendment one. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972). One must consider what might be lost by attenuating honorific characterizations, such as (to restate in my own terms a common formulation): "The first
amendment is a fundamental liberty interest protecting, among other things, political
speech, and such speech, and other forms of speech as well, trigger the strictest scrutiny."
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3. Convergence
All or some of these branching interpretive paths-author
variables, lexical meanings, recipient variables-may (but need
not) converge to similar or even identical outcomes. They may
all, for example, point to the constitutionally elevated status of
political speech and its resulting strong immunity from government interdiction, but differ sharply on other forms of speech
(say, commercial speech). A parallel point applies to various
aspects of personal privacy. And so on.
Whether or not these lines of interpretation converge in
particular cases, most observers would agree on several outcomes. One is that the Constitution's text/structure1 8 establishes
(or recognizes) certain constitutional value rankings among the
legal relations designated in the Constitution. These rankings
are supposed to reflect and implement underlying value orderings residing in the Constitution. The rankings are thus understood to involve complex links among different kinds of constitutional value. Inevitably, this broad accord on the results of
constitutional interpretation extends to the perceived necessity
of resolving conflicts within the hierarchy of legal relations, as
when individual liberties are pitted against government powers,
or government powers collide among themselves, or individual
interests are in tension with each other.
There are, of course, huge differences among interpreters in
their views of the nature of these rankings, and thus on what
differing levels of justification are laid upon government action
that impinges on these constitutional values. Some believe that
commercial speech is no less valuable than political speech;
18

That is, its textistructure understood, at the start, as a sequence of symbols

rather than as its specific intersubjective lexical meanings. The point of this qualification, as suggested, is to avoid conflating the chief concept (the Constitution) with
one (or more) of its criteria. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
As for the awkward term "text/structure": I simply mean that whatever
meaning is assigned to identified "units" within the text (words, phrases, full texts)
must reflect considerations involving how these units (other than the full text itself)
are joined or separated, how they are sequenced, and how they refer to each other or
otherwise affect each other. These are inquiries into the structure of the text. "Structure" is thus not different from "text"--it is an aspect of it. How one goes from
text/structure to specific interpretive outcomes may involve some important complexities. For examples that illustrate this account, see generally CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., STRUCrrIJRE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONsntYrIoNAL LAW (1969). The term
"structure" as used here is not restricted to any particular subset of problems, such as
separation of powers or federal-state conflicts.
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others believe it is only of modest consequence; still others say
it is "intermediate" (as reflected in current doctrine). Some believe the set of "nonexplicit" fundamental liberty interests protected by the Constitution is very large; others think it nearly
empty. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia acknowledged
such a hierarchy, but their own lists of critical interests sharply
differed (though they overlapped).
To briefly tie things up: I argue that hierarchy among constitutionally established legal relations is, in some form, an interpretive result of any or all of the interpretive axes applied to
the Constitution. The constitutional universe is not flat: some
interests count more than others, and claims involving constitutional issues can thus be sorted and ranked. One has a far better
chance of prevailing against government censorship or forced
sterilization or other restrictions on reproduction than against
local laws requiring sewer line connections in place of personal
backyard septic tanks.
As I said, I do not try to definitively confirm interpretive
convergence toward this sort of hierarchy. All I say here is that
if constitutional hierarchies are recognized by converging interpretive theories and are taken seriously, they must be operationally reflected in standards of review of one sort or another. If
they are not, then there are no hierarchies in the first place. To
put it crisply, if constitutional hierarchy (among legal relations
and their associated constitutional values) is accepted, to implement the hierarchy is to select and apply a standard of review. Doing so is embedded in realizing the hierarchy. Put otherwise, implementing a constitutional hierarchy amounts to the
application of a standard of review. This is elaborated in the
next few sections.
B. What is a standard of review and what does it do?
How is it identified and used?
This is a large and confusing question, but something must
be said about it.
1. In general: sorting claims
The term "standard of review" does not have one standard
meaning. Understood broadly, standards of review are constitutional meta-arguments that tell us to look for and apply hierarchies of constitutional value. They are thus (among other
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things) sorting devices. 19 How did we come to the issue of
"sorting" in the first place? I don't know what came first. Trying to answer this is at least remotely akin to inquiring into the
origins of the Big Bang, or into whether abstract thought or language came first. At some point at or near an Origin in constitutional hermeneutics, our work with the ideas of text, interpretation, and value ordering crystallized the question of what it
means operationally to say that there is an authoritative ordering
of values embedded in the text, or in any communication. 20 The
force of this question pushed us toward greater specificityfrom the general, roughly intuited idea of hierarchy to more specific argument structures derived from particular hierarchies
found in the text. We see the text as telling us, via a global
"standard of review," to sort generally and then to derive from
191 want to avoid conflating standards of review with more general standards
on how to proceed in constitutional adjudication. A standard of review, in both
broader and narrower senses (see infra text accompanying notes 23, 26-27, 38-39,
54-55), reflects a constitutional terrain that is not "flat": there must be within the
standard some general or specific reference to constitutional hierarchies of value, and
this reference is meant to influence the course of adjudication. For example: "In this
case, make the decision that best 'locates' the outcome within the full fabric of our
constitutional law, taking into account all rights, interests, values, and policies that
are fairly implicated in the dispute." This is too general to be a standard of review,
rather than a rough method of proceeding (as in "do the right thing" or "make the best
decision, all things considered"). This formulation is not a specific or even global
standard of review, although there might be a body of precedent that reflects and
implements our constitutional hierarchy, and from which an explicit standard of review could be inferred. For a directive to be a standard of review, it must specifically
lock into either a general notion of hierarchy or a particular account of a specific
hierarchy. The latter is the more common usage, as I suggest later.
I suggested in the text that" implementing a constitutional hierarchy amounts
to the application of a standard of review." Some might say that if the preceding
claim is simply a deductive consequence of particular definitions of "constitutional
hierarchy" and "standard of review," the claim is empty or trivial. But not all such
deductions are trivial. 'P implies P" is trivial. But the deductions offered herethough "contained" within the premises-are more complex and are easier to lose
sight of. Calling attention to deductive consequences may have illuminating and even
jarring effects. I suppose we need a theory of triviality here, but I leave this issue of
emptiness to logicians and cognitive psychologists.
The term "meta-argument" in the text is not used rigorously. It is meant simply to suggest that standards of review are arguments or directives about formulating
arguments or directives, all within the language of constitutional analysis.
20 At various points, I refer to standards of review; the idea of standards
of review; the burdens of justification embedded in, or entailed by, or constitutive of standards of review; the meaning (including operational meaning) of
"standards of review," and so on. There are obvious ontological problems here,
but I don't think they require special attention here, even if some formulations
technically category mistakes.
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this sorting a set of separate argument forms to implement the
sorting. These argument forms constitute particularized standards of review-"standards of review" in the narrower and
more commonly used sense. The global standard is, roughly,
"look for sorting or ranking by the constitutional text/structure."
A narrower standard is the particular instruction, e.g., "if you
find a fundamental liberty interest, see if the government's maneuvers are necessary to promote a compelling interest." Such
phase separation is a hazy process but for now it is enough just
to note this. (Some may want to withhold the term "standard of
review" from the global instruction and restrict it to the narrower sort. I don't consider this here.)
Standards of review (in either the broader or narrower
sense) are thus meant to typecast legal relations (rights, immunities, etc.) into categories that require varying degrees of justification for governments to burden or alter them. It is supposed
to be harder for government to silence its critics than for it to,
say, justify requiring a particular sort of community-wide waste
disposal system. This view does not reflect any "begged questions" if it follows from good faith sorting through the axes of
interpretation. The fact that most regulations of speech content
are invalidated cannot rightly be taken to show that the strong
standard of review in use betokens an issue improperly decided
in advance. Nor does it signal that the Real Issues have been
bypassed. On the contrary-it instead reflects the outcome of
working with at least one of those critical issues: the identification and ranking of constitutional values. Speech-content regulations are supposed to fail most of the time. We presume they
are invalid and place a heavy burden of justification on government to sustain them. Doing is this is part of the adjudicatory objective, not an objection to it. When standards of review
work the way they are supposed to work, they aren't being
"misused" or misunderstood.
This is easy to say, but hard to implement: one must still
pass the often difficult characterization stage. (Is relocating Xrated theatres content regulation? Are must-carry rules for cable
television content/speaker-identity regulations?21 ) And one must
21 As

to the former, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41

(1986) (agreeing with district court's finding that city ordinance prohibiting adult
motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of certain residential structures was not aimed at the content of those movies, but rather at the secondary effects
of such theaters on the surrounding community); as to the latter, see Turner Broad.
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also manage the challenging assessment of the government's
interests and the mechanisms designed to further them. The fact
that some analysts take the relative brevity of the process of
using particular standards of review to indicate an underlying
oversimplification of issues is unfortunate but not inevitable. It
is, in any event, not at all clear whether hiding the bones of a
constitutional argument structure will promote better reflection
on constitutional values.
2. The ontology of standards of review
(a) The stages of argument and the "location" of standards
of review
The purpose of this section is to explain, summarize, and
elaborate on what has just been said about the character of standards of review. For present purposes, we can be noncomprehensive and deal only with a certain (large) family of
disputes that have some threshold claim to being matters of
constitutional law: individuals, associations, business organizations and other "units of autonomy" against government action.
I will not deal with all standards of review in all circumstances
(e.g., one government entity or official against another government entity or official, as in cases involving federal separation
of powers or federal-state clashes). 22 In the sorts of cases reviewed here, the claimants-as initiators of action or as civil or
criminal defendants-complained of infringement of a right or
interest, usually couched in terms of "liberty interests," "equality," or (more generally) "due process" (and so on).
What I say here is not intended as a canonical account of
precisely how to proceed in constitutional adjudication-indeed, such precision seems conceptually impossible. I suggest,
instead, that any constitutional argument structure must involve
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II) (holding that cable must-carry rules are content-neutral).
22 Intra- and inter-governmental claims of course have their indigenous standards of review, although they may seem structurally quite different from those illustrated here. But these argument structures expressly or impliedly embody directions
for sorting and for imposing burdens of justification--even if couched in "functionalist" rather than "formalist" modes. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 355-56 (13th ed. 1997); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITuTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND

PoLiciEs 232-34 (1997).
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at least the premises in the paragraph next below at some stage
of the argument. Even argument structures offered as embodying "categorization" rather than "balancing" approaches must
address the matters mentioned in argument stages [i]-[vii] below. 23 As we saw, there is an obvious question about how to
identify "second-order" arguments (generic-level global standards of review) 24 that tell us what kind of "first-order" arguments (standards of review as more commonly and narrowly
understood) to formulate here-and so on with higher orders.
But I move on to other matters.
The required argument structure involves [i] a threshold
characterization of the claim-the right/interest/etc. invoked;
[ii] an account of how-and how seriously-it has been impaired; [iii] a ranking within the governing constitutional value
hierarchy of the individual or other claims against government;
[iv] the assignment (explicit or implicit) of a particular burden
of justification (the "specific" or "narrow" standard of review);
[v] the identification and valuation of legitimate government
objectives (near and remote) and of the government's power to
further them; [vi] the application of the burden of justification
via either a comparative assessment of the collision of personal
interest claims and government claims against each other (and
perhaps against other material constitutional value standards,
even if not raised by the parties) 25, or by the identification of a
particular interest that trumps any interest pitted against it; 26 and
finally, [vii] the outcome. 27
Note several points about this account.
* First, as we saw,28 there is the problem already mentioned
of identifying the exact thing we call a "standard of review." I
suggested that the phrase has (at least) a narrower and a broader
extension. The narrow one refers to step [iv] (or perhaps steps
[i]-[iv] or [iii]-[iv], depending more on taste than logic)
above-the outcome being the assignment of a particular burden of justification. This is the argument stage bearing colorful
23 See infra text preceding and accompanying notes 24-25.
24

See supra text preceding and accompanying note 19.

2 As noted, whether and when courts raise issues on their own is a function
of the derived hierarchy and its associated standards of review.
26 Here, I'm trying to avoid begging questions raised in the critiques of "balancing."
27 This simple phrase is also quite ambiguous, but I leave it at that.
28
See supra text accompanying note 19.
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names such as "strict scrutiny" (a/k/a the "compelling interest
test"); "intermediate scrutiny"; the "minimal rational basis test"
(at least in substantive due process); the not-always-minimal
rational basis test (in equal protection); and a number of others
located in different branches of constitutional law (such as the
First Amendment, separation of powers, and federal-state conflicts) 29 and which are not always clearly named.
The broad extension of "standards of review" covers the
second-order argument that generates the entire sequence [i][iv], and perhaps [v]-[vii] also. That is, it is the global set of directions that might be said to constitute the standard of review.
Blurring these two extensions is not of much significance for
anything discussed here, although it suggests a minor clarifying
point: it is usually the anticipationof known, specific standards
of review and the justificatory burdens they impose-or don't
impose-that drives the search for location in a hierarchy.
After all, that is in significant part what operational constitutional value hierarchies are all about-the placement of the
specific and sharply varying burdens of justification that vindicate those hierarchies. 30 (There is a cycling problem here; interpreters may end up revising the hierarchy in light of trying to
implement it as previously unearthed. This is an important theoretical problem to pursue elsewhere.) The directions specifying
those burdens are what we loosely call "standards of review."
But, as argued earlier, these specific standards are in theory derived from a prior independently established hierarchy derived
from converging interpretive maneuvers. This is not a true
"Which came first?" puzzle, but it suggests that the hope for a
particular standard of review is almost certain to drive us to
characterize claims in certain specific ways. This is, in part,
why dealing with standards of review is so often viewed as
question-begging, even though it isn't:31 we invent new basic
29

For example, "time, place, and manner" analysis, operating as a form of

intermediate scrutiny, and "reasonableness" standards applied to regulations of nonpublic forums. See generally GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 1234-35 (discussing the regulation of free speech in public and non-public settings). Recall also
the problem of identifying standards of review in "categorical in/exclusion" cases,
see supra text accompanying note 22.
30 These sharp differences are not confined to discontinuous tiers. Significant
movement along a continuum will of course generate significantly varying burdens of
justification.
31 See supra text following note 4 (referring to discussion of question-begging
and circularity where standards of review are used).

372

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 11:351

rights, so it is argued, not because they're "really there" in the
constitutional text but to buy into a standard of review that all
but guarantees victory. Once again, however, increasing the
likelihood that a rights-claimaint will prevail this is not an objection to using named standards of review: it is part of the very
point, of recognizing constitutional hierarchies of value and applying them in various regions of constitutional adjudication.
* Second, the initial step [i]-that of claims characterization-implicates huge hunks of constitutional theory concerning
the nature and status of "specifically" mentioned rights, implied
rights, and of equality claims. The need for claims characterization is driven by the previously derived hierarchy of legal relations and underlying constitutional values. 32 The nature of and
justification for ways of taking this step has been a major component of legal scholarship for decades.
* Third, the inquiry into the intrusion on the claimed interest raises several necessarily connected questions. Is there a de
minimis threshold below which the impairment doesn't count?
Or do we just (very roughly) assign a degree of intrusion along
some continuous scale via a finely calibrated standard of review? 33 (These questions apply to equal protection cases too,
though the issues require some reformulation into equality language. Different kinds of classifications are graded for
(dis)value, and the degree to which the (dis)preferred classifications
have been directly or indirectly made must be speci34
fied.)
* Fourth, as suggested, stage [iv] in the argument sequence
above is what is most often identified with the phrase "standards of review." If no specially protected interest has been invoked, or it has not been seriously impaired or threatened, 35 the
weak-to-nonexistent "rational basis" standard of review applies.
(Even that standard, however, can be taken to have some independent punch because the government's goals must be legiti32 Except for the limiting (and generally absurd) hierarchy requiring that one
party or claim always, and absolutely, trumps all others.
33 See supra text accompanying notes 13-17 (discussing the critique of multitiered standards of review).
34 Dealing with this would unduly expand this essay.
35 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that security for a
database containing information about patients' use of drugs having both lawful and
unlawful markets avoided threats to any informational privacy interests, and also that
no threat to privacy as independence in making certain important decisions was
shown).
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mate, and legitimacy does not depend exclusively on issues of
36
fundamental liberty interests or (semi-)suspect classifications.)
But if a specially protected interest is shown to have been impaired to a sufficient degree (which cannot be precisely specified), then "heightened scrutiny"-strict or intermediate-is
applied. The operational effect of this is to impose a seriousoften unsustainable-burden of justification on government to
show why the intrusion or mal-classification is permissible. The
more rigorous the review, the likelier it is that the
rights/interests/equality claimant will prevail. (What is entailed
by "review" and "burdens of justification"-in our biomedical
context, at any rate-will be discussed below. 37 The point of the
later discussion will be indicate why, in many situations, we
will have to reconstruct or reinvent standards of review to accommodate new circumstances.) This stage thus involves much
the same heavy-duty probing required by characterization of
interests, but with a focused concern on countervailing government interests. (To be sure, the characterization stage is likely
to involve or even require looking ahead to justificatory arguments, as we saw.)
The reference in the preceding paragraph to "often unsustainable" burdens of justification requires comment. When the
burden on government to justify, say, regulating the content of
speech-seems impossible to meet, observers often denounce
the use of standards of review as conclusory and misleading.
But this is itself conclusory and misleading. The constitutional
hierarchy of values, as we now know it, places immense value
on freedom to select whatever content we want for speech.
Some restraints on content regulation will in fact never be justified; any circumstances that might justify it are wildly improbable. Imagine, for example, a city ordinance forbidding persons
from commenting favorably in public for a on the writing of
Jane Austen. There is nothing inappropriately conclusory or
otherwise irrational in saying that, for all practical purposes,
such interference with speech content will never, ever be justified within the U.S. constitutional system as we know it now.
This is the result of the value placed on speech, not the un36 Finding

examples of this argument poses particularly difficult interpretive

problems. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional amendment prohibiting all governmental action, at any level, that is meant
to protect
gay persons).
37
See infra text accompanying notes 68-106.
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wanted outcome of a mistakenly conceived standard of review
that imposes impossible burdens on government to justify its
actions. The practical impossibility of finding circumstances
that would justify suppression of praise for Jane Austen is exactly what one would expect in a regime of strong speech protection.
For completeness, I note that, to reach an adjudicatory outcome, there must be at least a minimal hierarchy-i.e., some
ranking that allows for placement of burdens and formulation of
presumptions, in order to specify a default winner.
9 Fifth, the general argument structure [i]-[vii] above (or
parallel structures in other areas of constitutional dispute) 38 is
required for any constitutional litigation. All such disputes require characterization of competing claims; inspection of harms
to various interests, whether of individuals or governmental
units or levels; and the use of some sorting mechanism that explains how to assess the competing claims so that an outcome
can rationally be reached. Standards of review are involved in
any constitutional adjudication, because all require stages of
characterization 39 and all require specification of rules (whether
dubbed "burdens," "presumptions," or anything else) governing
who must show what to accomplish which outcomes.
* Sixth, on the role of biomedical technology and bioethical
problems in investigating standards of review: The point made
earlier is that bioethical disputes may impel (if not force) us to
ask foundational questions about standards of review and their
operational meanings. We will have to become more sophisticated in formulating and using them because they implement
the recognition of rights, interests, powers (and so on) in novel
circumstances, both when private parties contest government
action and when governmental branches and levels move
against each other.
(b) Characterizing standards of review
As we saw, a broad understanding of standards of review
identifies them with the overall argument structure that directs
38 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (referring to separation of powers

and federal/state conflicts).
39 Of course, the point applies to the planks of any argument--"Socrates is a
person"; "fetuses are not persons"; "in forcing women to provide ova, the State of
New Yolk unjustifiably impaired constitutionally protected reproductive autonomy."

2001]

CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

us to search the text for hierarchies in legal relations, to take
them seriously, and to act accordingly by formulating and using
specific standards of review. More simply, the broad sense of
"standard of review" (which comprehends all the narrower
ones), says "sort values and act accordingly." 40 The narrower
sense refers to the "act accordingly" stages of argument. The
phrase "sorting mechanism," used earlier, can designate either
the broader or narrower meaning of "standard of review"-the
"meta-" or "second-order" argument as opposed to its "firstorder" specific assignment of burden stage. In the broader
sense, standards of review direct the very search for rights and
interests and their rankings inter se. In the narrower sense, standards of review are confined to the argument stages [i]-[iv], or
to [iv] alone-the particular assignment of burdens of justification after the rankings are made.4 1 The ambiguity, though inevitable, is not very important. Characterization (and resistance
to particular characterizations) always looks ahead to-and in
this case is driven by-the consequences of sortings that entail
the assignment of (un)desired burdens. The full operation represents a logically (if not temporally or consciously) sequenced
and unified process.
There is a possibility that the broader notion of standards of
review will be conflated with that of constitutional interpretation itself. To deal with this, I suggest it is clearer to say that
constitutional interpretation, whatever drives it, leads to the discovery or recognition of hierarchy, and thus generates both
global and particular standards of review. (And the expectation
of finding hierarchy affects interpretation; there are no easy
roads here.) The phrase "standard of review" can for our purposes safely be taken to designate either [i]-[iv] or just [iv], but
nothing more global, unless otherwise indicated. The prior
stages of constitutional analysis are matters of interpretation at
the threshold-though the interpreters are looking ahead to
identifying and using standards of review.
40 Recall the importance of the reference to the process of grading interests in
defining "standard of review." See supra note 19.
41 To some extent, the problem of separating "stages" of argument depends on

the scope of the propositions we choose as premises. Compare "when faced with a
constitutional conflict you must search for interests of high rank" with "because you
are now faced with a constitutional conflict, to decide it you must begin this search,
and to complete it you must inspect matters of lexical understanding, framers' intent,
audience responses, tradition, history, custom...." It doesn't matter much, for present
purposes, where the "global" standard of review ends and the "specific" one begins.
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So, the argument stages [i]-[vii], taken seriously, 42 are a
loose set of instructions 43 that direct courts (and other constitutional interpreters-mainly legislators and other government
officials or entities)44 to characterize and sort disputes, and then
to impose appropriate presumptions and instructions for overcoming them. The installation of the presumption and the specification of how to overcome it are the principal constituents of a
specific standard of review. As we saw, this is the outcome of
the general directive (the global standard) to find or determine
characterizations of claims, to rank them, and to apply the
ranking.
For example, for a state to force medical treatment on a
competent person arguably impinges on a fundamental or important liberty interest in-things get still fuzzier here-personal security, or bodily integrity, or mental integrity, or "privacy." This cannot constitutionally be sustained unless government shows that impairing the interest is at least a substantial
factor (perhaps a necessary one) in promoting a significant
(perhaps compelling) community interest.45 All the normative
and related empirical difficulties, including foundational questions of constitutional jurisprudence, are theoretically filtered
through this stage, followed by the outcome.
(c) Applying the standards
Standards of review are rules directed primarily but not exclusively at courts.46 They spell out the logically connected
42 "Taken seriously" can be taken as a text-derived meta-instruction, adjuring
us to implement the specified stages. It too is part of the standard of review.
43 It is tempting to invoke the idea of an algorithm here, but algorithms, in the
technical sense, are not simply sets of general instructions for how to perform given
tasks-they are a certain kind of instruction, one that satisfies requirements of rigor
and certainty that legal analysis generally cannot (and is not meant to) match. See
generally DAVID BERLINSKI, THE ADVENT OF THE ALGORITHM: THE IDEA THAT RULES

THE WORLD (2000) (discussing the history of the algorithm and its modem applications).
44 I adhere to a "thin" interpretation of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803), not the Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), version, which seems to assign
excessive authority to the Supreme Court as the sole and final determiner of constitutionality.
45 See infra notes 117-173 and accompanying text (discussing Washington
v.
Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
46 Some may prefer to restrict the term "standards of review" to formal adjudication by courts. It makes sense to do so because courts-trial or appellate---operate under constraints that do not limit legislators or other parties. The reason for con-
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conclusions (a) that constitutional interpretation leads to recognition of hierarchies in claims of rights or interests; and (b) that
the particular locations of interests within a hierarchy dictate
what stance the court (or other reviewer) is to take on given
kinds of claims involving those interests; and (c) that this stance
consists of imposing particular burdens on particular parties
(government and private) to show certain things.
How these showings are to be made will obviously never be
completely specified. However, as the case review below suggests, there will be strong pressures for important incremental
specification of the commands of standards of review, and thus
of their interrelationships and interior structures. What are the
elements of interest-recognition and interest-sorting? What are
we to say about a claimed right to use human embryos for biomedical research or simply to discard them? What counts as a
sound argument for or against such recognition and ranking?
What existing constitutional boxes or spaces are relevant? What
counts as a sound justification for impinging on one interest or
another? What may or must a court look to or investigate to answer these questions? What must it avoid looking to? Is it to
"defer" to factual findings by experts? (What does that meaninstalling presumptions of correctness, or automatically accepting the findings, or what?) Should or must it investigate the
methodologies of studies, or certain aspects of these methodologies? Can or should it institute its own investigation of "legislative facts" and "legislative values"? 47 How do our standards
of review help us to establish value premises (or empirical accounts of what is valued by whom in what ways) in a constitutional argument? This is a particularly urgent matter when the
nature and proper application of the values at stake are contested and their status in the community's norms are uncersidering a broader sense is obvious, however: constitutional analysis by any party,
governmental or private, will be incomplete unless account is taken of constitutional
hierarchies, which are the foundation for standards of review.
47 See generally Karst, supra note 12. Legislative facts, loosely put, concern
factual issues taken into account or relied on by the legislature. "Legislative values,"
for present purposes, are value issues or conclusions taken into account or relied on
by the legislature. See id. at 88 (mentioning the term "legislative values"). I do not
pursue the evidentiary issues concerning expert testimony on legislative or adjudicative facts, beyond asking some general questions. See generally Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 concerning the admission of expert testimony based on scientific techniques and displacing the prior "general acceptance' test).
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tain-as they are likely to be for out-of-the-box disputes?-We
already know that motherhood and apple pie are wonderful, but
what is motherhood when the woman who gives birth to a child
is not the ovum source and
the woman who is the ovum source
48
does not give birth to her?
The question of how to discern and grade constitutionally
protected interests has long been with us, and I have no intention of revisiting the underlying hermeneutic issues beyond the
earlier comments on the axes of interpretation. But the application of these interpretive issues to problems that seem to escape-by large margins-existing constitutional abstractions
involves unusual difficulties. The uncertain relationship between, say, human cloning and the generally acknowledged
(though uncertain) constitutional protection of procreational
rights is another obvious example. 9 Talk of comparison to a
paradigm case of regular, natural, run-of-the-mill reproduction
doesn't get us very far when the very identification of the material features of the paradigm is part of what is contested.5 °
If we move beyond characterization of claims, we immediately encounter the related but distinct question of what counts
as a justification for interfering with what the claimants want to
do or avoid. We of course already know that this justification
stage will involve normative/constitutional questions about how
to deal with both empirical and value (and "mixed") questions.
And we know equally well (despite arguments against "balancing" in various contexts) that we must provide some account of
how, in principle, to view the array of government interests
when pitted (if not "weighed") against those of the claimants.
This argument stage has to be addressed, whether the argu-

48

See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that in a

gestational surrogacy case, California's Uniform Parentage Act should be read to
identify as the child's "natural mother" the woman who intended to procreate it and
raise it as her own).
49 See generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND
THm NEw REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (discussing how technology has
shaped the reproductive enterprise). Although the constitutional status of reproductive rights and its application to human cloning remain unclear, there is no serious
uncertainty about whether the cloned offspring are persons. Some may think otherwise, however. See, e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Ewegenics, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 31,
1997, at 25, 25 (stating that "clones aren't fully human").
50 See Shapiro, supra note 3, 249-54 (discussing the problem of identifying
the "defining" features of a supposed paradigm).
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ment's configuration sets up a balancing or a trumping5 ' of one
interest against another.
All these issues are partially constitutive of the operational
meaning-at least for courts-of using given standards of review. Whoever else engages in constitutional analysis (legislators or executives, for example), courts face their own distinctive tasks because-well-courts are different. At some point,
one must ask what procedures a trial or appellate court must,
may, or should follow in finding legislative and adjudicative
facts, and in making what seem either to be empirical judgments
about community values or "independent" judicial value
judgments. It is this last inquiry into operational meaning that
will occupy most of the rest of this paper.
C. The critique of standards of review-in brief
It seems unlikely that, after being alerted to it, one would
deny the conceptual link between hierarchies of constitutional
value and standards of review. The matter seems simple and
obvious. In fact, many (I do not know the exact proportion)
contemporary constitutional adjudications explicitly invoke one
or more standards of review. (They are of course part of the decision's infrastructure, whether explicitly so or not.) So why is
attention to standards of review so often put down? Perhaps because they seem to promise far more than they deliver-and indeed, they do not deliver the impossible: neatly packaged resolutions to all constitutional disputes. The standards are there and
may help one to "get started" and to continue once on the
road-but it may be a long way toward closure of the argument.
Standards of review-whether viewed as sharply differentiated
or as continuous functions varying along one or more gradients53 --are necessary but not sufficient for closure. Despite the
51In acknowledging the disputes about balancing and other aspects of constitutional adjudication, I do not necessarily endorse all alternative descriptions and
recommendations as plausible. In many cases, critiques of balancing lead to proposed
replacement processes that also involve balancing, rather than categorical trumping.
52 This is a tricky concept. For example, courts might believe (or we might
believe) that they "embody" the community's basic values, whether they consciously
attend to finding them or not. Should we view such judicial decision-making as not
constituting "independent" value analysis because of such "outside" influences? This
doesn't seem an apt description across the board: even though no one receives value
attitudes and beliefs ex nihilo, most of us think that value analysis is often rightly
See infra text preceding and accompanying note 93.
called "independent."
53
See supra text accompanying note 30.
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obvious fact that they take us so far and only so far, they are
sometimes dealt with as if they were full solutions to complex
problems and invoked (deliberately or not) as rhetorical covers
for question-begging.54 They are wrongly assumed to do all the
"work"-but a conclusion drawn in advance is the wrong kind
of work.
But the complaint linking standards of review to questionbegging and "deciding in advance" can be carried much too far.
The key to seeing the overstatement is to ask just how the silent
a priori "decisionmaking in advance" (to be rationalized later
by invoking a standard of review) was done in the first place.
How did a court (or other constitutional analyst) ever come to
the idea that the outcome must be this or that? Again assuming
good faith, a legal professional's schooled intuition incorporates
and is informed by the constitutional hierarchy as she perceives
it, and her decision making process moves in the pre-patterned
grooves defined by the applicable standard of review (whatever
she calls it, assuming she even consciously recognizes that it's
there). It is far too loose to view this process as a suspect form
of stealth adjudication. Characterizations are required at the
threshold and all along the way, and making them under the aegis of standards of review is not rightly viewed as circular;
whatever one calls the process, it is necessary because it is constitutive of constructing a constitutional (or any) argument.

54 For this and other criticisms of the multi-tiered system of standards of review, see Shaman, supra note 17. "Categorical balancing exacerbates the rigidity of
the multi-tier approach by increasing its propensity to predetermine the result of
cases. The a priori labels ascribed to governmental and individual interests tend to
preordain their constitutional fate. Through the categorization of governmental and
individual interests, their evaluation is diffused, and their relative merit is prejudged."
Id. at 175.
I believe that this is an overstatement. For one thing, threshold characterization of claims is not suitably described globally as a priori "labeling" or naming But
there is no doubt that any conceptual system can be misused or abused, and some are
indeed likelier candidates for such malfeasance than others. So it is right to call attention to this, as Professor Shaman does. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 203 (1976) (citation omitted), arguing that "the twotier model has its price. Since it requires the reviewing court to accept or reject the
demand to exercise strict scrutiny, it does not let the court use equal protection precisely to avoid committing itself on the underlying constitutional claims. It denies the
court one tool of ad hoc case-by-case disposition that is always a preferred judicial
option." The idea here seems to be that two-tier scrutiny in equal protection litigation
may cause a court to prejudge a substantive constitutional issue by having to select or
reject strict scrutiny.
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In constitutional adjudication, a standard of review is
rightly viewed as outcome determinative only in the sense that
the standard's embedded assignments of presumptions and burdens of proof or persuasion skew and channel the adjudicatory
process, in many cases "fixing" the outcome. This is the exactly
the sort of thing standards of review are meant to do. When a
serious burden of justification is imposed on government and
government fails to present an argument in defense, it loses; on
the other hand, if a claim is not one that imposes such a serious
burden on government, the claimant is likely to lose. This sort
of decision making process is far from being circular or clumsy.
What critics call "question-begging" may be the intuitive nonarticulated stage of constitutional analysis that is shaped by a
judge's understanding of the hierarchy of constitutional values
and its realization through applying standards of review. Of
course, it would be foolish to deny that some decisionmakers,
possibly (though not necessarily) acting in bad faith, decide
what they want without attention to constitutional values and
then make up a story involving standards of review. Indeed, it
may even be routine-but this is not attributable to the baleful
existence of standards of review.
Nevertheless, the understandable complaints about the obfuscating effects of some uses of standards of review may have
been so taken to heart by some U.S. Supreme Court Justices
55
(Justices Stevens and the second Justice Harlan come to mind)
that they often avoided any mention of standards of review, despite the logical necessity of using them, even if invisibly.
But it is a mistake for anyone, Justices or commentators, to
hide the use of standards of review. Specifying a standard of
review conveys information on constitutional valuation precisely because it announces where the argument-maker locates
the legal relations under analysis within the constitutional hierarchy. Standards of review are thus decision making rules that
implement our prior identification of constitutional values, ap55 See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(Stevens, J.) (holding ordinance that prohibited the posting of political campaign
signs on public property as constitutional); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (Harlan, J.) (holding that the State may not, absent a "more particularized and

compelling reason" than it had presented, make the "simple public display" of a single four-letter expletive a criminal offense). Justice Harlan's use of the term "compelling," however, seems to have signaled his use of strict scrutiny. In minimizing
talk about standards of review, the Justices may have had reasons other than obfuscation in mind, but I pass this by.
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plying-and possibly "reconciling" 56 them-in individual cases
or classes of cases. They are thus clarifying, not obfuscating,
when properly acknowledged and applied in light of their functions and limitations. In this broad sense of "standards of review," they can be viewed (very) roughly as second-order "algorithms" that tell us how to address a constitutional dispute
and ultimately assign a particular (first-order) standard of review for specified sorts of burdens on constitutionally based
legal relations. The broad sense of "standards of review" thus
coalesces into a general instruction on how to start, move, and
finish a piece of constitutional adjudication (or other tasks involving assessments of constitutionality), given a constitutional
hierarchy of values. Depending on how abstractly the global
standard is framed, one might think that there is only one global
standard of review, but this is a matter too slight to deal with
here, except to recall that at truly dizzying levels of abstraction
("take everything material into account and do your best") we
are no longer dealing with standards of review.
This notion of standards of review as the infrastructure of
all arguments that recognize and implement constitutional values may seem too broad to convey any information. This
breadth, however, reflects the two senses of the phrase already
marked out: standards of review as universal, omnipresent rules
about how to construct any particular constitutional argument
using a "specific" standard of review; and standards of review
as one of these specific standards. This leads one to say,
loosely, that using a-or the-global standard of review (the
entire sequence of steps from discerning a constitutional dispute
to the final outcome) is directed toward identifying narrower
standards of review that reflect important constitutional value
rankings and in turn lead one to an outcome.
These latter, more specific standards are supposed to embody at least rough directions on what to look for as possible
bears of strong constitutional value (e.g., "fundamental liberty
interests," "suspect classifications"), and on how to structure
the succeeding analysis-identifying and evaluating countervailing interests, and determining how to evaluate and "accom-

56

1 use "reconciling" as a neutral term to avoid (for now) that idea that val-

ues are not necessarily always "balanced" or "weighed"; it is theoretically possible
that some claims of right trump (or nearly so) all countervailing considerations.
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modate" the constitutional values at stake. 57 All this, taken together, follows from the earlier stage of recognizing hierarchies
of interests in the constitutional text in the first place. And
through all stages, the interpreters/deciders continue to work
with the interpretive axes that previously revealed a constitutional hierarchy. In doing so, they locate what particulars they
have before them within this hierarchy, and press the interpretive paths still further through a series of linked and overlapping
steps, illustrated below in the review of several cases. 58 In these
successive steps, the decision makers are pushed to consider
increasingly complex and detailed fact and value 59 issues about
how the matters before them fit into the constitution's value hierarchy. How, in principle, are they to address claims about the
adjudicative specifics-for example, the exact mechanisms and
effects of particular technological applications, and the appropriate means open to them as decisionmakers to try to
(dis)confirm the various claims. Without these specifics, the
decisionmakers may not be able to rationally accommodate the
values and reach a result. (Whether they may in the process
craft "new" members of the constitutional hierarchy of legal
relations-new fundamental liberty interests, new threats to
equality-is too complex a matter to go into here.)
Unless these elements of constitutional analysis are used
and understood (consciously or otherwise), a decisionmaker's
reasoning might not be channeled in accord with (at least her
view of) the constitutional value hierarchy. Examining an account of her decision, then, would not reveal to the "consumers"
of constitutional adjudication the nature and ranking of claims
about constitutional legal relations-the rights, privileges, immunities, liabilities (etc.) set up among different entities and
parties by the Constitution.
If the hierarchy is not made explicit by an account of its
constitutional ordering-as by specifying the embedded standard of review-we could ultimately identify it on our own by
571 do not push any further the search for instructions on how to craft instructions on how to proceed in constitutional adjudication.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 61-115 (discussing People v. Woody,

394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964), and State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1973), for an illustration of how to describe these steps).
59 As I explain later, "value issue" may refer either to empirical questions
about what people value or to moral valuation as such, as when we view courts (or
certain others) as being required to make "independent" moral decisions. See infra
text preceding note 93.
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reading a body of opinions, if not solely the opinion at hand.
But, rhetorical/political matters aside, there is generally little
point in crafting opinions as puzzles for contestants and onlookers-and other courts-to work out.
So, standards of review (as understood here) are not useless
and misleading anachronisms that generate (or are part of) circular arguments; nor are they optional instruments for us to use
or not use as our tastes dictate. They are there-immanent in
our recognized hierarchies. If writing them into an explicit argument leads a reader to think the question was "begged," so be
it. Their use is nevertheless no more question-begging than is
the use of any sorting device, provided that such devices-presumptions and burdens of justification-are derived from rational interpretive moves that lead to the underlying value hierarchy that calls for these sorters. Formulating initial hypotheses
about proper resolution of a constitutional dispute is not only
not automatically circular, it is necessary if good faith 6° rational
decision making is to proceed at all. What looks like questionmay well be the result of applying interpretive criteria
begging 61
to a text.
Summary: Standards of review, I have argued, are not just
the sports of courts and writers too lazy to do the heavy labor of
constitutional analysis. Indeed, one can't do this labor without
them. They are doctrines (or meta-doctrines) derived from the
Constitution as we have interpreted it-interpretations that
contain rankings of different sorts of interests that persons or
governments and their agencies might claim. For present purposes, I do not ask how this is shown, nor why some hierarchy
is established at all. (What would it mean to deny that there are
constitutional hierarchies?) I take the existence of hierarchy
(though not particular hierarchies that partisans might press) as
given, without reviewing the antecedent interpretive moves or
6o This is still another slippery qualification that I leave aside, except to suggest one obvious counter-example--deciding a constitutional dispute by use of
mechanisms of chance. Then again, when all possible outcomes seem to be in constitutional "equipoise," what's a good faith decisionmaker supposed to do?
61 Of course, argument soon stops: we do not inquire after further foundations
in an infinite regress. If all stopping points represent circular arguments, then all arguments are circular. Those who protest using standards of review and deny that they
are using them in constitutional argumentation or judging are wrong-again, assuming they are proceeding in good faith. These standards embed the ordering of basic
values we have interpreted the Constitution to contain. Still, after all this, we need to
consider just what a standard of review is.
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their justifications. These prior moves, however, go to what the
Constitution's text and structure mean. To canvass fully the
possible lines of interpretation would require several steps: applying the interpretive axes mentioned earlier; relating them to
the standard interpretive canon used by courts and commentators-Framers' intent, history/tradition/custom/practice, lexical
meaning, (independent?) normative analysis, and so on; using
the results to reach conclusions about the what the Constitution
protects and how strongly; and arriving at bottom lines in particular cases.
As I said, all these paths, separately and in various permutations, converge in showing that the Constitution establishes/recognizes rank-orderings of legal relations (although this
does not exclude the possibility of "ties"). But the only matter
probed here, and briefly at that, is to consider what it means for
constitutional theory to say that the Constitution recognizes or
establishes hierarchies of legal relations that must be identified
and reconciled in particular situations. Part of what it means is
that standards of review rule. (Sooner or later, the vernacular
seeps down into academic discourse.)

I1. MORE ON HOW STANDARDS OF REVIEW
EMBED BASIC VALUES: CASES ILLUSTRATING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS OF
BIOETHICAL PROBLEMS.
A. In general
The thin, simple claim here is that resolving constitutional
disputes arising from some uses of biological technologies will
take us to the present limits of our understanding of standards of
review; and that once we reach those limits we may want-or
be driven-to make the standards more responsive to the increased pressures placed upon them. This involves raising
questions that ordinarily need not be pressed in constitutional
adjudication, but that may be harder to avoid as technological
uses expand. Whether the outcome will be a reconstruction or
simply a more detailed specification of the operational content
of standards of review, the questions will sooner or later have to
be put and answered. Although novelty is hardly novel and the
Constitution has faced out-of-the-box problems many times
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over, there is novelty and there is novelty; perhaps some cases
will even escape the out-of-the-box box.
In any case, the more we know about standards of review,
the more we know about the Constitution and the way in which
it embeds basic values (and vice versa-cycling is inescapable
here). But just what is it that biomedical-technology-inspired
problems can tell us about the Constitution that we didn't already know? And what can they tell us that we don't know
about the Constitution that we didn't already know we didn't
know? As we move on to review actual and possible cases,
questions will come up about what courts should or must or
can't do in adjudicating disputes. They may have to determine
whether the applicable standards of review directly answer this,
or at least encompass some range of answers.
A government, for example, may claim a strong interest in
regulating dangerous behavior by inmates of prisons and mental
hospitals, and urge that the most efficient way to do this is to
administer mind-altering drugs that seem to be safe and effective. Would these inmates be on sound ground in claiming to
have a fundamental liberty interest in avoiding such intrusions
into their minds and bodies? Assuming they do, suppose the
government responds that the drugs "work" to promote compelling interests in institutional and public safety, and in rehabilitation and/or restoration of impaired mental functioning, and
that they do so without undue risks to the inmates or anyone
else. How far may or must the court probe in testing claims of
safety and effectiveness? (Leave aside the strongly linked value
premises for now.) Is the court to vet the methodologies of the
studies, from design and data collection and statistical analysis
to findings? If the government simply asserts its views on safety
and effectiveness without offering evidence, is the court to require a showing and rule against the government if it fails to
produce scientific evidence? Or fails to produce enough credible scientific evidence? Or should the court investigate the scientific issues sua sponte? In what ways? Can it do so without
crashing the boundaries of separation of powers in a republic?
To work this out, turn to standards of review as imposed by
the Constitution on courts. This is of course the common understanding of "standards of review." Lawmakers, officials, and
armchair theorists who pursue constitutional analysis will have
to apply these (or some) standards of review in certain wayswhether by thought experiments or empirical or other inquiries.
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But trial and appellate courts are constrained in constitutional
(or any) adjudication to adhere to principled limits on the inquiries and investigations they can mount. Legislators, although
they may recite the same canonical standards of review the
courts use, can and often do conduct inquiries or investigations
of far greater scope and intensity than do courts (though possibly of no greater rigor). On the other hand, courts don't appear
so tightly limited when they "take over" the administration of
prisons or school districts or conduct Very Large Cases-mass
torts, Microsoft's encounter with antitrust laws, and so on. (This
is an observation, not a complaint or endorsement concerning
such judicial ventures.) Such cases (not considered here) are, in
part, illustrations of how some courts implement the standards
of review they adopt-which are probably forms of strict scrutiny- in cases of racial or gender discrimination, or (though the
in those involving cruel and unstandard is not usually named)
62
usual punishment, and so on.
B. Some demanding cases
The task here is to consider how the cases discussed illuminate constitutional adjudication and its embedded standards of
review. In doing this, some of what is said may seem to be directed more to constitutional interpretation generally, rather
than just to the idea of standards of review. This may be, but, as
I have indicated, the standard axes of constitutional interpretation are what take us to the idea of standards of review in both
the generic and specific senses. In U.S. constitutional law as we
know it, there is no gulf between the topics of constitutional
adjudication (on the one hand) and standards of review (on the
other).
63
1. People v. Woody

Two older cases nicely set up or suggest several useful
lines of inquiry into constitutional adjudication. These cases
may at first seem odd choices because the technologies involved
FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528-830
By (Structural) Injunction").
"Government
(2d ed. 1984) (discussing
63 The following discussion is adapted from a parallel account in MICHAEL H.
62 See

generally OWEN M.

SHAPIRO, Roy G. SPECE, JR., REBECCA DRESSER & ELLEN WRIGHT CLAYTON,

BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS Part III (2d ed. forthcoming).
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are far from exotic-but technologies don't have to be exotic to
raise important issues.
First, a word on the current constitutional status of People
v. Woody. 64 Woody used the standard of review governing free
exercise of religion cases at the time-strict scrutiny: the intrusion on the interest was said to be constitutionally justified if
and only if it was necessary to further a compelling interest. But
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,6 5 the Supreme Court ruled that only government action
that purposely targets religious practice will trigger strict scrutiny. If there is no such purpose, then any impingement on religious exercise is an "incidental" burden, and as such does not
trigger heightened scrutiny of any sort, never mind the strictest
form. Whether Woody still stands under California law is unclear. 66 The defendants relied on both the U.S. and California
constitutions, but the exact terms of the opinion focused only on
federal constitutional constraints and do not expressly state
whether the state constitution was an independent, adequate
ground for the decision. It probably wasn't, but the question
needn't be pursued further here.
On to what happened in Woody-at least as described by
the court: A group of Navajo Native Americans were convicted
of violating a state ban on the unauthorized possession of peyote. Despite its ambiguous doctrinal status, Woody remains
interesting because of the judicial techniques used in resolving
the defendant's appeal. Although it does not stand out as a
"biological technology" case, it works for present purposes because it is one. It involves the deliberate ingestion of mindaltering substances to induce (relatively) specific states of mind
(and possibly various associated behaviors) that are intrinsically
and instrumentally valuable, given the religious beliefs of the
users. Some may think this reflects too broad an understanding
of "technology": the mind-altering process is simple (the opinion does not indicate whether the peyote buttons are processed
64 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (requiring California to allow members of the
Native American Church to use peyote in their religious practices).
65 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith II) (stating that it is permissible for a state to

prohibit the religious use of drugs if a public policy exists promoting a valid public
interest).
66 But cf Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,
39 (Ct. App. 1991) (viewing Smith as contrary to Woody, but noting that Woody
invoked the state as well as the U.S. Constitution). This case is not citable pursuant to
California Rules of Court.
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after removal from the cactus plants) and also covers using
drugs for recreation. Not all technologies are recent or complex,
however, and many are often used for entertainment.
The state had stipulated at trial that the defendants and others were performing a religious ceremony of the Native American Church that involved the use of peyote. We might ask, as
students of professional advocacy, why the state so stipulated.
How clear was it that a "religious exercise" was in fact involved, at least on that particular occasion, and on what meaning of "religious"? The ease with which everyone slid over this
hurdle-barely recognized as one-eliminated certain questiontypes that will be critically important in biological technology
cases to come. These questions concern the threshold characterization stage-the critical layer of analysis necessary to determine what sort of right or interest is claimed and what its
constitutional strength is. This is a major question even if we
view ourselves as dealing with "specifically protected" rights
such as free exercise of religion and free speech.
How does this bear on Woody? For one thing, the actions,
events, or circumstances in question might not constitute a religious exercise or speech within the First Amendment's meaning. Of course, the difficulties in distinguishing matters of religion from "other" matters were not just recently discovered. It
is by no means clear, for example, that certain forms of conscientious objection to military service are best described as matters of religion, despite some broad opinions issued by the Supreme Court. 67 Such major conceptual challenges occur in every
branch of constitutional law and indeed wherever abstractions
are in use, which is everywhere. Think of some well-known
characterization challenges in free speech cases: although some
forms of communicative conduct not involving "language" (as
usually defined) have been viewed as forms of First Amendment speech (burning draft cards and flags, for example68), others have not (political assassinations 69), although no coherent
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (finding a broad
understanding of the idea of belief in a "Supreme Being" under § 6j of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, which provides for exempting a draftee from
military service based on his religious beliefs); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970) (also finding a broad meaning for "religious" training and belief).
68 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning).
69 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984),
where the Court assumed arguendo that sleeping in a park might be a form of speech
67
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theory for such (non)characterizations has emerged from the
Court.
In any event, characterization of one's interest may well be
crucial to whether one's claim prevails. Whatever else they may
disagree on, professional observers of constitutional adjudication know quite well that characterizations generating heightened scrutiny will in most cases immediately displace the
starting advantage for the state and replace it with a major advantage for the claimants. But-a point often undervalued-the
burden of persuasion is on the claimants to show that their proffered constitutional characterization is correct. 7 1 The contours

of this burden have never been clearly specified, however. This
is partly because it doesn't always come up: although there are
very troublesome doctrinal areas (e.g., the "non-linguistic conduct as speech" cases, to put it loosely), we generally know
what we are dealing with-religion, speech, abortion, and so on.
But when the issue of burden-to-establish-characterization does

come up, it may really come up-as the first Supreme Court
abortion case illustrated. The contest over whether abortion is a
form of liberty (or, inaptly, privacy) that triggers heightened
scrutiny is a characterization
battle that goes on and is unlikely
72
ever to cease.

within the First Amendment's meaning, but ruled that even under what was in effect
an intermediate form of scrutiny it could nevertheless be prohibited, given the circumstances. Justice Marshall dissented, and in passing stated that political assassinations could be a form of speech, but also that compelling state interests in preserving
life would override the speech claim. Id. at 307-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is
unlikely the Court will ever accept this characterization, even though the bare outcome-political assassinations remain punishable as criminal homicides--concurs
with the result of the refusing to call them forms of speech.
70 The "almost always" qualification is to cover the possibility of nonminimal applications of the rational basis test-rationality "with bite." This standard
is said to fall short of the "intermediate scrutiny" occasioned by semi-suspect classifications. See generally GUNTHER & SULLIvAN, supra note 22, at 646-47. In such
cases, the default presumption of constitutionality of government action seems weakened, but perhaps not displaced by the opposing presumption.
7' See Clark,468 U.S. at 293 n.5 (explaining that it is the claimant's burden to
show that the conduct is protected by the First Amendment). The issues involved may
of course involve questions of fact (as in Clark) or conceptual issues (Seeger and
Welsh (or both).
72 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right
to
abortion is fundamental); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994)
(holding that the liberty interest in abortion cannot be unduly burdened by government).
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* Characterizationand reinforcement of norms. An important point about characterization of constitutional interests may
sometimes get lost, so I mention it here: a characterization
(stage [i] in the loose argument-model above) 73 is chosen partly
for its honorific or pejorative effects. These are perceptual effects and may have consequences for learning and behavior, although such claims are plainly very difficult-possibly impossible-to confirm. 74 One of the (possibly hidden) reasons that

we have an explicit multi-tiered system of standards of review
is precisely to generate such effects, which of course are
strongly audience-dependent. For many, it is offensive to assert
that abortion is a fundamental liberty interest-and for others, it
is offensive to deny it. Sexually-oriented speech may be denounced as "not involving speech, just tawdry sex"--a conceptually odd remark that is partly explained by the reluctance to
apply the honorific appellation "speech" to the offensive communication.
The point to take here is that awareness of the differing impacts of rival characterizations is a major aspect of disputes involving uses of biomedical technology. Consider whether germ
line genetic control deserves to be viewed as constitutionally
protected, at least to some extent, by viewing it as an aspect of
"procreational autonomy" or of some other yet-to-crafted and
similarly honorific category. 75 The characterization is so important that some opponents of germ-line alteration are likely to
assert that such maneuvers "aren't part of true human procreation"-a denial whose structure parallels that of, say, "burning

73

See supra text preceding and accompanying notes 24-25.
74 See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation as Language: Communicating Values by Altering the Contingenciesof Choice, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 681, 685,
687 (1994) (discussing possible learning effects from observing or participating in
social institutions and practices).
75 Although it may seem far afield to cite McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), educational or reinforcing effects were obliquely referred to in
Chief Justice Marshall's analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause of U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. During the earlier part of the opinion, Marshall concluded-without reference to this Clause-that a relatively simple doctrine of implied powers sustained Congress' powers to create a national bank. When confronted
with the obvious question about the Clause's redundancy, he conceded this possibility, but concluded that the Clause helped resolve doubts about the existence of im-

plied powers in favor of recognizing them generally, and in recognizing particular
claims of implied powers. See id. at 420-21. In this light, the Clause is a rhetorical
device meant to embody an interpretive canon.
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76
flags isn't speech," or "Muggles [persons who can't do magic]
aren't really human persons."
These points about characterization are highlighted when
77
Woody is paired with its "companion" case, In re Grady,
which involved a non-Native American who claimed his beliefs
were religious. The California court, noting that there was a
sixteen-year-old female guest sleeping in a bedroom (she was
turned over to juvenile authorities), obviously thought little of
Grady's claim, but nevertheless remanded his case for trial on
the issue of whether his defense reflected a good
faith religious
78
belief and was not a cover for illegal conduct.
There are several questions here that are likely to be repeatedly raised in biological technology cases, and in trying to
answer them, courts will be pressed to fill out their ideas of
standards of review. The Woody characterization involves conceptual analysis that is heavily linked to ideas of tradition and
custom generally, and to the collisions of particular traditions
and customs with other, perhaps more dominant ones in a setting containing a variety of cultures. It may not even be clear
whether there is an overarching tradition, or some metatradition governing matters of inter-tradition tensions. Many of
the practices of the Woody defendants suggest the "closeness"
of their peyote use to more familiar, majoritarian forms of religious practice. There is reference to the Almighty God and to
enabling participants to "experience the Deity., 79 And although
the comparison is a bit (but not completely) off, one thinks of
sacramental ingestion of wine and foodstuffs. One might also
think of other religious groups bent on entering mystical states
of mind. 80 But peyote use also conveys images of partying and
getting high for largely recreational or escape purposes. There is
both a factual dimension (what exactly the peyotists were doing
and why) and a conceptual dimension: can using drugs-rather
than our own internal resources, possibly aided by group activity-be part of "religious practice" or "religious practice within
76 For those out of the loop, see the sequence of children's books beginning
with J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTrER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1997). The text
example is not a quotation.
77 394 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1964).

78 See id. at 729.

79 See id. at 817-18.

8o See generally Walter Houston Clark, Religious Aspects of Psychedelic
Drugs, 56 CAL. L. REv. 86 (1968) (discussing whether drugs create religious experiences and the possible legal issues raised by the use of these drugs).
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the meaning of the First Amendment"? Is the lack of a tradition
protecting the use of powerful psychotropic drugs (at least other
than alcohol) for religious (or other nonmedical) purposes fatal
to any characterization effort not backed by "history," as with
Peyotism? What "sub-traditions" in our heavily fragmented array of traditions might apply? And how-operating under a
rigorous standard of review-are courts supposed to investigate
and determine this? The Woody court presented a brief historical account of Peyotism as practiced by some Native Americans, but seemed simply to accept the defendants' account in
toto without serious examination or expressed reservations.
Perhaps the court sensed that closer inquiry would be offensive
to Peyotists, or to Native Americans, or to religious persons, or
to everyone. But at least some methods of constitutional adjudication must be pursued even at the risk of offending some
members of the audience.
Here, I make a quick forward reference in order to compare
parallel questions: thought and speech may be heavily affected
by ingesting substances to improve our memories or other intellectual functions. Is this form of consumption of drugs the
sort of thing that counts as being intimately connected with
speech, placing it within the coverage of the First Amendment? 81 If it does, does it get strong, middling, or marginal
protection? And from another arena: assuming reproductive
autonomy is a fundamental liberty interest, are the various
forms of surrogate motherhood to be characterized as fully protected by this constitutional category? What about cloning or
germ line alteration?
An important generalization informs this forward look at
biological technologies and constitutional adjudication. Life
processes as we know them are going to be increasingly carved
up and reorganized into other forms. These reorganized processes may involve any physiological functions, including those
bearing on thought, behavior, and physical structure and ap81See Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control:
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237
(1974) (analyzing the coercive use of behavior control technologies and their impact
on fundamental rights). I do not suggest, however, that ingesting psychotropic drugs
is itself speech, although one might designate such ingestion as symbolic of something or other. (One might compare this to, among other things, political campaign
expenditures and contributions.) There is, of course, a logical connection between
speech and mental functioning.
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pearance. The processes and their results may be viewed as
falling far outside the material abstractions we now use as tools
of thinking and feeling. If this is correct, then constitutional
adjudication, and its necessarily included standards of review,
are going to face increasingly complicated pressures, from the
threshold characterization stage to the outcome.
Let us now finish the account of Woody, keeping in mind
both the broad conception of standards of review as secondorder directives instructing us to formulate the specific argument structures we know as standards of review.
First, a reminder: although the formal presentation of particular standards of review contains organized discrete stages of
analysis, these stages are interlocked and hard to separate. For
example, whether we assign the generally complimentary adjective "religious" to certain uses of mind-altering drugs depends heavily on whether we believe that significant interests
are placed at risk by the claimed religious practice. Whether we
become aware of these risks at earlier or later stages of analysis,
we may ultimately decline to award a given characterization if
we come to view the conduct as abhorrent. (Recall the reference
to political assassination as a form of non-linguistic speech.)
To return to the particulars of Woody: the case reminds us
that different religious ceremonies may not be equally important within a given religion. Peyote was said to play "a central
role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American
Church, a religious organization of Indians." 82 The Church,
however, had no formal prerequisites for membership, no membership rolls, and no recorded theology. It was unclear what the
"membership" criteria were, thus making it difficult to know the
extent of the Church's practices. (Figures of 30,000 to 250,000
were mentioned-a range so wide that they seem to be no more
than uneducated guesses that sounded good to the defense and
the court.) The court said that Peyotism began in the 16th century and was well established by the 19th century. Who were
the historians who determined this? How did they conduct their
investigations?

82

People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1964).

2001]

CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

As we saw, the court took the religious-practice characterization as correct, noting the state's stipulation to that effect. 83 It
then predictably invoked the compelling state interest test"strict scrutiny"-because of the then-prevailing view that this
was the standard required by the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause, even though religion-or a particular religion
or religious practice-had not been targeted as such. The court
reviewed peyote's effects, stating:
When taken internally by chewing the buttons or drinking a derivative tea, peyote produces several types of
hallucinations, depending primarily upon the user. In
most subjects it causes extraordinary vision marked by
bright and kaleidoscopic colors, geometric patterns, or
scenes involving humans or animals. In others, it engenders hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or
paranoia. Beyond its hallucinatory effect, peyote renders
for most users a heightened sense of comprehension;84 it
fosters a feeling of friendliness toward other persons.
This level of detail in assessing the effects of technology is
not an everyday matter in constitutional adjudication. Of course,
it arises in other contexts all the time-patent litigation, tort
claims and products liability, antitrust, etc.-and occasionally
pops up in constitutional adjudication. Woody is an example
of a case that provides a court an opportunity to test the meaning of a particular standard of review, but the opportunity is
largely declined or not recognized. Indeed, where the government does not vigorously defend its assertion of compelling interests by relying on specific empirical evidence-perhaps coupled with expert opinion-the court is probably not bound to
look for it on its own, and perhaps it shouldn't. If some opin83

See id. at 815. One might ask why the Attorney General so stipulated if it

was seriously interested in a ruling in its favor. (I am not suggesting that in fact there
was no bona fide religious ceremony.)
84 Id. at 816-17.
85See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (striking down, under
the Equal Protection Clause, a regulatory scheme that prohibited sales of 3.2% beer
to males under 21 but permitted such sales to females between 18 and 21). Justice
Brennan, for the majority, attacked the methodology of the statistical analysis concerning differential arrest rates of male and female juveniles for driving under the
influence of alcohol. Id. at 200-03 & n.14. This differential seemed to be the primary
justification offered for the regulatory scheme.
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ions seem deficient in their handling of what are ultimately empirical as well as value issues, this may be because of thin argumentation by government.
Still, one might argue that the court should have held a
hearing on "legislative facts" 86 that might have been contested.
(Some of them were, in nonrigorous ways.) On the face of it,
there is no way to tell whether the court's description of peyote's effects (they are largely attributable to mescaline) is adequate, and no indication of where to get authoritative confirmation. Moreover, there are no explications of the clinical entities
referred to in describing possible adverse drug effects (schizophrenia-like hallucinations, for example), no probabilities or
even rough likelihoods of specific outcomes mentioned, no reference to the effects of dosage and mode of administration, no
reservations expressed about the claimed effects, and only the
thinnest conclusory mention of even the specific mental and behavioral effects desired for religious purposes.
Still, one might wonder whether the court's recitation was at
least as helpful to the state as it was to the defense. After all,
triggering hallucinations and feelings of friendliness are not
trivial adversities. To the extent that the presentation of peyote's effects worked against the state, how was it to respond?
By searching the literature for more alarming accounts? Calling
expert witnesses? Conducting new studies? (No scientific
sources were cited by either side or by the court, though they
were easy enough to find.) Did the state at least receive adequate notice of the court's conclusions of fact (if that's what
they were)? The court presented no information on the incidence of various effects under various circumstances, and contained no hints of evaluation of the adversity or benignity of
these outcomes. How bad are the schizophrenic-like episodes,
on any understanding of "bad"? Effects can be horrific even if
they don't pose risks to persons and property. What, in general,
should or could the state have done to defend its drug regulations as enforced in these circumstances, given the heavy burden of justification imposed on it? Did the court seem disposed
to listen?
The anemic nature of the government's defense may partly
account for the lack of arguably material information in the
86

See generally Karst, supra note 12, at 75-77 (comparing legislative with

adjudicative facts, and noting that the categories overlap).
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opinion-information a rational person would want before deciding on a legislative policy. But suppose (as is likely in cases
to come), the government defended itself with carefully
wrought arguments urging explicit factual findings based on
credible evidence, and clearly stating what value premises it
applied to the evidence and what value conclusions it drew.
This presents several questions about how the court could have
dealt with the parties' contentions. The first question concerns
the possible need for specific directions within the standard of
review selected concerning both whether and how a court is to
probe into matters of fact and value.
Consider the following inquiries, and whether they should
have been dealt with, under the court's expressly identified
standard of review. What do we know about the effects of certain "doses" of peyote/mescaline and of its varying modes of
administration in religious and nonreligious contexts? What is
the incidence and seriousness of the hallucinatory symptoms of
"schizophrenia,.... dementia praecox, " and paranoia? (The
court's reference to both "schizophrenia" and "dementia praecox" is suspect: the latter term is the old name for schizophrenia, emphasizing its usual onset fairly early in life. Perhaps it
was looking at a very old-even for 1964-text that lacked
pocket parts.) What was the methodology and the publication
date of the court's sources of pharmacological information?
Were any studies called to its attention by counsel? (I haven't
inspected the briefs.) Could the court rightly search the scientific literature on its own? If it didn't, should it have? In vetting
the studies, should the court "strictly scrutinize" (say, in the
manner of peer reviewers for a scientific journal) the overall
designs, structures, and mechanisms of the studies, their statistical soundness, the status of the investigators (experience, conflicts of interest, etc), the inferences drawn from the data collected, and even the exact form of data collection (self-reports
by subjects, effects observable or measurable by monitors,
etc.)? Do the studies indeed specify peyote's effects when it is
consumed in certain ways and amounts? After all, mode of administration or ingestion and local situational variables might
make a big difference in generating both the target effects significant for religious purposes and the unwanted "side" effects.
Perhaps the two sets of effects might overlap when comparing
religions; some religions encourage or require actions that may
harm oneself or others, or at least put one at risk. It may not
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even be entirely clear what outcomes are adverse or benign.
What is the precise role of the court in determining not only
what the likely outcomes are, but whether they are indeed "religiously relevant and important" within the defendants' religion, and whether they are good or bad? If they are bad, how is
this valuation to be applied to the defendant's claims of immunity from state regulation?
These questions are about the court's role in (dis)confirming
claims about legislative facts and values as part of its strict
scrutiny of the state's action. Does strict scrutiny really entail
such judicial depth of analysis? There is an obvious risk that a
court's careful pursuit of whatever truth is out there will usurp
the functions of legislatures and executives, although it is notoriously hard to specify the nature of such misappropriations of
the tasks of other branches of government. And the stricter the
scrutiny, the greater the risk. How strict is strict, and is it consistent with our vision(s) of what courts are supposed to do or
avoid, at least in constitutional adjudication? What degree of
empirical and analytical rigor does the applicable standard of
review demand of the court's review of the claimant's actions
and the state's responses? Of course, whatever degree of rigor is
imposed suggests that the legislature itself should legislate only
after careful investigation and reflection, if it is to protect its
legislative offspring from invalidation. But, for the present, the
subject is courts.
Although it may seem paradoxical, perhaps the high ranking
of the liberty interest at stake cuts against heavy court involvement in some of the contested matters. Given the importance of
Free Exercise rights and their degree of impairment in a given
case, one might wonder whether the less intense the inquiry into
the scientific findings the better. After all, the results of the inquiry may shore up the state's claim of dangers to participants,
bystanders, and the community (or communities) generally. And
if the individual claimants say that peyote indeed does certain
things, and does them pretty safely, can we rightly gainsay
this?87 Asking whether a wafer really becomes part of the body
of Christ, or whether Elijah really comes to visit when the door
is opened during a Passover seder. With fundamental rights or
87

Dealing with similar factual claims may require different frameworks de-

pending on what constitutional stage of adjudication we are in. This topic is too
complex for present consideration.
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liberty interests, there is, by design, a major asymmetry between
the contending claims, with one side strongly favored. That's
what burdens and presumptions are about. Perhaps, then, giving
short shrift to those who burden religious rights might be just
the thing to do: accept the defendants' attacks on the state's
claims and findings unless the state, on its own, presents its
factual and evaluative premises, and when it does, to view them
askance. Otherwise, the court's independent search for significant contending societal interests may seem to attenuate and
disrespect the perceived strength of the claimant's interest, and
possibly the state's.
In any case, if the government does produce data and inferences it believes are sound, then-to vindicate the interests of
both sides-strict scrutiny requires some serious judicial inquiry into the quality of the government's argument, and in
particular, to the verification of its claims. A court cannot
rightly push aside the state's efforts to defend itself, and sotaking the call of the standard of review seriously-a claim of
compelling interests compels the court's attention. Alert state's
attorneys, knowing of the strictness of strict scrutiny, might
provide whatever studies aid their case. In these circumstances,
the court cannot properly avoid questions posed about the nature of its scrutiny of the legislature's work product. After all,
the claimed rights are presumptive or defeasible-precisely how
this is put does not matter here. 88 Simply to assume a bottomline right is pure circularity: we can only find the bottom-line
right-"defendants, all things considered, have successfully resisted the effort to overturn the rights-presumption favoring
them, so they have the right they claim"-at the end of the day.
But however lofty the rank of a constitutional right, no
standard of review properly imposes a truly automatic loss on
government, even though government may, overall, rarely win
the battles fought within the strictest standards. As we saw, this
is exactly what one would expect with highly protected rights:
the relative rarity of state victories in cases where characterizations as fundamental rights or interests have been accepted does
not by itself show we are afflicted by an epidemic of questionbegging.

88

See generally RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-94 (1978)

(discussing types of rights).
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* A note on all-or-nothingsystems. I stop here for an

important clarification of what was just said. One thinks here of
the well-known, confusing, and perhaps ill-named issue of
"categorization versus balancing. ' 89 In form, an argument
structure relying on categorization seems superficially to be
pretty simple: "X-ing (designating the main category in use) is
not constitutionally (and specially) protected under the Zth
Amendment; Y-ing, which is what we have before, us, is a form
of X-ing; so Y-ing is not protected in any way under the Zth
Amendment." Assuming the first premise is correct, evaluating
the argument's soundness requires us only to decide whether Ying (say, distributing a certain publication) is a form of X-ing
(say, distributing obscene material). If it is, then Y-ing is, from
the start, not protected by the Zth Amendment-period. The
state can regulate or ban Y-ing merely by satisfying the minimal
(and dominant version of) the rational basis test. The restriction
is not "presumed" to be unconstitutional under the Zth Amendment, and (in theory) no argument that the presumption is overcome by the need to promote significant interests is necessary
or even material. (We note the qualification that the very difficulties in determining membership in the unprotected category
may drive us to consider such interests.) Either it's in the unprotected category or it's out-no ifs/ands/buts, no qualifications at all. Sounds absolute. Where is the Zth Amendment's
standard of review? Where is this directive on placing burdens
of justification? There's nothing to burden or justify and there's
nothing else to think about (beyond the default minimal scrutiny
standard). (While we're at it, think of other examples, which
89 See generally Kathleen

M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of

Categorizationand Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.293 (1992). I suggest the possibility that the issue is ill-named only because it seems to suggest that the use of categories-i.e., abstractions of certain sorts-is avoided by resort to "balancing." Of
course, no such avoidance is possible. We often develop argument structures that
involve different abstractions doing different kinds of work, although the distinct
possibility remains that many (or all) of the adjudicatory outcomes will be the same,
whichever conceptual systems are chosen. This possibility of outcome-invariance,
however, does not entail that it does not matter which conceptual system is used. For
one thing, outcome invariance may not hold across the board because of differences
in the way decisionmakers use the one or the other argument structure. For another,
different forms of argument may seem to embody sound or unsound moral premises.
In turn, the argument structures may have different rhetorical and educational effects,
and this may affect outcomes in the long run. There is much more to be said about
choice of conceptual systems, both within and outside of the law, but not here. See
generally Shapiro, supra note 15.
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appear explicitly in the Constitution: the Equal Protection
Clause is unqualified-the state can't deny it (not "nor shall any
State... deny to any person... the equal protection of the laws
without due process");90 so also the ban on cruel and
91 unusual
ban.
categorical
a
just
presumptions,
punishment-no
This is, of course, old stuff. There is-there must be a standard of review in place, directing traffic, after fashion, although
it is not articulated. The "global" standard of review in the category Z example provides that, given the outcome of the categorization stage (Y-ing is in the excluded category Z), no specially
protective specific standard of review is to be installed. Reformulating the dispute into an exclusively is-it-in-or-is-it-out
question doesn't really remove-though it may alter-the underlying infrastructure, and possibly the outcome. The
reformulation packs the later argument stages [ii]-[vi] into stage
[il-the characterization stage-and immediately moves to
[vii], the final outcome (assuming minimal scrutiny is operationally zero). Stage [i] remains a characterization premise that
sorts claims into presumptively invalid or presumptively invalid
bins, but it now (if not before) includes (implicitly) the arguments about the constitutional value of the rights said to be infringed and of the state's countervailing interests. Although the
categorization as initially set up might be thought to make later
argument structures simpler (pure in-or-out questions), it
doesn't generally work that way: the obvious definitional difficulties require decisionmakers to revisit the original issues
about whether and how to construct an excluded category.
More, because the case is presented at the threshold as a possible case for strong individual interests-say, First Amendment
protection-the constitutional hierarchy already developed by
earlier interpretations might arguably dictate a skewed risk of
error: when in doubt, place the claim in the protected rather than
the unprotected categories of conduct. (I am not claiming that
this is straightforwardly the present doctrine; at most, one might
suggest a much thinner point-that after the rights-claimants
have tried to satisfy their threshold burden but the issue remains
in equipoise, doubts should be resolved their favor. But this
may not reflect current doctrine either.)

90 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (deliberately altered for purposes of argu-

ment).

91See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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So, such characterization issues often import considerations
of the sort involved in "balancing" cases. Whether given materials are in or out of the protected/excluded speech categories
depends on complex similarities and dissimilarities between the
communications at hand and protected forms of communication.
And this comparison is likely to draw on ideas about the benefits and harms of communications of various sorts. Assuming
we have figured out just why we would want a system of categorization of this form (that general moral issue itself must be
worked out within the constitutional hierarchy of values, including government powers in various domains), the individual
in-or-out cases are decided in accordance with a hierarchydictated definition of the key category. Put otherwise, this reflects an to construct a category set that is, overall, meant to
implement a preference for speech while simultaneously according serious consideration to state interests that may be adversely affected by certain communications. (Some writers refer
to this as "definitional balancing.") 9 2 Collapsing the outcome of
conflicting considerations into a bottom-line category ("this is,
all things considered, obscene") cannot avoid a review of these
conflicts when they reappear in the form of the basic categorization question: is this (distributing the publication) indeed a
case of unprotected that (distributing obscene material).
Nevertheless, the result of this collapsing of premises is that
both the speech-protective and society-protective considerations
are generally obscured within the characterization ("definitional") stage; the only visible "official" standard of review (if
93
articulated at all) is the minimal rational basis test.
In general, then, suppressing a protective standard of review
via a "categorization" maneuver doesn't send the standard or
its workings down a black hole. Although the point is arguable,
there may be no net gain or loss of "correct" outcomes in
choosing one conceptual system (say, categories, as in obscenity law) over an alternative scheme (say, more global categories
92 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 2.02-.03

(1984) (discussing ad hoc versus definitional balancing by the Supreme Court).
93The Court was somewhat more explicit in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973). Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion reviewed various state
interests, but expressly stated that the Court was not "to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional case where that legislation
plainly impinges on rights protected by the Constitution itself." Id. at 60. The Court
also ruled that governments could-as they often have-act on "unprovable assumptions."Id. at 6 1.
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that presumptively protect "all" speech via a standard of review
that invites comparison of interests). One might guess, however,
that masking the testing, weighing, comparing, and balancing
brought out in some conceptual systems is unlikely to improve
constitutional adjudication (assuming we have at least some
agreed-to criteria for "improvement").
To return more directly to the operational meaning of standards of review, and in particular the questions that courts, under a given standard of review, must put to government: Don't
say without qualification that these inquiries into the quality of
scientific fact gathering and reasoning are for the legislature.
They are obviously for the legislature in the first instance: they
are part of what legislatures do (or are supposed to do) under
any plausible politico-philosophical theory. But if "strict scrutiny" and the determination of "compelling interests" mean
anything, they mean that the court has to investigate whether
the state's defense of its action fails or succeeds. The court is
hampered in doing that, however, when all it "knows" are the
contents of a government's terse, conclusory, unsupported account-an account, as in Woody, that doesn't even have its concepts and terminology straight. Unless strict scrutiny means
"the individual rights claim always wins"-which it doesn't
even if it sometimes looks that way-this way of proceeding is
indefensible from a constitutional perspective.
In theory, then, the expected direct effects of peyote are
crucial both to defendants' case and the state's case. (But recall
that the prime concern for defendants in assessing direct
physiological impacts would seem to be "safety"; religious
value is probably ascribable, in theory, to a vast range of a
drug's mentational, physical, and behavioral effects.) Moreover,
even if the facts are well understood, they require evaluation,
not just recitation. This point is strikingly illustrated by the fact
that the parties on both sides could in theory have cited some of
the same effects in making out their respective cases: producing
an hallucinatory state might be viewed as a serious danger justifying prohibition-but that very state might also be identified as
a (or even the) main reason for using the peyote in the first
place. 94 As for risks of outcomes conceded on both sides to be
harms, the issue is whether such dangers justify the state's prohibition. How likely and grave are they? Are they the sorts of
94 See People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1964).
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risks that, serious as they may be, must be borne in the interest
of religious freedom? Is religious freedom really sufficient to
outweigh the baleful risks of producing "feelings of friendliness"? Here, describing the standard of review seems to require
identifying procedures in formulating and confirming value
premises, either as such or as empirical claims about community
values.
Consider next another critical stage of analysis, whether
from the perspective of the rights-claimants, the state, or the
court. Suppose (very heroically) that all sides concur on the
soundness of a list of pharmacological effects one might reasonably expect, and on their likelihoods under the given circumstances. The question now is: so what? The list raises two
broad and overlapping families of still more questions, some
empirical, some evaluative, some melding both kinds. Suppose
there is an ascertainable risk-say, one percent per ceremony,
that someone will undergo a psychotic episode that all agree
will be extremely disturbing (at least 9.8 on a scale of 10) to the
subject, and very frightening to the group. (Readers here can
specify their own preferred hallucinatory content-say, an Indiana-Jones-like snake/roach/rat phobia.) The episode may have
lasting effects, creating a new probability of, say, 10% for any
given subject that another episode of similar gravity will occur
in any given year from then on. Such episodes may last for seconds or days or weeks, and are in many respects inconsistent
with the subject's being able to function-from performing
complex tasks in planning trips to Mars to simple maneuvers in
scanning groceries at a check-out stand. In some cases, the effects may never fully dissipate. How bad is this? Is it bad
enough to warrant prohibiting the religious practice? That depends on the constitutional value of freedom of religious practice generally and of the particular practice in question, and of
the value losses arising from jeopardizing their pursuit.
Constitutional analysis doesn't quite "run out" here, but we
are in some trouble. On the face of it, asking how bad is bad is
an evaluative question, though "evaluative" is hugely ambiguous. There is no clear consensus on how this evaluation is to be
done-despite the foundational status of the question, which
goes to the heart of what we think courts are meant to do or
avoid. Every reasonably alert law student encounters these doctrinal black holes early on: Take your pick: * "Judges are to
make moral judgments 'on their own'." * "No-they are to de-
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fer to the valuations of the communities in which the judges are
embedded by empirically investigating what the community's
norms dictate about the worth of religious practice generally
and about the beneficial and harmful effects of a given religious
practice, and accepting these judgments; or, failing that, courts
must consider what the community would conclude if it were
adequately informed and had reflected on the issue." + "Well,
maybe, but judges don't have to take a poll or call anthropologists or moral seers to the bench because judges themselves are
the community's proxies." But proxies to do what? To discern
the community's views and speak for them via those particular
views? Or to craft independent moral judgments 95 because this
is a task that our basic law delegates to them? Or perhaps there
is no way to sort these elements out. Making a moral judgment
"on one's own" is not really acting entirely on one's own. On
the contrary, we are all products of our culture and what we decide reflects the culture's norms, which have been wired into us
over time.
Perhaps-quite likely-the relevant community norms are
hard to identify and use, and they themselves "run out": they
often are not specific or precise enough to yield the value
premises needed to complete a constitutional argument. A
striking illustration of this is the very quandary under discussion
concerning the functions of courts. There seems to be no coherent community consensus on what courts are to do when they
face normative uncertainties, including those concerning how
factual uncertainties are to be dealt with.
To be sure, one might moot. the issue by urging that, even
under the strictest of scrutinies, assessing the legislature's value
judgments is not a proper judicial task, whether one views the
legislature as being empowered to make "its own" moral judgment-while courts are not-or as being required to "mirror"
community sentiments, or as some complex melding of both.
On the former view, courts should not displace the legislature's
function of making moral judgments; and on the latter, they
should not displace the legislature's views on what their constituents' valuations are (or would be if consulted)-courts are
not to conduct independent judicial inquiries into community
attitudes and beliefs. Under no circumstances, it is argued,
should a court apply "its own" moral faculties to the task.
95 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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But shouldn't courts, acting under a rigorous standard of review, be able to raise objections of some sort to a state's norms,
or to the accuracy of the legislature's determination of what
they are or of how they are to be applied, or to the legislature's
independent moral judgments? Why should courts be restricted
to questioning factual determinations (if they can even do
that)-assuming they could even compartmentalize the issues
this way? If anything, this scheme is backwards: courts
shouldn't second guess empirical determinations, but are better
able to do "value analysis"-or are they? Much depends on
what value analysis is to consist of for courts, as we saw in the
preceding paragraph.
To further illustrate the problem of judicial valuing, consider again some of the adjudicative facts in Woody. The religious "meeting" was said by the court to be the "cornerstone" of
Peyotism (yet another fact that can cut two ways-great benefit,
great risk), and involved sacramental use of'the drug.
A meeting connotes a solemn and special occasion.
Whole families attend together, although children and
young women participate only by their presence ...
The central event, of course, consists of the use of peyote in quantities sufficient to produce an hallucinatory
state. 96 (At a particular stage of the meeting, peyote
"buttons" are passed around and chewed.) At sunrise on
Sunday the ritual ends; after a brief outdoor prayer, the
host and his family serve breakfast. Then the members
depart. By morning the effects 97of the peyote disappear;
the users suffer no aftereffects.
How did the court (or anyone) know there were no aftereffects? Many drugs have cumulative impacts over time. Does
peyote? Is there a risk of addiction or habituation? Or is that not
a "risk" as opposed to a desirable possibility, given the religious
importance of continued peyote use? Isn't religious use protected and desired, even (or all the more so) if driven partly by
addiction? For a given religion, being addicted to religious
practice may be a rightly sought-after condition. If the risk of
objectionable drug addiction is indeed material, however, how

Woody, 394 P.2d at 817.
97 id.
96
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big and bad is this risk? Does the risk overcome the presumption of constitutional immunity for the practice?
Still more layers of inquiry now open up in testing the constitutional propriety of restricting this simple peyote technology. What is addiction (or habituation, or dependence, etc.)?
What are its global effects on a person, on non-religious functioning as well as religious exercise? Does continued use of peyote in religious practice risk impairing the efforts of law enforcement to control non-religious use of peyote, or most uses
of other hallucinogens, or of narcotics, mood elevators, and so
on?
After this run of questions, it's time to clarify and illustrate
why we put them at all. What drives their formulation? Where
do they belong in the abstract sequence of steps involving the
specification and application of a standard of review? 9 8 Assume
that we have already derived and worked with the relevant constitutional hierarchy and have installed a heavy burden of justification on the state (stages [i]-[iv]). 99 We are now pressed to
identify government interests (stage [v])-or at least the ones
touted by the state when enacting the laws-and to rate not only
these interests but the power of the state to pursue them in certain ways. Then we apply the particular standard of review
(stages [iv]-[vii]).
To stress a point made earlier, however, no existing standard of review as currently expressed dictates an answer to our
question: Should a court be asking any of these questions about
evaluative and empirical premises at all, and if so, how is the
court to go about answering them? This question about putting
questions is not likely to go away, and there is no obvious crisp
answer to it. There is, however, an obvious non-crisp answer:
The set of questions for courts that a particular standard of review should be taken to generate depends entirely on the perceived value of the constitutional and governmental interests at
stake-say, an individual claimant relying on a "mental integrity" liberty interest, or a government relying on its constitu98 As asked earlier, if the government hasn't raised such questions after the
claimants have successfully invoked a fundamental liberty interest or (semi-)suspect
classification, it is contested whether the court must, may, or shouldn't raise them on
its own. The court may thus not have to worry over where any of these questions
"goes" in an argument structure. In any event, the response to this issue may itself be
dictated by the standard of review and its underlying hierarchy.
99 See supra text preceding notes 24-25.
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tional power to protect the public and to assist the miscreants
themselves by protecting them from harm. The more seriously
both sides are taken, the more material are the detailed questions about what was studied pursuant to what methodologies
with what results. But if a particular standard of review embodying heightened scrutiny does not require a court to address
significant empirical and value questions when they arise, it is
hard to see what is heightened about the court's scrutiny.
To revisit the opinion's text and continue our scrutiny of its
scrutiny: the Court in some passages couples its "findings" on
peyote's effects with a determination of what in fact happens at
meetings, but the link is not very precise; all we have are bland,
favorable characterizations that evidence the court's strong orientation toward protecting the religious claimants. As we saw,
the court did not ask questions about the incidence of hallucination, and said very little about the likely contents and probable
effects (short- to long-run) of the hallucinatory states on the
subject, the persons in the immediate vicinity, the subject's
family, or on the various communities of which she was a
member. It did not ask about the incidence of schizophrenia/paranoia, or its degrees of seriousness. It did not adjudge the
risks of peyote ingestion in light of the possibility of intra-group
pressure or undue influence-or is this a forbidden inquiry in
Free Exercise cases? After all, religious exercise is a specially
protected constitutional interest, and one must recognize that
many, perhaps most, religions necessarily impose (often coercive) pressure to conform to religious doctrine. If one buys into
a particular religion, one is likely to be obliged to do or refrain
from doing certain things, whether they want to or not. (Some
might even question whether a completely non-coercive system
can even be a "religion.")
The court did go into some detail about the theology of
Peyotism-a presentation meant to shore up the religious value
of the peyote rituals, and thus to illustrate the constitutional
value of the religious practice. It explained the religious significance of peyote use:
Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar
to bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is
more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an
object of worship; prayers are directed to it much as
prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the other
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hand, to use peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious. Members of the church regard peyote also as a
"teacher" because it induces a feeling of brotherhood
with other members; indeed, it enables the participant to
experience the
Deity. Finally, devotees treat peyote as a
,'protector." 1°
So, the Court concluded that peyote use "plays a central role in
the ceremony and practice of the Native American
Church....
The statutory prohibition thus "remove[s] the
theological heart of Peyotism." 10 2 The court then addressed the
compellingness of the state's interests in justifying the abridgement of defendants' First Amendment interests. The court rejected, virtually out of hand, all the state's arguments. (I have
interlineated some italicized comments in the following passage.)
The evidence indicates that the Indians do not in fact
employ peyote in place of proper medical care; and, as
the Attorney General with fair objectivity admits, "there
was no evidence to suggest that Indians who use peyote
are more liable to become addicted to other narcotics
than non-peyote-using Indians." Nor does the record
substantiate the state's fear of the "indoctrination of
small children"; it shows that Indian children never, and
Indian teenagers rarely, use peyote. Finally, as the Attorney General likewise admits, the opinion of scientists
and other experts is "that peyote... works no permanent
deleterious injury to the Indian. . . ." [This doesn't answer the charge that the court didn't particularize its
generalfindings about peyote's effects-which includes
determining what happened at specific meetings.] Indeed, as we have noted, these experts regard the moral
standards of members of the Native American Church as
higher than those of Indians outside the church. [What
are these experts expert at? How do they identify
"moral standards," or measure compliance with them,
or determine which groups rank higher in the moral
standardspantheon than others?]
'oo Woody, 394 P.2d at 817-18.
l1 Id. at 817.
i02 Id. at 818.
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The Attorney General also argues that since "peyote
could be regarded as a symbol, one that obstructs enlightenment and shackles the Indian to primitive conditions" the responsibility rests with the state to eliminate
its use. We know of no doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order to free
them from the suppositious "shackles" of their "unenlightened" and "primitive condition." 10 3 [Note here the
importance of the Free Exercise characterization.
Secular drug use intended to enhance or otherwise alter
mental functions for non-religious and non-medical
purposes gets near- zero protection (under the minimal
rational basis test) when the enhancement mechanisms
are "street drugs" or other restrictedsubstances. There
is no fundamental secular interest in "freedom of mind"
that does the threshold work of the fundamental interest
in Free Exercise of religion.]
The court also expressly rejected the state's argument based on
the risk of fraudulent claims of religious use, a risk jeopardizing
enforcement of drug laws generally. 104
To loop back to our overarching topic, standards of review:
Woody might be invoked as a classic example of the futility and
vacuity of "standards of review." Let's be done with this sort of
superficial nonsense about standards of review. The invocation
of the compelling interest standard in Woody was simply an
empty or even fraudulent gesture of pretended objectivity. The
court wasn't about to allow the state to stop the Navajos from
practicing their religion; Native Americans had been pounded
enough and were not to be made yet again to exit their faith.
(Compare, to his disadvantage, Mr. Grady's situation.)
But this won't do either; we cannot be done with standards
of review even if one thinks (as I do) that the prosecution's case
here was a particularly obtuse application of the generally obtuse idea of broad criminalization of the use of mind-altering
drugs. The problem lies in how well or ill we think certain
things through, whatever label we pin on the process. True,
standards of reviews are both an effect and cause of how we
think about certain matters; such back-and-forth cycling is in103Id.
104

See id. (explaining why the Prosecutor's contentions were unfounded).
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evitable. But the standards are not the culprits responsible for
inadequate judicial decision making-indeed, taking them seriously may be the best way to improve constitutional adjudication. The requirements for rational legal argument formation in
any arena of law are not optional, to be discarded when we feel
like doing so. Deleting references to standards of review will
simply require us to re-describe what we are doing, or to be
even more silent about the interior structure of our thought. The
fact that a set of instructions-such as a standard of review-is
mishandled or used dishonestly doesn't, alone, establish that the
instructions are infirm. (To be sure, they might be, and to the
extent that they are poorly formulated, they invite "mishandling.")
The point of reviewing Woody, then, was to illustrate how a
relatively modest technology that plays a central role in a constitutional case might (and should) move a court to raise critical
questions to about what furthers or impairs our constitutional
hierarchy of values. There are pressing questions about what is
operationally entailed by a standard of review-about what
must count as a material issue of fact or value and about the exact ways in which courts may or must resolve them.
Whether any of the particular questions a court might view
as material can rightly be avoided can't be answered broadly.
Questions of this sort escaped scrutiny in most prior constitutional adjudications not simply because of judicial perceptions
about separation of legislative and judicial powers, but (perhaps) because these issues were not as vividly and urgently presented to us. Think, for example, of Whalen v. Roe, 1° where, in
a superficial opinion, the Court seemed grudgingly to recognize M6 a patient's privacy interest in keeping sensitive information about the use of certain drugs confidential. But it saw no
significant risks of breaching this confidentiality, and so ruled
that there was no intrusion on any fundamental right of information privacy, thus avoiding the need for (further?) heightened
scrutiny. One might say that the Court's view of data security
105 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
106 See

id. at 603-06. The opinion is a bit cryptic on this. One might argue that

the Court assumed an informational privacy right arguendo. One might also say that
because the Court, via Mr. Justice Stevens' majority opinion, seemed to rule that
even conceding an informational privacy interest, it was not threatened in that case,
there was therefore no holding on the constitutional status of informational privacy.
See id.
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seems remarkable only in hindsight, and that the Court did no
wrong; nevertheless, the question of security of databanks was
far from unknown in 1977.107
Still, the Court had to look fairly carefully at the contested
factual issues: the decision not to apply heightened scrutiny required, in a sense, some heightened scrutiny. Once again, the
stages of argument are interlinked; earlier stages look ahead to
later stages, and the latter look back in turn to what came before.
But putting the questions generated by a standard of review
is one thing; answering them is another. Many of the questions
seem terminally puzzling, and things will only get worse: as I
argued, we are dealing with ways of sharply rearranging important life processes involving mental functioning and behavior, reproduction, genetics, and lifesaving and life-prolongation,
and these rearrangements often do not "track" how we think and
feel (at least now) in any simple ways. °8
10 9

2. State v. Whittingham

This is another peyote case. It raises some of the specific
questions not considered by the Woody court, and so illustrates
further some of the issues just raised about what courts are supposed to be doing under the auspices of particular standards of
review. The appellants were convicted of possession of peyote.
They said they had used it in the course of their marriage ceremony, and that the marriage was a true Native American Church
religious observance. The trial court ruled that the ceremony
was religious, but nevertheless found defendants guilty. The
appellate court reversed, focusing on the state's evidence concerning the effects of peyote. A pharmacologist had testified
during the trial, expressing opinions based on unpublished research on dogs and monkeys performed sixteen years earlier.
(Whether it was his own research is not clear.) Many of the
dogs apparently had convulsed and died. The expert testified
that dogs could tolerate peyote doses about 100 times greater

107 See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE
SOCIErY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972).
108 I discuss this feature of various biomedical technologies elsewhere; see,

for example, Shapiro, supra note 15, at 333.
504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
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than humans-but no humans were involved in the research.
The court stated:
The record . . . is devoid of any evidence of death or

convulsions in humans. This is not to say that DrSeevers' testimony was incorrect or could not ultimately
be proved to be correct with reference to the effects of
peyote on humans. In essence, the testimony does substantiate the State's contention that the excessive use of
peyote might be attended by certain ill effects or damage to humans. However, we take judicial notice of the
fact that many products are marketed universally and
yet if ingested in unusually large amounts can be harmful, to wit, aspirin and alcohol.F °
The court then noted that the evidence showed peyote was11not a
narcotic, and that peyote use would not result in addiction.
The court, as in Woody, required a showing of a compelling
interest in regulating the religious practice. It accepted at least
part of the factual testimony of the expert-that in some cases
dogs died from administration of large doses of peyote-but
rejected the state's apparent inference that humans might be at
similar risk. The court's rejection of that inference seemed to
have flowed from its understanding of what constitutes sound
scientific reasoning. (It is thus akin to what the U.S. Supreme
Court did in Craig v. Boren in questioning inferences about differential arrest records for school-age males and females for
possessing low-alcohol beer. 112)
Did the court go too far? Probably not: the state after all,
had raised the danger argument and tried to support it by expert
testimony. The court simply pointed out that, given the flaws in
the state's inferences from the data generated in the study, it
had simply failed to satisfy the heavy burden of justification it
bore, given the impairment of the claimant's free exercise right.
Pointing to the obvious gaps between dog data and people data
is far from a case of intrusive displacement of legislative judg"0 Id. at 953.
1 See id.
112 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202-03 & nn.12-14 (1976). See infra
text accompanying and following notes 112-13. Craig's outcome might also in theory
be understood to accept the inferred findings as scientifically sound but to reject on
value grounds the danger supposedly established by the state. However, Justice
Brennan's opinion did not expressly take this form. See Craig,429 U.S. at 191-210.
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ment, particularly when the result bears on a strongly protected
individual interest.
On the other hand, that very comparison between dogs and
humans bears further scientific investigation-an investigation
the court surely did not have to undertake here. The state failed
to identify situations in which what happens to dogs strongly
resembles what happens to humans under specified circumstances. (That human and dog reactions to similar stimuli or insuits vary I take as common knowledge.) Perhaps if the state
had introduced such evidence, it would have satisfied its burden. Would the court have been on sound ground in calling for
further argument and demanding that the state show that these
other situations were relevantly similar to the case at hand? If
the state had introduced human/dog comparisons suggesting a
nontrivial risk to humans, would the burden have shifted back
to the claimants to show otherwise? Even if the dogs-to-humans
argument were accepted, shouldn't the state also have to establish the value premise that the now-demonstrated risk to humans
was enough to justify the free exercise intrusion?
Yet another issue concerns the "raw data" itself. Would it
have been proper for the court to inquire into the manner of its
collection and recording? How did the investigator assure that
the dogs died because of the ingestion of peyote rather than
from some other cause? Were any of the dogs unduly vulnerable-say, because of preexisting disorders? What dog breeds
were involved? The opinion offers no guidance here. (Big difference between a mastiff and a dachshund.) Were there control
groups of dogs not receiving peyote? How were dosages (which
were very large) decided upon and controlled? Some of the
proffered "information" about dog deaths may itself be the
product of questionable action, observations and inferences.
How many of the convulsions preceding (causing?) death were
observed, rather than inferred, and if the latter, on what evidence?
Suppose the court had instead accepted the claim that,
given the dog data, there was a calculable risk of harm of specified sorts to humans-perhaps even convulsions followed by
death if the victim is not treated. Would it be open to the court
to conclude that the (assumed) established risk-say, one in
10,000-was "too low" to amount to a compelling interest?
How about one in 1,000? As asked earlier, is questioning the
state's value conclusions inappropriate, even within heightened
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scrutiny? How would a court make this value assessment? (For
that matter, how does a legislature do it?) By inquiring into
community values concerning the risks that individuals should
be able to take for religion's sake? How would the inquiry be
conducted? By making its own self-determined value judgment?
Any of these paths to filling in value premises requires comparing the risks to individuals against the value of the religious
practice to them-and the value to the community in upholding
the right of individuals (and groups) to pursue religious values
generally. Reaching value conclusions also requires that the
speculative risks to the community's social and moral fabric
must also be counted. These are formidable missions, and courts
might well shrink from them and say that the most plausible
judicial option is full deference to legislative value judgments.
Of course, even the clearest determinations or estimates of
serious risk can be overridden in constitutional adjudication by
the force of countervailing constitutional values. Indeed, if this
were not so, the whole idea of specially protected interests
would be vacuous. Think again of Craig v. Boren,1 13 where the
Court rejected a statutory restriction disallowing access by
young males to "3.2% beer" when similar-age females were allowed access. The state had introduced statistical data purporting to show a greater number of arrests of young males for
drunk driving than for females within the same age range. The
Court questioned both the methodology of securing the data (arresting many males while not arresting similarly afflicted females-although how this itself was known by Justice Brennan
is unclear)-and the soundness of the inferences based on them.
It also said, to undercut the state's defense, that "proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the normative
philosophy
114
that underlies the Equal Protection Clause."
This is something of an overstatement (to understate the
matter); it depends on what is sought to be shown and how.
Still, it reflects the requirement that findings must generally be
individuated to particular claimants. It thus isn't quite like saying: "Don't bother me with the facts." It may instead be a call
113 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This is of course not a biomedical technology case
(although it does involve the primitive technology of imbibing alcohol to induce preferred states of mind), but I never said that the sorts of issues that will regularly arise
in that domain never come up outside it.
14Id.

at 204.
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for more finely calibrated facts. In any event, there is a serious
open question remaining: if the facts about the probability of
some described outcome were indeed taken as established
through sound scientific methodologies, what would the Court's
tasks have been and how would and should they have been pursued? If young males were rigorously shown to pose greater
risks than young females, why wouldn't this overcome the presumption that the semi-suspect gender classification was invalid? Does the "individuation" requirement mandate rejection of
any statistical findings that do not rest on the specific characteristics of each individual male/female? Does this even make
sense? Findings about individuals with specified characteristics
can be made only by generalizations based on findings concerning others with the same or similar specified traits. Is Justice Brennan's rather awkward handling of the statistical issue
an example of the baleful effects of openly looking to standards
of review? I think not. Standards of review didn't muck up the
Court's opinion. The Court did this on its own.
There were at least two major problems that confused matters for the Court and for its analysts. One was the actual softness of the data and the inferences derived from them. Truly
skilled statistical analysis wasn't required to see this, although
the government's offerings here weren't as weak as those presented in Whittingham. The second problem is much deeper. It
concerns the basic structure and application of rights and interests analysis. The interest here was in avoiding loss of opportunities because of one's gender status. Although this interest involves "only" a semi- (or quasi-) suspect classification, it remains fairly important. The state may have claimed too much
for its data, but their case wasn't ridiculous. It's the sort of data
that might move a competent behavioral scientist to formulate a
tentative hypothesis and to conclude that more investigation
was warranted. If so, did the state show enough to justify its
classification-via a not-absurd inference that many personsthe arrestees, other drivers, pedestrians-were at risk for the seriously bad outcome of getting killed or hurt in road accidents?
Or is this empirically somewhat shaky argument just not enough
to overcome an important constitutional interest?
Given the Court's value stance here, the state had an especially difficult task. The Court's opinion, amazingly, dismissed
an order-of-magnitude difference between male (2%) and female arrest rates (.18%), not just because it thought the data
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were too soft to show this, but because both the percentages
were too low. If there were one chance in fifty that you or anyone else would be killed when trying to cross Sunset Boulevard,
would you think it a safe street? Of course, running someone
over while you're driving (whatever your mental condition) is
one thing; simply driving under the influence is something
else-right? After all, you're not going to kill someone every
single time you drive drunk-right? The state should just loosen
up.

To briefly tie together the Woody/Whittingham discussion,
recall the basic question raised here about the nature and "operational meaning" of constitutional standards of review. In
principle, how are courts to identify, evaluate and compare or
weigh the state's interests as against those claimed by the other
side-a conflict that also appears at the characterization stage,
though generally couched differently." 5 If one claims a personal freedom (religious or not) to ingest substances of one's
choice for medical or nonmedical reasons, how is this to be valued constitutionally?
This is no vagrant question. It seems probable that, with the
arrival of new generations of mind-altering and possibly mindenhancing drugs, the earlier cases dismissing claims of right to
ingest more primitive and imprecise drugs such as marijuana
and peyote might not block recognition of secular rights to
technologically shape one's mind through chemistry.116

115There is a significant literature criticizing the notion of balancing, at least

as practiced in certain areas of constitutional adjudication. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 9971001 (1987) (presenting such criticisms). Although I do not press the issue here, I
suggest once again that alternative conceptual systems that supposedly avoid rightstalk and/or balancing-talk offer no improvement in constitutional adjudication (assuming we have some agreed-to criteria for such "improvement"). The replacement
systems either involve testing, weighing, comparing and balancing within a different
conceptual system (whether with similar results or not)-or, if they don't, they are
clumsy, hamfisted, formalistic systems that fall to attend to matters that ought to be
compared and weighed, however difficult the process.
116See, e.g., People v. Werber, 97 Cal. Rptr. 150, 156 (Ct. App. 1971) (rejecting defendant's claim that his marijuana use was religious and concluding that it
was unprotected under the First Amendment; the court noted defendant's testimony
that marijuana produced "a new awareness of various unfamiliar and abstract concepts"). See generally Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection:Performance Enhancement and the Control ofAttributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 11 (1991) (discussing issues concerning the enhancement of human traits by technological means).

418

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 11:351

But what is the process of constitutional valuing in this
context-whether pursued by courts, legislatures, government
agencies, or anyone else? How should a court assess the state's
claim that persons using, say, a memory-enhancing substance
(effective for both the demented and normal) are at risk, say, for
physical and mental harms that the state has a power (a right? a
duty?) to prevent? On what political/moral theory would the
state have-or not have-this power? Again, to what extent
should the court defer to the state's factual claims or to the
state's valuations of the gravity of adverse outcomes as compared with any beneficial outcomes (including the bare benefit
of having one's preferences vindicated)? Does it make a difference if the state had already been heavily involved and thus experienced in the general field addressed by the litigation-for
example, providing or paying for health care, or denying it, and
in general dealing with the benefits and harms of medical and
policy decisions?
The same set of oppressively hard questions arises in virtually every branch of biological technology. How do we even
begin to morally evaluate the process of reconstructing our
germ lines, or of edging into identity change through augmenting our mental and physical capacities? If the legislature is to be
deferred to, it is surely not because it knows better than others
how to work within the universe of moral principles, standards,
and rules. If no one knows how to pursue sound valuation in
these realms, perhaps the legislature is rightly deferred to as a
(democratic) black box. The very murkiness of the substantive
evaluation clarifies the quandary: important constitutional interests cannot simply be left to legislative whim, but our vision of
the principled limits that courts should place on legislatures will
become even foggier when new category-busting technologies
arrive. This can drive fans of principled limits away from
strengthening judicial standards of review toward suspending
them and dumping still more tasks into dark legislative containers.
Suppose now any constitutional decisionmaker (court, legislature, executive) faces a well-populated set of major questions-some dictated by a standard of review and some about
what a standard of review dictates. What follows from the fact
that there is no handy moral metric available to compare discordant interests? (I do not pursue problems of incommensurability
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and nontranslatability here.) 1 7 Not a lot. One could say that it
shows courts should not compare, weigh and balance the rival
claims. If they don't do that, however, who wins? What is the
default rule, and why? It makes as much sense (and it isn't
much) to say that the government always wins when value
claims are incommensurable as it does to say that the government always loses in those cases. After all, one can't even properly install presumptions about who wins if one can't compare
the claims of competing parties.
Turn now to some other illustrative cases, this time from
the Supreme Court.
1 8 & Youngberg v. Romeo' 19
3. Washington v. Harper'

(a) The extant constitutional grid in brief; the Court's opinion
In Harper, a convicted, imprisoned robber had been paroled but civilly confined, and while in custody committed several physical assaults. His parole was revoked and he was imprisoned in a special section of the prison for mentally disordered persons. Although he had initially accepted treatment
with antipsychotic and other medications in the prison facility,
he later refused them. The prison complied with state-mandated
procedures for in-house review of the decision to medicate him
over his objection. He filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
but the litigation's pre-Supreme Court history needn't be examined here. As the matter crystallized before the Court, the
narrow issue for resolution was whether the prison could require
Harper to submit to treatment without a prior judicial hearing.
There are several reasonably well-established paths toward
answering this question. The "narrow issue" in Harper sounds

1

117See

generally Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U.

PA. L. REv. 1215 (1998) (arguing that commensurability and comparability often
"have the character of attitudes, dispositions [etc.]," rather than being inherent properties of values, reasons, options and norms) (Id. at 1216-17)); Frederick Schauer,
Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785
(1994); Richard Warner, Incommensurability as a JurisprudentialPuzzle, 68 CI.KENTL. REv. 147 (1992).
18 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause allows the state
to medicate a seriously mentally ill prison inmate against his will if the state has a
legitimate interest in protecting the prisoner or others).
119 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that the state may not restrain mentally retarded residents except when it is necessary to assure the safety for all residents and
personnel within the institution).
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in procedure-the need, if any, for a certain type of hearing-so
one begins to consider the procedural due process cases. On
fairly stable views of federal procedural due process constraints,
attention must at some point (early on) focus on matters of
"substance." Some interest, whether categorized as a matter of
life, liberty, or property, must be at risk before the rigorous,
lumbering mechanism of a judicial hearing is required. The
Court here dealt with this in two ways. It described the state's

law, which itself might create a liberty interest of sufficient
strength to trigger federal process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. It also considered whether the Fourteenth

Amendment itself-without reference to state-created interests-protected a liberty interest important enough to require
protection through a judicial hearing requirement.
The Court did indeed find a nontrivial liberty interest, but
said that, under the circumstances (particularly the various state
procedural steps already completed), a judicial hearing was not
required 120 before the imposition of treatment. Since the Court
found an independent federal liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, the description of state procedures was not
offered as a demonstration of the value that the state accorded

the liberty interest (though this might be federally relevant in
various cases). Instead, it was part of an argument showing that
the independently established federal liberty interest 121 had been
120

See Harper,494 U.S. at 228. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Louder-

mill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), the Court rejected the "bitter with the sweet" approach in defining liberty interests by reference to their apparent procedural protections under state law. That idea reflected a reduction of supposed state-created and
state-protected interests to the actual procedural protections afforded by state law.
However grandiose the state's formulation of a right (e.g., a right to continued employment by the state unless good cause is shown for termination), if the only state
procedural protections afforded were toothless (e.g., the aggrieved was entitled only
to a letter explaining her termination, and no recourse was possible), then no Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections could be invoked. The supposedly important right protected by the state had an operational meaning too trivial to support
federal procedural due process protections. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976) (holding that a dismissed law enforcement officer was entitled to no more
protection than what was provided by the applicable ordinance-a written notice of
discharge and the reasons for it). The status of Bishop is not entirely clear after
Loudermill.
121The term "liberty interest" does double duty here. It is used in both in substantive and procedural due process jurisprudence, and although its meanings in the
two linked domains overlap, they are not the same. What counts as a liberty interest
sufficient to trigger rigorous procedural protections may be quite different from what
counts as a "substantive due process" liberty interest. Of course, both categories of
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adequately protected by the state's required procedures, and
nothing further-and certainly not a prior full-dress judicial
hearing-was warranted.
In the federal "substantive" domain, the threshold characterization problem-is there an important right at stake (perhaps
a "fundamental liberty interest")?-was difficult enough to
move the Court to an odd characterization: it recognized a "liberty interest" in refusing antipsychotic drugs. 122 This is a curiously specific result-one that sounds like a bottom-line characterization deriving from some broader one. Still, it seems
preferable to global claims of a fundamental right to "privacy"
or, worse yet, to "be let alone."' 23 One wonders, however,
whether the liberty interest excludes, say, antidepressant drugs.
Shouldn't the liberty interest cover all medicinal psychotropic
drugs, or all forms of mind and behavior control using the tools
of biological psychiatry? Or are these categories too broad? One
would think that some generalization above a particular set of
drugs but less than a vast right to be let alone could serve
passably well, but for present purposes there is no reason to offer anything beyond some suggestions made as we proceed.
Whatever the appropriate abstraction, the Court's characterization generated what seems to be a form of heightened but
less than strict scrutiny, an intermediate position probably attributable to the prison context: the state was required to show
that what it did was reasonably related to a legitimate penal interest, as in Turner v. Safley.' 24 The workings of this standard
are reviewed below.
liberty interest ultimately have "substantive" foundations because significant procedural protections presuppose some basic positive valuation of an interest that is not to
be seriously burdened without proper procedures. See generallyMathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Liberty interests of any kind require both substantive and
procedural protections. This is partially illustrated below in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). As for the annoying question: Is Harper
a procedural or substantive due process case?, the correct response is obvious.
1"2See Harper,494 U.S. at 221-22 (stating "[w]e have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty interest created by the State's Policy, respondent possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
123Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)) (upholding, as applied to sexual acts between males, a Georgia Statute that
criminalizes sodomy).
124 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding prison regulation restricting inmate correspondence but striking down marriage restriction).
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(b) The conceptual pressures of technology's increasing
precision of control
Describing the liberty interest in Harper requires attention
to the nature of the mind-altering technology used there, though
not to the point of mastering human neurochemistry. How do
these antipsychotic medicines get into the body and what do
they do physiologically once inside? They are generally administered orally or intramuscularly and alter the brain's electrochemical functioning with resulting effects on mood, cognition,
alertness, and other mental states and operations. The mechanisms of action are thought to heavily implicate the workings 125
of
neurotransmitters, which mediate electrochemical activity.
Counsel for those in Harper's position would thus be well advised to say something about liberty interests in bodily integrity
or personal security, but perhaps more specifically in mindintegrity. 126 The most pertinent threshold inquiry seems to be
whether the technology used significantly alters-for better or
worse-not just the subject's physical processes but his mental
functioning, be it cognitive, emotive, volitional, or within some
other category of mental operation.
Finding the underlying abstractions for any unmentioned
liberty interest is of course a familiar problem, long antedating
any high-technology biomedicine. It is not surprising that it remains unclear what underlying constitutionally-relevant abstractions best explain Harper's outcome. Recall that bodily
integrity wasn't said to be the foundation of Roe v. Wade, 1 7
though it was obviously relevant. It was clearly of some moment in Harper, given the risk of serious physical side effects.
(The mode of administration may also enter the fray, especially
if some unusually invasive procedure is used.) But considering
the likelihood of newer and far more precisely effective psychotropic drugs, future cases may require notions of mental in125 See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE
BIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1992) (examining the implications of studies of
mental disorders); THE NEUROTRANSMITrER

REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN,

SOCIAL

BEHAVIOR, AND THE LAW (Roger D. Masters & Michael T. McGuire eds., 1994) (discussing findings about the effects of neurotransmitters on human behavior and the
impact of these findings on established ways of thought).
126 They can also be administered directly into the brain.
Without Star Trek
technology, however, one would obviously have to make some sort of physical intrusion into the patient's head.
127 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling that abortion is a fundamental right).
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tegrity, the preservation of identity, or something cruder but
more global, such as "personal security.' ', 28 Such formulations
may fit later cases better than those resting simply on bodily
impingements.
Harper thus foreshadows an increasing need to look to
"foundations." We understand well enough what a breach of
bodily integrity or a limitation on freedom of movement is; we
understand less well (if far more than minimally) what a
"breach of mind" might be, and this complicates the use of
standard interpretive paths in deriving or rejecting constitutional
protection against it.
Whatever constitutional standard of review was (implicitly)
selected by the Court in Harper,applying it required a degree of
empirical analysis that, as suggested earlier, is usually absent
and often unnecessary in constitutional litigation. 29 The obvious factual questions in Harper dealt with the palette of near
and remote effects of a particular psychotropic drug. (Recall the
Woody problem of figuring out what peyote did.) This is no
easy matter to deal with-it cannot be a simple matter of describing and measuring exactly what happens physiologically
and mentally; we need a theory of mind-intrusion. "Mind harm"
would be too tendentious a description because many would
characterize administration of medicinal mind-altering drugs as
usually being, all effects considered, beneficial to the mind and
so to the person. Still, one can't even make the simple-seeming
claim that reducing psychotic symptoms is a pure benefit. Their
sudden disappearance from a person's mental processes may
cause mental or physical harms of various ' sorts,
possibly in30
cluding the loss of some valued "capacities."'
128That

was the driving generalization in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307

(1982), recognizing a liberty interest in personal security. Mr. Romeo, who was severely impaired mentally, was thus entitled to habilitative training to enable him to
control his violent proclivities, which resulted in his being injured by the responsive
violence of others. However, the selected "standard of review" specified all-but-total
deference to "professional judgment" on what measures should or should not be undertaken.
129 For an exception, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)
(reaching its conclusion after evaluating the proffered statistical basis for a genderbased law).
130 For example, a partial remission of symptoms may enable a previously
nonfunctional patient-but still far from fully symptom-free-to accomplish certain
harmful or even catastrophic goals, such as suicide. See also infra note 148, raising
additional issues about "erasing" disorders.
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Although the Court will defer in many ways to physicians
and psychopharmacologists (and other techno-professionals), it
must nevertheless know to what it is deferring. What is the expertise about? The force of expert testimony in this realm rests
ultimately (but perhaps not exclusively) on empirical investigation, and one can (must?), ask whether the Court should vet the
methodologies used in generating information, the experts' inferences from them, and even the way in which the "raw" data
were gathered and recorded. 131 Once again, the ways in which
legislative facts and values are (dis)confirmed requires reex132
amination. (Recall the Woody and Whittingham discussion.)
Washington v. Harperwas unclear on these matters, and didn't
even bother to specify the standard of review, although it seems
clear that it was more than minimal but less than strict. 133 Some
may argue that nothing more rigorous was called for, given the
conceptual uncertainties in constitutionally characterizing the
techniques for altering mental processes. And one might argue
that this cuts the other way: confused conceptualization in a
field requires judicial oversight to avoid even worse chaos. But
of course this leads us back to asking what such oversight
should consist of, absent reasonably clear conceptual constructs.
In any event, the Court's failure to formally name its standard
of review is not fatal to gaining at least partial understanding of
its work product. The tenor of the opinion certainly does not
131See

State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 953 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1973) (reversing judgment of conviction for possession of peyote during a Native American
religious wedding ceremony). The court dealt with the state's effort to show peyote
was harmful. It accepted at least some of the factual testimony provided by the state's
expert, who said that in some cases the ingestion of peyote in large doses killed dogs,
but rejected the empirical inference the state seemed to draw that humans may be at
similar risk. See id. That non-inference itself apparently rested on the court's view of
rational 32
scientific reasoning. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 61-115.
133 Some observers may insist that minimal rationality was the operational
standard of review in Harper, whatever the Court said. Perhaps so, but this is not
shown just by attending to the bottom-line rejection of Harper's claim. Although
significantly different questions were at stake, the Court's decision in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), suggests a nontrivial burden of justification for infringing
on the liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic drugs. The Court reversed defendant's murder conviction because he was given antipsychotic drugs in violation of
this liberty interest at trial. The varying contexts-aspects of a criminal trial as opposed to institutional security in a prison-seem to account for what seems to be the
stronger standard of review in Riggins. The Court is itself the ultimate expert on the
constitutional requirements for fair trials, and the notion of deferring to medical or
correctional experts is sharply confined in this context.
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suggest negligible (or non-) scrutiny. The Court did not dismiss
Harper's claim out of hand, but wasn't bowled over by it either.
A better rationalized opinion, however, would have been more
explicit and offered more guidance for how to proceed in other
technologically-troubled cases. (I am not asking for advisory
opinions here; I'm suggesting significant incremental clarity
that offers guidance as the Court more carefully articulates the
rationales for whatever decision is at hand.)
For our part, we have to find out why the Harper Court
recognized or formulated a liberty interest at all, why it investigated what it investigated, and why it decided the way it did. In
this way, we may learn more about the pressures that some
technological developments place on existing constitutional
analysis, and one of the better ways of doing this is to inspect
Harper'sargument structure more closely.
(c) Another look at Harper's argument structure
As suggested, the Court was dealing with a set of problems
deriving from the increasing precision of effect of "biological"
treatments in psychiatry.1 34 "Precision" of course is an imprecise term, inspiring the retort, "compared to what?" Compared
to the therapeutic universe pre-dating psychotropic drugs, biological treatment for mental disorders or conditions (or "problems," to reduce the pathology aura) is now far more effective
in reaching its target than nonbiologica 135 therapies used alone.
Some drugs aim for depression, others attack mania, still others
are indicated for delusions, and many researchers, clinicians and
other observers in the field believe that many studies purport-

134For better or worse, "organic" therapies in psychiatry-chemicals, shock

treatment of various sorts, direct electrical or chemical stimulation of the brain, surgery on the brain-are often described as examples of "biological psychiatry." See,
e.g., H.M. van Praag, Biological Psychiatry Audited, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 195, 196 (1988).
130 But note that "nonbiological" therapies-with emphasis on the various
forms of "talk therapy"-also act "biologically." See generally SuSAN C. VAUGHN,
THE TALKING CuRE: THE SCIENCE BEHIND PSYCHOTHERAPY at xiv (1997) (arguing
that "[p]sychotherapy works because it produces long-lasting changes in the neurons
that make up your mind"). These observations are not meant to be ontologically reductive-i.e., they do not presuppose that mental conditions and processes (and
mentalist talk) are completely reducible to physical conditions and processes (and
physicalist talk).
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ing to establish high probabilities of reasonably effective and
136
safe relief for a variety of mental disorders are sound.
But there is precision and precision. Pharmaceutical companies are trying to design ever-more finely calibrated chemicals that aim for specific forms of disordered mental functioning, and specific forms of alteration or enhancement of mental
processes. They seek magic bullets for single or multiple targets
that do what they are supposed to do, no more and no less. (Of
course, there are ultimately intractable problems in fully defining varying kinds of disordered or desirable functioning, and
therefore in selecting exactly what to "target.")
So, compared to what was available in earlier times, the
Harper technology is far more exact, and the exercise of this
substantial increment in precision of control intensifies the need
to ask questions about constitutional adjudication that, while far
from unprecedented, are now rather more apparent and pressing.
The analytical/decisional tool called "strict (or other heightened) scrutiny must itself be strictly scrutinized-as must all
particularized standards of review, including the rational basis
test, in all the emerging contexts these standards are to be used.
If in doing so we do not revise or extend our analytical tools, we
may at least understand them better.
How is any of this different from what came before?
Changes in how persons think and feel via persuasion and education is ordinarily characterized by gradual and at least partly
resistible changes. Our system of constitutional and other legal
norms is reasonably comfortable with this-and indeed is in
theory directed toward furthering these processes in certain directions. But inducing such changes in mental functioning by
altering the chemistry and structure of the brain seems quite different in various respects. What needs to be assessed within a
constitutional framework, then, is not so much the physical
impingements entailed by swallowing pills or receiving injections, but "mind-assault"-and for this, as suggested, there are
136This view of the studies is not universally held, but I will not pursue the
controversy here. Compare FROM PLACEBO TO PANACEA: PUTTING PSYCHIATRIC
DRUGS TO THE TEST (Seymour Fisher & Roger P. Greenberg eds., 1997) (discussing
whether psychotropic therapeutic drugs are biomedically effective), with Frederic M.
Quitkin et al., Validity of Clinical Trials of Antidepressants, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
327 (2000) (finding that, although there may be biases at work in clinical research,
examination of the studies claimed to show that the validity of antidepressant trials is
questionable does not support this view).
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no clear precedents. For example, there is so far no wellworked-out doctrine suggesting that "biological treatment" or
enhancement of prisoners raises concerns about cruel and unusual punishment, although the idea is worth consideration.
(The Court did not take that path in Harper.) Until Harper,we
had no named category of personal liberty interests in avoiding
(or seeking) precise, fast-acting and hard-to-resist mechanisms
for affecting specific mental states and operations and their accompanying behavioral dispositions. Our tools of behavior
control were long limited to the uncertain effects of moral suasion, disablement via confinement, deterrence, and coercion,
and perhaps to the gross effects of intoxicating liquors, sleeping
potions, coffee, tobacco, or just plain knocks on the head.
The Court was thus faced with matters that, while not entirely out of the box, were viewed in some quarters as part of a
''revolution" in treatment of mental disorders-and perhaps in
control and prediction of unwanted behavior generally. The
Court had had few encounters with this expanding technology, 137 and it was by no means clear what path it would or
should follow. I don't know how the Court thought it through,
but it often helps in sorting out legal/conceptual and factual issues to put oneself in the positions of a trial court and/or trial
counsel in a situation where there is no prior appellate (or even
other trial court) decision that decisively governs. Consider a
Harper-like situation from that perspective.
The trial judge, though lamenting the fact that the parties
couldn't settle their dispute without going to court, nevertheless
seizes the opportunity to Make Law. She reviews the facts as
presented by the contending parties and moves along, step by
step, hoping to intuit at least a tentative resolution before too
long. She acknowledges that each factual claim-for example,
that antipsychotic drugs bear a risk of irreversible tardive dyskinesia and other serious, occasionally fatal adverse effects 38137 See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (remanding, without
ruling on
the merits, a right-against-treatment case in which voluntary and involuntary patients
in mental health facilities objected to administration of antipsychotic drugs). The
Supreme Court remanded Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983), involving the
right of a mental patient to refuse psychotropic drugs, for reconsideration in light of
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court deferred to the
"professional judgment" of care providers who were responsible for dealing with a
severely mentally impaired patient in a nonpenal facility. Id. at 321.
38 See Edmond Hsin-tung Pi & George M. Simpson, Medication-Induced
Movement Disorders, in 2 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
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can be met with a "so what" retort by the state? Those defending both voluntary and involuntary use of such drugs are certain
to say that these risks may and should (perhaps must) be borne
to promote an invaluable benefit: the relief of psychotic ideation
139
that renders its victims substantially or totally nonfunctional.
In this field of endeavor, as in most others, there are no free
lunches, life isn't fair, and that's the breaks.
We clearly need some illuminating, constitutionallyrelevant abstractions to help us to deal with the So-what questions and related issues. What might these conceptual tools be?
Because of the way the issues are formulated by counselor herself-the judge must now have to consider what the Constitution directs her to do. She needs to decide what should be
the proper initial ("default") stance to take when someone
claims an individual right against certain government action and
government either denies there is such a right, or says that if
there is one it is of no special importance, or urges that the right
is in fact not (heavily) burdened, or that whatever the severity
of the intrusion on the right (and whatever the right's value),
there are adequate public policy justifications for what it did or
is doing or plans to do. She will of course have to specify the
justificatory standards she believes must be applied under the
circumstances-the standard of review, in the narrower sense.
Are the state's goals sufficiently worthy (compelling, important,
significant, at least legitimate)? Are its mechanisms necessary
or substantially connected to furthering these state goals?
In order to reach decisions, courts use default rules, which
operate in some way in every case via presumptions and burdens of proof/persuasion and other "procedural" devices. Some
such rules are necessary in any rational adjudicatory system. If
a party complains about being hurt by a defendant but offers
nothing to show this, the defendant wins without having to establish anything on his own. The default rule could be otherwise, of course, but to most of us it seems to be the correct default rule in ordinary circumstances. If the default rule is "the
government always wins absent a showing that it acted in bad
faith," then evidence on the effects of the antipsychotic drug is
PSYCHIATRY 2265, 2268-69 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed.
2000).
1391 won't try to unpack "nonfunctional" here, except to note that there are
degrees and kinds (some contested) of functionality.
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immaterial (unless it bears on matters of good faith). 140 This
latter default rule has the merit, one might urge, of allowing our
democratically elected governments and their delegate agencies
to efficiently promote the public welfare.
Suppose, however, the default rule is: "Anyone who claims
and proves that the government physically invaded her body
over her objection wins." Every interpretive axis of constitutional adjudication 141 tells us that freedom from such unwanted
invasion is a core aspect of both the ordinary and constitutional
meanings of "liberty," and probably always has been. And just
because a legislature thinks such invasions are called for in
some cases and its bills are passed and duly enacted doesn't
mean that the due process or other constitutional constraints
were satisfied. 42 That would lead to the absurdity-at least in
our system-that government can do anything it wants.
Suppose the trial judge's stance is that because she is clueless about neurochemistry, she should rule that whatever the
personal interests at stake, she must defer to the expert evaluations of Harper's medical and correctional situation, as counseled by the "professional judgment" standard of Youngberg v.
Romeo. 43 For the trial judge, the task of examining new facts in
140Thus,

even under this qualified default rule, if a claimant could show that

there is no reasonable basis for expecting the drug to be efficacious in improving the
course of the disorder and that there is, on the other side, a reasonable basis for expecting the drug to cause adverse physiological effects, the government's plan in this
case was not adopted in good faith. But this isn't the end of the story. One must ask:
"Efficacious with respect to what goal?" If the goal is not "medicinal" but to control
unruly behavior whatever its genesis, and if this is a constitutionally permissible goal
(this remains unclear in some contexts), then that particular bad faith argument is
likely to fail, if the drug indeed forestalls or reduces the unwanted behavior.
141See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
142For a discussion of legislative procedures viewed from a due process lens,
see generally Linde, supra note 54.
143457 U.S. 307 (1982). Here, the Supreme Court recognized a liberty interest
in "safety and freedom from bodily restraint." Id. at 319. The claim was raised by an
institutionalized mentally-impaired person whose aggressive behavior occasioned
self-defensive and retaliatory moves by others, resulting in a series of injuries to the
claimant. The Court indicated that the liberty interest drew a form intermediate scrutiny, but held that the demands of this standard of review were met if the attending
providers made a professional judgment, whatever they actually authorized or failed
to authorize by way of habilitation services. Although it said that "respondent's liberty interests require the State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training
to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint," id, it also said that:
[W]e agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In
this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is
such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
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order to fashion new concepts or amend old ones is easily finessed by her extremely deferential standard of review-leaveit-to-the-professional-which requires only that parties be licensed generally to do what they do (specialists don't seem to
be required), and that they actually do it: they look at (or are
given information about) a patient or subject, figure out what
might be ailing her, and then select appropriate (non)treatment.
They must make a judgment, even if it falls far short of customary practice.
An all but complete deference to professional-judgment,
however, requires more justification than a judge's unwillingness to learn some basic medical/scientific ideas. Although unformed or uncertain legal/moral conceptualizations make it hard
to determine reliably what courts should look for, they can still
undertake preliminary searches: they do not come to the situation with a blank slate.
Sooner or later, of course, the court will have to determine
what it should make of what it has seen. It might try to discern
some analogy between sharply altering our mental processes, on
the one hand, and what we have already recognized as matters
of privacy, personal security, and control of one's body, and
then to craft a plausible category-perhaps cross-cutting the
others-to characterize what has happened. Don't say that in
doing this the court is hung up on abstractions. One can only
spend so much time looking at what happened unless what happened means something-and transmission of meaning depends
on receptive frameworks, which, by definition, are abstractions.
If we see the person being administered something over his objection and we then observe behavioral changes, we haven't
gotten very far unless these changes concern something we care
about, and those somethings are, again, described-and evaluated-by abstractions. If an excited person calms down, is this
good or bad under the circumstances? If he calms down but
only at the price of becoming groggy or otherwise incapable of
clear thinking, is it worth it? And so on.
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In determining what is
'reasonable'-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training by a
State-we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized.
Id. at 322.
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These are the sorts of things we see and look for-and we
look for them because we assess them through the valueassigning frameworks that constitute our schooled intuitions.
Perhaps the court should say that constitutionally relevant
physical intrusions can be as simple as swallowing a pill-at
least if the intrusion is closely tied to some recognizable mentational or behavioral change, whether seen as good or ill or
mixed. The results of some pill swallowings can be physically
illness or even death. But suppose the intrusion makes us better-as when someone is forced to undergo an emergency appendectomy, for example. And-more pertinent to our situation-suppose the effects of the intrusion present themselves
primarily as behavioral and mental changes, for better or worse.
Do we have a fundamental liberty interest in "mental privacy"
or "autonomy of mind"? Is this a plausible extension of what we
already have in hand, or something wilder?
Before leaping to the Supreme Court, where our case has
now arrived (leave aside the procedural path), a point of clarification: the mission of an appellate court is not the same as that
of a trial court, though the tasks overlap. Here, the notion of
"appellate standards of review" may generate some confusion in
discussions of "constitutional standards of review." There are of
course shared meaning elements; in particular, constitutional
standards of review do have something to say about what forms
appellate standards of review can take in various cases (say,
how closely the appellate court is to scrutinize findings of constitutionally material "fact," such as "malice"), I don't see any
reason to take up this and related appellate review issues here.
Now to the Supreme Court: Suppose, as in Harper,the trial
judge has already against a claimant's request for a judicial
hearing, but the state supreme court overturns this, and now the
matter is before U.S. high court. 144 What set of abstractions/rules did the Supreme Court turn to in Harper,and why?
Through much of the twentieth century, the Court-to the
dismay of some-has been working out a set of argument forms
constituting or embodying standards of review. However murky
the standards remain, they go far beyond the simple default
standards mentioned earlier, which specify who won on the basis of the identity of a particular party making certain very general claims or bearing certain traits. The Court, in working out
144

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 217-18 (1990).
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the developing jurisprudential regime, took two basic steps:
First, it specified that when individuals and governments contend, governments don't automatically win. (The reverse default
standard-those resisting the government always win-never
existed across the board, if at all.) Second, it roughly identified
the now well-known "tiers" of review that tracked the more important rights and legal relations into one (ultimately subdivided) bin-the heightened scrutiny group-and much of everything else into another-the minimal-if-any scrutiny group.
Interior sub-bins and layers have been added from time to time
(e.g., commercial speech within First Amendment speech generally; semi-suspect classifications within suspect classifications generally).
Put otherwise, the key move was the Court's identification
of certain claims of right whose impairment required heavy justification by government as compared with more run-of-the-mill
claims. (This "heavy justification" includes both substantive
and procedural matters-as exemplified in the Harper Court's
detailed specification and evaluation of the state's review process.) This move was made for certain "specifically" covered
rights (speech, religious practice, and some instances of property rights displacement governed by the contracts and taking
clauses), and also for classifications of a particularly odious sort
(race, gender) protected by the Equal Protection Clause and the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (I do not mean this to
be an exhaustive list of strongly protected substantive or procedural rights.) Similar moves were made for other strongly protected rights and interests said to be implicitly protected by one
or more of the same clauses (e.g., abortion and marriage via due
process analysis, and the rights to vote and travel via equal
protection analysis).
(d) Standard of review questions: hierarchies of interests
Beyond the foregoing, there are several important unresolved issues concerning both Harper'sinitial characterization
of the constitutional interest at stake and its (necessarily) accompanying standards of review. 145 I am not going to recite all
145Again,

one might want to characterize as a standard of review the larger

argument structure that tells us first to look for hierarchies of rights and then directs
us on how to deal with them by assigning particular burdens of justification. The
specific burdens ultimately assigned are what we generally call "standards of review." See supra text accompanying notes 19-43, 54-55.
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of these continuing issues here, any more than I did in discussing Woody and Whittingham,146 but some of them may have to
be answered sooner rather than later because of the impact of
the escalating technological revisions in life processes. In many
ways, they parallel the inquiries about Woody and Whittingham:
* We still must deal with a basic question raised earlier
concerning the very nature of Harper's liberty interest. What is
it about? If it is not (solely) about physical invasiveness, is it
about the risk of adverse physical and mental effects, or is it
about any major impact on his mental functioning, whether for
good or ill? (Recall that under the common law, competent persons can refuse beneficial-even lifesaving-medical treatment.) 147 To revive an earlier inquiry: If the state used a "magic
bullet" that had simply "erased" Harper's disorder (this is both
conceptually and factually a heroic assumption) without producing what we ordinarily view as adverse effects, 148 would he
have had any case at all? On what rationale?
146 See supra text accompanying notes 61-115.
147See infra text accompanying notes 176-204 (discussing Cruzan v. Director, MissouriDep't of Health,497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
148 As mentioned earlier, eliminating a disorder is not a simple concept. Even
something as innocuous as removing a small splinter leaves memories in place-to
"undo" the wound is not to turn time back. To "erase" clinical depression and restore
one to her status quo ante without "side effects" does not leave her exactly as she was
before, even if this were her first episode and the condition never reoccurred. Moreover, disorders have multiple aspects, some of which could be looked on, in the abstract, as advantages. The "flight of ideas" and hypersensitivity to perceptual stimulation that characterizes some disorders may generate some genuine insights that
outlast the patient's florid state. One can then speak (somewhat loosely) of special
capacities or aptitudes that are intrinsic to the disorder. Moreover, the beneficial and
adverse aspects of the disorder may not be separable into discrete units: the benefits,
such as they are, may be bound up with the very nature of the disorder, as the preceding example indicates.
To eliminate a "capacity", however, may be (looked at narrowly) to work an
impairment. One can then speak loosely of "therapy by impairment." Of course, in
most cases this prospect does not justify avoiding treatment, for the very reason that
the capacity is bound up, conceptually or otherwise, with serious disadvantaging
conditions that may annul most or all benefits from disorder-connected capacity. And
if that capacity is something intrinsically and instrumentally evil-say, to derive intense pleasure from inflicting pain on and/or killing other sentient beings-the sooner
it is erased, the better, at least for persons not being trained as warriors. Impairing a
capacity, in such cases, is precisely among the things we want to do. See generally
SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 63.
There are commentaries that illustrate some of these difficulties in thinking
about eliminating or ameliorating disordered mental states. For example, some have
suggested a possible association between mental disorders of certain sorts and "creativity." See, e.g., KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, TOUCHED wITH FIRE: MANIc-DEPREsswvE
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For any specific liberty interests, how "constitutionally
distant" are they from each other (assuming they are indeed different)? To the extent that they differ in constitutional value, is
this difference implemented by appropriate variance in the degree of burden placed on the parties under specified circumstances? For example, how much stronger is the protection for
the right to engage in political speech than for the right to manage the disposal of your household wastes?
e What sorts of hierarchies are there within these ordered
bins and how are they established? Again, start with political
speech and compare it, not with a non-speech claim, but with a
right to say something in commercialese. ("Buy our product and
you'll have more dates.") First Amendment law is not limited to
two tiers, and possibly not even to three. It's hard to say just
how many there are-which occasions the next point.
* The presence of many bins within bins of course signals
fine-grained differences in the rankings of rights and interests.
If so, there should be quite a few standards of review, or perhaps a continuum of justificatory burdens on the contending
parties, keyed to the importance of the individual interest at
stake and how seriously it is impaired. (These degrees of impairment form their own continuum of inflicted harm.) If there
are indeed interior hierarchies within as well as among individual rights and interests-and among government interests and
mechanisms for promoting them-then our universe of constitutional relations has become pretty complicated, but perhaps
not irrationally so.
* A "continuous" standard of review (one might balk at
calling it such) would of course still require appraisal of constitutional values in order to locate one's case on the continuum-and on the related continua involving degrees of impairment, importance of government interests, and the extent to
which they are impaired. Giving names to regions of what may
indeed be a continuum is a common way of communicating: we
know more about a person when we are told that she is tall, despite the adjective's imprecision. It would be odd to respond to
an inquiry about her height by saying that the concept of height
designates a continuum and giving names to different portions
of it would be arbitrary. Of course, we do have a true metric for
e

ILLNESS AND THE ARTISTIC TEMPERAMENT

(if any) remains unclear.

(1993). But the nature of this "association"
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height, but we don't (and can't) always use it, so we continue
to say things like "you're tall" and "look at Mutt and Jeff over
there." But whether our ordering of values is continuous or
segmented, we will almost certainly have names or characterizations for different regions of this ordering. And these regions
are precisely what are named or described by standards of review.
e It is possible that our ways of describing constitutional
disputes and their attendant standards of review serve certain
purposes that are worth certain costs. Using specific standards
of review that contain explicit characterizations of interests and
burdens of justification may reinforce basic constitutional values and (perhaps corresponding) social norms. The fact that
specific standards seem to presuppose and to trumpet odd discontinuities in constitutional values and their infringements
("you get either strict, intermediate, or non-scrutiny") may not
even be a "cost": we make sharp differentiations of interests
("right P is fundamental and invading it requires heavy justification, but right Q is not and its impairment requires virtually
no justification") in part because value reinforcement is enhanced by identifying a small number of discrete categories of
interests bearing significant announced values. The "announcement" is made not only by invoking honorific characteristics
("this is about free speech and equality"), but by expressly requiring that countervailing interests must be "compelling" or
"important" and government intrusions must be "necessary" to
promote them or must "substantially further" them. A continuous, undifferentiated scale of review is difficult to describe except by charting functional relationships between "intensity" of
scrutiny and degrees of constitutional value and harm. Conversion to such a "spectrum" scheme may result in loss of some
beneficial opportunities for value reinforcement.
e There are some additional observations to make about the
logical (if not chronological) stages of constitutional argumentation, from the starting characterization of claimed interests
through the assignment of burdens of justification and to final
resolution. Consider how standard interpretive tools work here.
We have our three closely tied interpretive axes at handauthorial states of mind, lexical understandings of text and its
structures, and recipient frameworks and reactions. 149 These in
turn lead us to interlinked matters of tradition, history, custom,
149See

discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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lead us to interlinked matters of tradition, history, custom, details of textual structure, moral theory, analogy, precedent,
comparison to paradigms, and still more, depending on variations in how we identify and compare such factors. As I said, I
do not try to specify how these variables are embedded within
the three higher-order interpretive axes-or whether they represent additional independent axes.
Assume we have already acquired data about the nature and
effects of government dealings with involuntarily confined persons, from doing brain surgery on them to letting them run
amok. We also know something about what the newer-and
perhaps forthcoming-"mind control" techniques are. But, once
again, what other, familiar processes do these techniques
strongly resemble? Are they like physical restraints or confinement, thus possibly assimilating them to preexisting "liberty
interest" bins protecting "personal security" or "freedom of
movement"? If not, and no other similarities present themselves
as more persuasive, how in principle do we manage these so-far
constitutionally uncharacterized interests? Ask asked earlier:
Should we connect the newer happenings to matters of matter
(physical intrusions and effects), or to matters of mind (the
autonomy or privacy of thought and feeling), or to both? Should
our answers be incorporated within standards of review that are
gradually becoming more detailed and thus instructive (or more
confusing)? It's easy to see the connection between being in the
stocks and being confined to a locked room, but the leaps from
confinement or beatings to biological treatments for mental disorder, or to controlling behavior without reference to a disorder
model,150 seem more challenging. (Recall the earlier questions
about how to relate human cloning, and other departures from
the usual ways of creating new human beings, to what many
now view as constitutionally protected forms of procreational
autonomy.)
The Court made little effort to describe exactly what
Harper's specific fears and complaints were, or if he was able
clearly to articulate them. Nor did it stop for long on the pharmacology of antipsychotic drugs (in this case, Mellaril). One
150A "disorder" model is an abstract guide to both description ("What we see
here is the effort to treat a disorder") and evaluation-including action-justification
("Nonconsensual physical or mental intrusions are justified only to treat a disorder,
not just unwanted but nonpathological thought and conduct"). The rival "custodial
control" model is discussed later. See infra text accompanying notes 160-70.

2001]

CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

senses at the outset that Mr. Harper's beef was considered lessthan-titanic, although one reason for this was that he was being
held in penal custody-he wasn't just a patient. The Court, after
all, invoked a standard of review already set in place by Turner
v. Safley"': prison measures need only be reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. Still, the Court did devote some
time and space to explaining the general range of risks linked to
medication administered to Harper-risks that seem to have
played a role in his personal objections to the proposed medication.
(e) Assessing the Court's work to this point
In general. I have already suggested that the Court's efforts
in Harper were inadequate in certain respects. Was it sufficiently attentive to the reasons for Harper's refusal of treatment,
even given his penal circumstances, which seemed to call for
deference to correctional/medical judgment? Did the Court give
a cursory account of Harper's complaints against medication
because of the impact of its non-strict (though nontrivial) standard of review for complaints by prisoners? If the Court had
attended more carefully to the particulars of Harper's encounters with antipsychotic medication, it might have considered
assigning greater weight to his claimed interest (in mentational
integrity?), requiring a more rigorous standard of review. This
would have required refinement of the Turner v. Safley standard-subdividing it into sub-tiers-but maybe this was not
called for under the circumstances.
Perhaps in some ways Harperdisplays the ills supposedly
associated with standards of review-encouraging decisions at
one stage to be made by looking ahead to later stages. But this
is not in principle an "ill" feature of standards of review, given
the intimate connection between rating a claimed interest and
imposing a burden on others to justify its infringement. Of
course the characterization stage "looks ahead" to the standard
of review stage-it's supposed to. Still, it is open in any case to
consider whether a court is excessively result-oriented, "justifying" its outcome through the illusive effects of a standard of
review that was not applied in good faith. (I have no reason to
think that this was the case in Harper, but no one-and no
...482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987) (upholding prison regulation restricting inmate
correspondence but striling down marriage restriction).
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court-escapes the influence of result-orientation, and this is
not universally a bad thing. Part of the jurisprudential analysis
problem here is to explicate what is meant by "resultorientation.") In any case, it seems to get causation wrong when
critics of standards of review to attribute a questionable outcome or opinion to the skewing effects of these standards, at
least as an across-the-board claim.
Perhaps the simplest hypothesis about the Court's argument
structure is the most plausible one: the relatively soft standard
of review in Harperfollows from the Court's modest valuation
of Harper's constitutional claims as made under the circumstances of his penal confinement. The Court (along with many
others) is deeply suspicious of the merits of complaints by convicted criminals. It is the perceived lowly status of prisoners'
claims in the constitutional hierarchy that accounts for importing Turner v. Safley's standard of review. The Court saw no occasion to investigate the nature and worth of mentational integrity or to self-assess its judicial powers and obligations to examine the empirical and value foundations of a government's
asserted interests. But, sooner or later, it will have to, as I have
argued.
On what basis could a stronger standard of review have
been recognized? Where did the Court's valuation go wrong-if
it did? Suppose we try a "subtraction" experiment, excising the
fact that Harper was in prison, and placing him instead in a
mental health facility. What would we learn about how the
Court might have valued his interest in avoiding forced alteration of mental functions? Would Harper's preferences have received even less attention because of the professional judgment
rule deriving from Youngberg v. Romeo? If the Court were
given-in this setting-a vivid account of the serious risks of
currently available antipsychotic medication, would it have assigned greater disvalue to such adverse effects, and compared
them carefully to the claimed beneficial therapeutic effects on
mental functions?
. A valuation paradox: valuable liberty interests
drive strong standardsof review, but some valuable liberty interests won't be recognized in the first place without prior installation of a strong standard of review. Here, we do run into
what at first seems to be a paradox. I think it dissolves upon reflection, but it scanning it reinforces the earlier accounts of constitutional valuation. The problem is this: everyone, as they say,
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can understand a punch in the whatever, but evaluating punches
in (or to) the mind is something else. Administering, say, a drug
causing nothing but nondangerous feelings of pleasure (whatever their subject or content) is far from an unambiguous benefit. How do we value the core idea of imposing unwanted alterations in our mental functions? How is our ultimate valuation
affected by contingent factual matters-what the drug or other
modality actually does, mentationally and behaviorally? The
point to stress here is that some overall constitutional valuations
of liberty interests are heavily-but not entirely-fact dependent. But courts may be unlikely to address these empirical issues in the first place unless moved to do so by a rigorous standard of review-which won't be applied without a prior strong
valuation of the very liberty interest that determines whether the
standard of review is light or rigorous.
The "paradox," however, is not much of a blockade to the
jurisprudence of standards of review. It is much attenuated if
one looks to the distinction between specific standards of review and the global instruction to do what is necessary to identify the precise standards to apply. One soon sees that the vulnerable plank in the paradox is the idea that courts may not address important factual issues that go to the characterization of
liberty interests unless they are already governed by a rigorous
standard of review. Why would one even think to inspect what
an antipsychotic drug really does? The prisoner takes it, and (at
least over time) one's disfavored behavior is improved. Who
cares whether the mechanism is physical, mental, or magical?
As a matter of theory, however, to interpret the plank that way
is a mistake: careful factual investigation may be required at the
threshold characterization stage simply because of the critical
importance of that stage of constitutional adjudication. It is not
driven by a particular standard of review, but, as noted, by the
global standard of review that tells the courts what kind of work
needs to be done-characterization of constitutional disputes
within and in light of our previously derived hierarchy of constitutional values. If the application of a particular standard of
review in later argument stages covers some of the same ground
involved in the threshold valuation of a purported liberty interest, so be it. If the overlapping stages are conceptually connected, this is inevitable.
Of course, even a more rigorous standard of review might
have reached the same result as Harper did. More generally,
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there is so far no reason to think a stronger standard of review
would hamper the proper maintenance of order in prisons. A
stronger standard, of course, might well have unearthed additional critical legislative facts (beyond whatever was turned up
at the threshold characterization stage) and stimulated more
careful evaluations. Harper might have succeeded in showing
that the avoidable harm to him was not outweighed by promotion of penal interests. But if so, this would have been a constitutionally desirable outcome, not a case of unwarranted thwarting of state interests.
The difficulty with the Court's way of proceeding is not
that the Justices thought ahead to what they were going to do
after they selected their initial working abstractions-of course
they did. The problem, if there is one, is that they did not rate
Harper's interests more strongly at any stage, and it isn't clear
that they actively considered a stronger position. Perhaps they
were inattentive to the global standard of review. The impression is of sloughing off because the somewhat anemic valuation
of Harper's liberty interest generated a feeble version of "intermediate" scrutiny. The Court simply didn't think it had to explore any more than it did-and this seems wrong, even if the
final result would remain the same: no judicial hearing required.
Suppose next that the Court is fully engaged within the
global standard of review, directing it to mine the terrain for
constitutional values in jeopardy and to select a particular standard of (further) review. On what grounds would one argue that
the Court didn't rank Harper's interest strongly enough? Think
again about whatever normative and empirical generalities explain the constitutional status of freedom from confinement and
physical intrusion-personal security, physical freedom, bodily
integrity, and so on. These notions only partly explain why we
would want to protect the mind from unwanted, fast-acting and
hard-to-resist changes,
R2 however induced-perhaps even without
physical intrusion. Mental integrity may implicate a particularly strong interest: the mind, after all, is a-probably theconstitutive component of personal identity, more so than our
physical constitutions. In this sense it is the prime substrate
("author"?) of all liberty claims. 153 To say this does not commit
152Complete and prolonged sensory deprivation might be an example.
153 There is no reason to probe the concept of personal identity here. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 219-33 (1984) (discussing memory and
psychological continuity in the course of examining the idea of personal identity).
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one to anything approaching an automatic bar to intrusions on
the mind, as some have mistakenly thought. 54 But it seems significant that the Court did not define the liberty interest at stake
in physical terms: the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs was
couched not by reference to physical intrusions or straightforward physical effects, but in mentalist terms-the right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs, which, whatever their physiological
mechanisms, are generally perceived as working on the mind.
This of course does not guarantee a bottom-line right to refuse
it; the target mentational and behavioral effects may still, on
balance, be sought, even in the face of non-target (and often adverse) physical and mental effects.
So far, then, constitutional analysis of Harperhas required
us to think more precisely about the sorts of things liberty interests generally protect, and in particular, about matters that,
pre-technology, had never been threatened in the ways they are
now. The escalation of, say, privacy intrusions from watching a
house to using a telescope to using sensitive sound recording
equipment to using heat sensors poses important challenges, to
be sure, but the linkages among these techniques are relatively
clear. But in the arena of behavior control, moving from physical confinement, beating, or torture to changing the contents of
one's mind by physiological alteration rather than gradual education or persuasion (or even conditioning or "brainwashing")
seems to be a greater incremental change. The current and future prospects for such biological controls include, as suggested,
measures that quickly, precisely, and (in certain ways) irresistibly change one's mental functioning at the government's (or
anyone's) behest. Thus, even if the Court need not have gone
further in Harperitself (I still think it should have), the underlying issues remain and grow more pressing. The next judicial
step-when it is called for-should inquire into what the
Court's narrow description of a "liberty interest in avoiding antipsychotic drugs" left out and why. Any plausible basis for a
liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic drugs seems in part to
be of a piece with possible liberty interests in refusing antidepressants, stimulants, intellect-enhancing drugs, or any other
mode of technologically altering mental functions. The changes
induced by these means are of course (in general) wildly differ154

See the discussion of this point in SHAPIRO

ET AL., supra note

63, ch. 1, §

5-G (discussing the effectiveness and intrusiveness of different forms of treatment
and responding to critics of prior accounts of the distinction).
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ent. "Canceling" depression is an enterprise sharply different
from eliminating delusions, and the two projects may well have
a different constitutional status.
As things now stand, it ordinarily (if not universally) seems
more benign to impose antidepressants 55 on someone than to
require antipsychotic drugs or electroconvulsive therapy. One
could argue, however, that delusional psychosis is more serious
than depression, and the benignity of a mental intrusion rests
not simply on a drug's effects, but on a comparison between
such effects and the need for more radical improvements in a
person's mental functioning. When "need" is matched to "remedy," then, antipsychotic drugs are also "benign," provided their
adverse effects are suitably controlled. This seems oversimple,
but it raises serious issues about the nature and gravity of mental intrusions. Although the general outline of the constitutional
argument may be the same for different mechanisms of
mind/behavior control, the outcomes need not be. Still, it is unsettling to multiply the universe of separately named liberty interests rather than relying on fewer, more comprehensive interests. Should the Court have recognized a threshold liberty interest in forced administration of any mind-altering agents, based
on some account of the integrity of mind and identity?
I don't want to exaggerate the degree of conceptual innovation that constitutional jurisprudence will have to bear as
biomedical technology develops. Not every case will be terminally mystifying. If the Court does eventually deal with Harperlike cases involving antidepressants, there would be no pressing need to break new ground; it would only have to say that the
mood-elevating medicine's better risk/benefit profile makes it
easier to justify the government's (coercive) use of it. Nevertheless, the Court would need to say something about how to
describe the (new?) (expanded?) liberty interest. Perhaps some
treatments would be seen as so non-intrusive and so strongly
effective in controlling mental disorder that, whatever we call
still are no magic bullets, however. See Robert Langreth, Researchers Seek Safer Drugsfor Wide Array of Brain Disorders,WALL ST. J., May 9, 1996,
at BI: "The new-generation drugs work more like a dart aimed with greater precision,
isolating one particular group of brain receptors and thereby having fewer unintended
effects .... With the notable exception of the newer antidepressants, most existing
mental-health drugs act with the subtlety of a sledgehammer, broadly knocking out or
altering a wide spectrum of brain activities to get at the particular one they seek to
affect. In doing so, they trigger an assortment of unwanted side effects, ranging from
nausea to impotence."
155There
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the liberty interest, it is not sufficiently impaired to merit strong
scrutiny of government action. The Court occasionally says
things structurally similar to this, as in Whalen v. Roe.1 56 As we
saw, it conceded the existence of an important informational,
privacy interest held by patients concerning their histories of
treatment with certain drugs. It nevertheless held that the database was secure and that therefore the interest wasn't impaired
or threatened enough to trigger a heavy burden of justification. 157 The Court, however, did not inquire closely into the effectiveness of the security system, leaving us to wonder whether
it even took the privacy claim seriously. As explained earlier,
there is an obvious question about why the Court works with
discontinuous standards of review (no elevated scrutiny-not
just less-below a certain threshold of harm or risk) rather than
smooth ones (a modest increment
in risk is matched by a mod158
est increment in scrutiny).
Despite the attractiveness of finding comprehensive liberty
interests to cover "mind intrusions," different drugs and different kinds of non-drug interventions may, as already stressed,
differ sharply in their mind-alerting effects and in their physical
and mental risks. "Mind intrusions"-whether benefits or
harms-are not only not identical, they vary immensely, and we
do not have a large palette of descriptive terms to help describe
and evaluate them, partly because of our relatively limited experience in technologically directing such mental incursions.
* Matters left out. This is not the end of the critique of
Harper.The discussion has so far bypassed several issues that
had already come to light in the prior jurisprudence of mind alteration. They should be recounted briefly.
156 429 U.S. 589 (1977).

157 See id. at 603-06. One might argue that the Court in Whalen in fact used a
different argument structure in which the burden indeed triggered some degree of
heightened scrutiny, but the government interest was efficiently promoted in a narrow
way that preserved privacy interests because it had installed a security system. This
seems a less accurate account of the Court's ruling, however.
158 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See generally San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)

(discussing the idea of a spectrum of standards in an equal protection context). See
also Peter S. Smith, Note, The Demise of Three-Tier Review: Has the United States
Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding Scale" Approach Toward Equal ProtectionJurisprudence?, 23 J. CoNTEMP. L. 475 (1997). It seems this approach would also be

applicable to fundamental rights or fundamental liberty interests within a due process
context.
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* Competence; mental disorder; the distinctive nature of
prisons and its bearing on the standard of review. One major
dimension of Harper, which affects all stages of its argument
structure, concerns the rights-claimant's competence to make
the therapeutic decision at hand.
First, I insert a point of clarification: it appears that the
Court viewed the issue of Harper's mental competence as constitutionally immaterial, at least in the context of penal confinement. It thus didn't improperly assume Harper's competence-it just didn't care about it. Moreover, no one seems to
have argued that Harper was incompetent, so no issues arose
concerning "proxy" decisionmakers and the standards they are
to use in making decisions on behalf of incompetent persons.
The idea of mental competence (whether for particular
functions or more globally understood) is well-known to the
law. 159 The reason is easy to state, at least while we analyze the
issue at comfortably vague levels of abstraction. Competence is
a central component (element? aspect? presupposition?) of
autonomy, and is generally viewed as a necessary and constitutive precondition for considering a person, her decisionmaking,
and her decision itself, to be autonomous.' 60 To say that a competent person's largely "self-regarding" personal decisions,
medical or not, may be overridden by others is immensely
threatening to-and perhaps in some cases destructive of-the
very possibility of autonomy. Competence is thus not just some
stray and dispensable side constraint in working through the
concept of autonomy. Indeed, its centrality is universal: to assess the nature and limits of competence is to work at the heart
of autonomy, which is far more than simply being able to purSee generally Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 945 (1991) (discussing patients' competence to make decisions about their
medical treatment); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication:
Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 689
(1993).
160 For comments on the conceptual structure of the idea of autonomy, see
Michael H. Shapiro, Is Autonomy Broke?, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1988) (reviewing C. Limz ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN
PSYCIATRY (1984)). See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A
159

HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT

235-73 (1986) (discussing the condi-

tions necessary for autonomous action). The uncertainty about the appropriate terms
to use-for example, "element," "precondition"--is not a question of "mere terminology." It is a conceptual issue that may (but need not) appear as a procedural problem- say, whether one must show in advance that one is competent, rather than
wait to respond to a possible competence challenge.
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sue one's preferences, whatever they are, without outside interference. Here, however, I offer no arguments about autonomy's
ultimate moral and legal/constitutional status, nor about the
range of its defeasibility, nor about paradoxes involving burdens placed on some aspects of autonomy in order to enhance
some of its other aspects. Collisions between selfgovernance/individualism ideals and paternalism are also outside the present mission.
The assessment of competence is heavily (but not exclusively) involved with the idea of mental disorder. Most observers now agree (or say they agree) that mental disorder alone imports no automatic inference of broad incompetence or even
specific incompetence for particular tasks. The possible (and
admittedly frequent) concurrence of mental disorder and incompetence to make therapeutic decisions drives some serious
legal disputes, given the formal legal doctrine that a competent
person's refusal of medical treatment is decisive: he simply may
not be treated over his objection, even if others (and perhaps he
himself) believe treatment would in some sense promote his
best interests. (This doctrine is not always honored, especially
within state institutions.)
This account seems intuitively plausible to the liberal mind.
Still, if a crazy person refused to tell us how to stop the microbe
that will, if unchecked, destroy the human race, I would be quite
willing--even eager-to assist in forcing (even highly intrusive) medication upon him to get the information that will save
us (even if I thought the universe would be better off without
the human race). More realistically, one might expect that in
dally life, competent persons (even those not officially viewed
as mentally disordered) are often pushed, prodded and tricked
by physicians, family members, and friends into taking medication. If so, the supposed tradition of deferring to competent
refusal of medical treatment is fractured: the statement of the
legal rule may represent a liberal ideal, but private practices
161
may not entirely conform to it.
The Harper Court, however, did not explain why it acknowledged no direct role for a competent patient's views on
the matter. What are we to make of the failure? Again, the
prison context may explain, if not justify, the failure to confront
161The problem of complex traditions is mentioned again later, see infra text
accompanying notes 187-91.
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the issue of competent refusal of therapy. 162 But, to state the obvious for the sake of completeness, prisoners are not entirely
without important constitutional rights, and the absence in
Harper of any discussion of decision making competence requires explanation. If the government's goal is custodial control
within an institution, one might think that the disorder model
and competent refusal are irrelevant: if we don't ask prisoners
for permission to place them in solitary confinement, why
should we ask them if we can give them drugs to control their
behavior, whether they are disordered or not? But the Court did
not frame matters this way, and indeed noted in a footnote that
Washington had not abandoned the disorder model and did not
allow non-disordered prisoners to be medicated over their objection. 163 It did not, however, state that preservation of the disorder model was constitutionally required.
But bypassing competent choice is not the only problem
here. Even if the constitutional materiality of competence is accepted, we may not fully understand what it is we are accepting.
Competence is generally not an all-or-nothing predicate and it is
hard to evaluate. Nor is it a matter of linear "more-or-less"
vagueness in a single dimension. Moreover, incompetent persons are also legally and morally entitled to be heard, and often
to be deferred to. Physicians, for example, may be reluctant to
impose major medical/surgical treatments on non-assenting minors who may in fact be mentally incompetent as well as legally
incompetent because of their ages. (I know of no cases in which
an incompetent person of any age was made to serve as an organ donor where the record contained evidence that he or she
affirmatively dissented.) 164 More generally, incompetent persons remain "persons" and are rights-holders, although there are
serious problems in explaining what this means, both in theory
and in operation.
In any case, the Harper majority did not inquire into
Harper's competence, and only Justice Stevens' concurring and
162 There

are other, quite different circumstances, in which the Court has had

to take serious account of a claimant's incompetence, as in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
163 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 & n.8 (1990) (discussing
the requirements for forcing medication).
14 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) is not on its
face a counter-example. The mentally impaired younger sibling was thought to affirmatively want to rescue his older brother with a kidney transplant, but the facts
behind the record may be more complex than that.
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dissenting opinion suggested the importance of the issue. He
noted that Harper had never been adjudged insane or incompetent.165 All we know from Harperis that in his circumstancesdisplaying dangerousness in a penal institution-it made no difference that Harper might have been competent. This seems a
bit much even under the softer varieties of heightened scrutiny.
Even if the explanation for the Court's inattention to "detail"
was (at least partly) the prison setting, this does not excuse the
failure even to mention a major, normatively material issue.
Although as decided, the issue of competence was, for the
Court, constitutionally immaterial under the circumstances, the
materiality issue was material at the next higher level of generality. That upper level involved consideration of a liberty interest in declining drug therapy that sharply affects mental functions and bears serious risks.
But the penal setting and its urgent requirements for order
may explain (without necessarily justifying) why the competence issue was not addressed. The Court's idea seemed to be
that because Harper was in prison, it simply made no difference
whether he was competent or not. Prisons, after all, have important things to do to, for, and about prisoners and staff, and
various concomitants of life as a free person are lost or attenuated because prisoners are in the state's hands for various legitimate purposes. The prison setting thus explains (if any one
factor can explain anything) the particular formulation of
Harper's standard of review, taken up whole from Turner v.
Safley:166 what the prison does must be reasonably related to a
legitimate penological objective.1 67 Although this does not in
terms invoke the minimal rationality test, it is tempting to say
that because Harper lost his case and certain important matters
(such as competence) were not even addressed, all the Court did
was apply the rational basis test, dressing it up to make it seem
otherwise. This reflects, one might argue, a simple default rule:
165 See Harper,494 U.S. at 250-57 (Stevens J., concurring in part and dis-

senting in part, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.). Both the majority and the concurring/dissenting opinion noted the "substituted judgment" doctrine for vindicating
an incompetent person's rights by inquiring into his true preferences. See id. at 222
(majority opinion).
'6 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (finding that "[slubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
the intractable problems of prison administration.").
'67 See id.
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in Prison v. Inmate, prison always wins. But there is no such
rule, and prisons don't always win, as Turner v. Safley itself
shows.
What sort of standard is the formulation "reasonablyrelated-to-a-legitimate-penological-objective"? Is it a kind of
strict scrutiny crystallized into a particular shape for use in prisons, where government interests are generally viewed as compelling? Probably not. In terms, it seems in between the heaviest
and the lightest justificatory burdens the Court has used. But
what the Court calls it is one thing; what the Court does with it
may be something else.' 68 How did the Court implement it?
Think first what a penological interest might be, legitimate
or otherwise, and how it bears on deferring to competent choice.
Keeping order is an obvious candidate. Prisons contain persons,
some dangerous and at close quarters with other inmates. It is
easy for a small incident to cascade into a local war. A prisoner
who may assault persons and damage property obviously may
and ought to be controlled in some way, and deep thought on
that point alone is not called for, at least not in the Court's
opinion. But the "in some way" requires attention and a better
accounting of penological interests. Identifying and evaluating
them involve serious complications not dealt with precisely by
the Court-and it should have dealt with them, considering the
traditional status of competent refusal or acceptance of therapy.
We might pause here for what serves as station identification-asking, once again, how we came to consider the role of
decision making competence in constitutionally valuing a prisoner's refusal of therapy. As before, one can simply say that the
particular standard of review revealed by prior constitutional
interpretation imposes these questions on us. But this blurs the
underlying question of what the standard of review means operationally-and that depends on prior constitutional valuation.
Perhaps the most we can say for now is, once again, that the
Court did not place a high value on a prisoner's exercise of
168The

Court, for example, sometimes invokes the rational basis test in equal

protection cases involving important but formally protected interests, thus masking
(purposely or not) the fact that it is applying a more rigorous standard. See, e.g., City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment aimed at limiting legal protections of the status of gay persons; the Court ruled that it had no rational relationship to legitimate state interests, and that states cannot act to make gay
persons unequal to all others).
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choice, at least where there is an issue of prison security. How
the Court ought to have performed this "entry-level" valuation
is not a topic for this article, however.
There may be good reasons for correctional authorities to
ignore or downplay the historic role of competent decision
making, but these reasons need to be stated: If they are not, it is
not clear how we can justify compromising a long-standing
principle simply by saying that the person is in prison, when the
moral and constitutionalsignificance of being in prison was not
properly plumbed. And once again, the need to do so is greatly
magnified by the technological context: it is one thing to deny
there is, say, a right to refuse "talk therapy"; it is another to
deny there is a right against biological therapy directed toward
the mind.
* Dangerousness.Little was said in Harperabout standards
for confirming the factual and value claims about Harper's
dangerousness, although in this case that was no great failing:
Harper had acted violently before, and such a background is a
fair (perhaps the only good) predictor of future violent incidents. Perhaps the detail could have been richer-after all,
averting harm was the ultimate justification for forced therapy;
controlling Harper's mental disorder for his own sake was not
high on the agenda, if it appeared there at all, and there is a
question about whether it could properly be there.
In some cases, however, the components of the risk
evaluation require attention, and a threat must be established
empirically and appraised. (The role of mental disorder in establishing the risk of misbehavior is raised below.) 169 Is it a
threat of homicide or bruises? Of mattress fires or blocked toilets? Who makes this evaluative judgment? And whoever makes
it, is he, she or it supposed to weigh the benefits of compelled
treatment against the disvalue-such as it is-of displacing the
prisoner's personal decision not to be treated with antipsychotic
drugs?
In real life, both the prison authorities and the mental
health professionals who are directly on the job make the decisions as they come up. Any other starting route would make little sense: even if an omnipresent court were hovering about, or
quickly available via the Internet or other communication system, a judicial hearing would generally be an inefficient first169 See the discussion of disorder and control models infra, pp. 450-54.
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line decisionmaking process. That decision, however, is of constitutional dimension. The parties on the line, all agents of the
state-physicians, prison administrators, and other professionals-are making value decisions that bear on constitutional liberty interests (however they conceptualize it for themselves).
Once again, should the Court have said more-this time,
about the processes of fact-determination and value judgment in
prisons when an inmate's nontreatment preferences conflict
with the institution's security interests and with his own longrun health interests? And once again, the answer seems to be
that the liberty interest at stake in a prison is either worth less
than the parallel liberty interest on the outside, or is more easily
intruded upon justifiably in a prison, or both. 170 Either way, the
level of importance the Court discerned in the right to refuse
treatment with antipsychotic drugs in prison was not high
enough to warrant anything more than a simple outline of the
physical risks to persons and property posed by the prisoner.
* Disorderand control models. The contrast between controlling behavior by treating mental disorder and controlling it
without reference to such disorder is familiar topic, and was
mentioned in the preceding section. The nature of the control
"model" in use is yet another major variable that must be considered in judging Harper. (As used here, a model is simply an
abstract guide for decision, action, analysis, etc.) This variable
was of limited relevance before the introduction of technologies
that targeted specific mental processes. (The use of strong sedatives, which have long been available, doesn't seem to have
been a visible issue in prison contexts, as opposed to mental
health facilities.) If correctional officials establish and evaluate
an empirical risk posed by a prisoner, is this enough to make
out a presumptive case for controlling behavior chemically, regardless of the presence of disorder? We know this much from
Harper: Harper argued that the state could not constitutionally
administer medicine to him over his objection without first establishing a medical need for it. As we saw, the Court, in a
footnote, responded simply by saying that the substantive and
procedural provisions of Washington law required an adequate
showing of treatable mental disorder. But the Court did not say
that such a showing was essential. So, what do we know?

17 0 The two descriptions are closely connected.
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Here, two linked sets of issues require separation: first,
whether a given therapy-like measure (e.g., medicine as opposed to physical restraints) must, as a matter of constitutional
law, be justified by diagnosis of a mental disorder and a showing that the proposed measure may be effective in treating it;
second, what showings of such disorder and of its safe
treatability are required. The former, we just saw, was not definitively answered, despite the Court's reference to Washington law requiring use of a disorder model to justify imposed
therapy. Nor was the latter. Of course, the looser the requirements for showing that mental disorder plays a significant role
in determining how dangerous the inmate is, the less operational
sway a disorder model has. It is not hard to posit disorders, and
some seem to do it at every opportunity.
I still am not suggesting that the Harper majority should
have squarely confronted the ultimate role of mental disorder;
under long-standing rules of constitutional adjudication, this
was not at issue, and deciding the matter might have been improper. In any event, the constitutional (and moral?) materiality
of mental disorder is the core issue here. It underlies the question whether biological "therapies" may constitutionally be imposed over a prisoner's objection only if she is found to be
mentally disordered, and if so, whether she is likely to behave
violently because of the disorder (though other variables may
also be relevant). Even if the Court had had to address the issue,
the record seemed to contain evidence adequate to support a
relevant diagnosis and prediction of danger. (Whether the disorder and the danger were adequately shown to be causally linked
is another issue.) The relative lack of effort to investigate the
"risk/benefit" ratio of Mellaril and apply it to Harper has already been noted. But, sooner or later, the Court is likely to encounter a case in which the constitutional status of a custodial
control or disablement model must be addressed. The point is
familiar to nearly everyone in the corrections and mental health
businesses: why is mental health or disorder even material? If a
prisoner properly shown to be dangerous can be more or less
neutralized by physical restraints or solitary confinement, why
can't she be neutralized by "chemical restraints"? ("It's too
dangerous" won't do, for various reasons, including the fact that
physical restraints and solitary confinement are also dangerous.)
Why do we care whether someone's dangerousness is (partly)
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attributable to her mental disorder rather than to her being a
rotten person? After all, disorder or no, the danger remains.
The issue arose in Harper simply because Harper and Justice Stevens raised it, though somewhat obliquely.17 1 The Court
noted that the Washington statute required a showing of mental
disorder, but, as we saw, it did not flatly rule that Washington
law was constitutionally obliged to do so. Perhaps it is easy to
evade the mental disorder requirement because the plasticity of
the notion of mental disorder allows broad diagnostic discretion, but this is not the fault of legal analysis. Nevertheless, the
requirements of legal/constitutional analysis (along with other
factors) oblige us to press the inquiry. If the Court is ever confronted with this issue more directly, it will have to decide
whether "medical" procedures (such as administration of mindaltering drugs) can be used to control non-disordered prisoners,
whether through the "side" effects of the medicine or even its
target effects, which can induce changes in the mental functions
of the nondisordered. If a medicine can neutralize a danger, why
not use it instead of shackles? This is a problem that implicates
serious philosophical and moral issues about autonomy and
state power that can never be fully settled.
For simplicity, one can assume that the chemical restraints
are no riskier than the strait-jacket/hard-or-soft restraints/solitary confinement restraints (whatever the nature of
the risks). Do due process, or equality constraints, or cruel and
unusual punishment restrictions require the governance of a
disorder model to justify biological controls originally developed to treat disorder? If so, is this only because of the (supposedly) greater risks posed by biological therapies? The situation
may to some extent be transient: newer generations of psycho171

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 (1990). As the Court put

it, responding to Justice Stevens (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
[Justice Stevens] contends that the SOC [Special Offender Center] Policy
permits respondent's doctors to treat him with antipsychotic medications
against his will without reference to whether the treatment is medically appropriate.... For various reasons, we disagree. That an inmate is mentally
ill and dangerous is a necessary condition to medication, but not a sufficient condition; before the hearing committee determines whether these requirements are met, the inmate's treating physician must first make the decision that medication is appropriate. The SOC is a facility whose purpose
is not to warehouse the mentally ill, but to diagnose and treat convicted
felons, with the desired goal being that they will recover to the point where
they can function in a normal prison environment.
Id. at 222 n.8.
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tropic drugs are, as I said, likely to be far more precise in their
targeted anti-disorder actions, and thus less prone to generating
adverse ("side") effects. Indeed, such medicines may turn out to
be less risky to a given inmate than, say, soft or hard restraints
or solitary confinement. 172 (Parallel questions apply to persons
confined in mental health facilities, although penological considerations are only tangentially involved-unless the inmate
has a "double" status as prisoner and patient in such facilities.)
This choice-of-models issue leads to another largely unoccupied space in Harper, and was mentioned briefly above: the
nature of the legitimate penological goals to which prison
measures must be reasonably related under Turner v. Safley.
Most criminal law and prison cases do not deal with these issues, never mind the broad rationales for criminal punishment,
and (usually) rightly so. But, because of the state's incentives to
use medical mechanisms of control as in Harper,the problem
of identifying proper penological goals merits some attention.
One might ask, for example, how the issue of whether to retain
the need for a disorder model in justifying "biological restraints" bears on the concept of legitimate penological goals.
How does its presence or absence promote or impair general
and specific deterrence, retribution, disablement, reinforcement
of appropriate norms, or any other rationale offered for criminal punishment? And even within a specified penal system that
incorporates the requirement of disorder, one might ask whether
restoring a prisoner's mental health by force is a proper pe172 These

choice-of-models issues were involved (using different terminol-

ogy) in several well-known cases from the 1970s. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491
F.2d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding, inter alia, that use of psychotropic drugs "not
as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but for the purpose of controlling
excited behavior" was cruel and unusual punishment); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that use of an emetic drug as part of an aversive conditioning program without inmate consent was cruel and unusual punishment);
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a complaint
alleging the state's misuse of a paralytic drug as part of a conditioning process for
prisoners should not have been dismissed, observing that "proof of such matters
could.., raise serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes") (citation omitted); and
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABaiTY L. REP. (Mental
Disability Legal Resource Ctr.) 147 (Sept.-Oct. 1976) (holding that legally adequate
consent cannot be given by involuntary detained person to experimental psychosurgical procedures); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (1992) (holding that the state may
not coercively treat an incompetent death row inmate with antipsychotic medication
in order to render him sane and thus eligible for execution while under the medication's influence). See generally SHAPiRo ET AL., supra note 63.
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nological-or other-state interest. What if a prisoner is neither
dangerous nor gravely disabled? The Harper Court was of
course not required to ask how restoring anyone's sanity
(whether prisoner or mental health patient or neither) promotes
any state interest at all.
* A final review of Harper'sstandard of review; Justice
Stevens's critique; Youngberg v. Romeo. Early on, the Court in
Harper said it was recognizing a liberty interest. This clearly
suggested use of a nontrivial degree of scrutiny, one that imposes some serious burdens of justification on the state. The
Court then sanctioned a nonjudicial administrative procedure
that seems calculated to uphold the government's position in
nearly every case: not only is there no judicial proceeding, there
is no proceeding with a detached, neutral, impartialdecisionmaker at all. The prison health care providers are reviewed by
in-house prison personnel and perhaps others, all of whom either work for or are retained by the state, many of whom are
professional and/or personal colleagues of the on-the-line decisionmakers, and many of whom are strongly inclined to actively
practice what they were professionally (and expensively)
trained to do. 173 How could anyone reasonably expect anything
other than routine confirmation of all but the most egregious
decisions by grossly incompetent personnel?
Perhaps this puts the difficulty a bit hyperbolically, but its
core idea was a major argument in Justice Stevens' concurring
and dissenting opinion, and it was not answered satisfactorily
by the majority. The Court simply dismissed, in platitudes, the
idea that professionals would be likely to unreflectively affirm
their colleague's decisions. These personnel are, after all, professionals, and professionals don't behave in such irrational
ways, or so one might urge. This dismissal of a central procedural and ultimately substantive issue seems, once again, linked
to the relatively low substantive value the Court assigned to
Harper's interest in avoiding medication while imprisoned-an
interest that the Court had just identified as a liberty interest,
prison context or not.
173 For a description of the reviewing process, see Harper,494 U.S. at 215-

16, 229 (describing the process for determining whether an inmate should be treated
with antipsychotic drugs against his will). Justice Stevens complained that this process involved "disqualifying" conflicts of interest. See Harper,494 U.S. at 251-57
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As I say in the text, his argument was not successfully refuted by the Court.
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Given this sort of constitutional (dis-)valuation by the
Court, why didn't it simply adopt the "professional judgment"
rule announced earlier in Youngberg v. Romeo? 174 There, as
mentioned earlier, a profoundly impaired man in a nonpenal facility was imperiled by his fellow inmates because he could not
control his own assaultive conduct, which generated responsive
violence. His mother filed an action on his behalf, arguing that
he had a right to habilitative treatment. The Court said that Romeo had a liberty interest in "personal security" that it apparently thought significant, but then adopted the Circuit Court's
very thin standard of review. It provided that if a professional
made a good faith professional judgment about a particular
course of (non)treatment, a court had no additional oversight
role beyond reviewing the record to determine whether the evidence showed that the judgment actually was made in good
faith by a qualified clinician. Beyond this, there was to be no
inquiry into the nature of the diagnosis and treatment. Presumably, a good faith professional judgment would be preceded
by, among other things, acquiring specific information about the
patient in question.
Although it isn't entirely toothless, this isn't much of a
standard of review. Whatever it means, it seems far closer to
minimal scrutiny than the Harper/Turner standard. It all but
automatically validates whatever the state does, acting through
its therapists. Why did the Harper Court go through whatever
hoops Turner v. Safely required instead of just citing Youngberg
and deferring to what the psychiatrists and other professionals
retained by the prison system wanted? The Court barely mentioned Youngberg and its professional judgment standard, and
did not explain why the majority opinion was longer than the
few lines needed to state the facts and apply that standard.
One possible explanation is the differing (though connected) nature of the respective forms of expertise in penal and
nonpenal settings. The Youngberg situation was primarily
therapeutic/custodial, not penal, and its indigenous professionals were evidently doing more or less what they were supposed
to do in carrying out the facility's mission. But (as one might
argue) the function of a prison is not to administer therapy to
the mentally or physically impaired, except insofar as this promotes its legitimate penal objectives, or is required by the
174

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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Eighth Amendment. 175 So, one might think that medicating
prisoners is therapeutically suspect-the action seems somewhat anomalous in the penal setting, despite the possible constitutional obligation of prisons to provide medical treatment in
certain situations. The prison system's primary mission concerns criminal punishment, not helping out those in its charge
to reclaim their lives; the prison is not in loco physicianis. The
medical/professional judgment rule is thus weakened in prisons-but of course not entirely displaced. To complicate matters, the intersection of medical-professional judgment and correctional-professional judgment is not clear. But the prison
system's professional judgments, medical and correctional,
eventually carried the day in Harperas well as Youngberg, and
the Court found it a much easier case than the length of its
opinion might indicate. In any case, a simple-seeming question-given Youngberg, why was Harper so labored?-has
moved us to revisit the differences between punishing and
healing.
176

4. Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health
(a) Conceptual backdrop

The "rights-claimant" in Cruzan was Nancy Cruzan, and
the scare quotes around "rights-claimant" are meant to highlight
the importance of certain kinds of global incompetence that go
far beyond incompetence to make therapeutic decisions. Ms.
Cruzan, being permanently unconscious, represented the limiting case of maximum incompetence. (The dead are not incompetent.) Her organic system was sufficiently intact to allow
various autonomic functions to continue, but she was gone for
good as a person (in the philosophical rather than the more familiar legal sense). 177 Her parents wished to remove her from
175 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding "deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" violates the Eighth Amendment).
176 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (stating that the right to refuse of certain forms of
lifesaving care is a liberty interest, but that the Constitution does not require the state
to allow the patient's family or anyone but the patient herself to make this decision;
and also ruling that the state could disallow surrogate decision making, absent clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes).
177 On the philosophical notions of personhood, see, for example, John F.
Crosby, The Personhood of the Human Embryo, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 399 (1993),
discussing the criteria for personhood. The "gone for good" idea requires some qualification. "Recovery" of any sort from a permanent vegetative state (a vegetative state
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life-support systems, but Missouri law required "clear and convincing evidence" of her pre-existing preferences. The evidence
presented in court at the time could not support such an inference, in Missouri's view. (After remand from the Supreme
Court, additional evidence was introduced to bolster the claim
that she would have preferred to have life support terminated so
that she could really die. I cannot comment
on the incremental
178
probative value of the new evidence.)
Although the issue is peripheral to Cruzan itself, we can
pause on the idea of death and how it bears on constitutional
analysis. Courts may eventually have to deal with constitutional
questions raised by statutes that adopt a criterion of death resting on whether there is a nontrivial possibility that a patient is
or will be conscious to some ascertainable degree. On that criterion, permanently unconscious persons would be dead. Of
course, with such patients, something is alive-an organic,
physically-integrated shell, one might say. But from the standpoint of human interaction and striving, patients such as Nancy
Cruzan are simply no longer with us and, on this view, would
suitably-perhaps obligatorily-be viewed as dead.
This is an oversimplified justification, however. The point
to stress is that this technological fragmentation of life into disparate (though connected) components-living organism once
bearing a now-departed personality-pushes us to examine the
course of constitutional valuation of contending interests more
closely; the sharply new circumstances are not an easy fit with
everyday notions of death. Whatever specific standard of review
is ultimately developed and applied, we will have to review

is considered permanent after 12 months if the condition is caused by trauma and
after three months otherwise), is said to be "exceedingly rare and almost always involves a severe disability in both adults and children" if caused by trauma. If nontraumatically caused, "recovery does occur, but it is rare and at best associated with
moderate or severe disability." See generally The Multi-society Task Force on PVS,
Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (Second of Two Parts),330 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1575 (1994). One might argue that recovery of some cognitive/perceptual functions indicates that the diagnosis of a permanent vegetative state
was wrong, rather than that the condition has some small recovery rate for such functions. This stance, however, imports problems of its own.
178 See Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the
Right to Die, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al (referring to a hearing following the
U.S. Supreme Court decision; three of Nancy Cruzan's co-workers testified at the
hearing that they remembered her saying she would not want to live "like a vegetable").
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what it might entail concerning the issues of fact and value that
courts may, must, or must not deal with. 179
Just what are we to do, then, when we see that the something that is alive is inextricably linked to Ms. Cruzan? It is
"merely" a remnant, perhaps, but a living one. So, maybe Nancy
can't quite be dead yet-not as long as some major (not former)
aspect of her lives on. The connection between the living residuum of Ms. Cruzan and her departed personal identity is so
close that viewing her as dead and then killing her living remainder by removing "life support" and then burying or cremating her "alive" may be too great a threat to our norms of respect for persons and life. If we are told that we should try to
see it differently through revising our perceptual frameworks,
we might respond that we are at bottom not cognitively and
emotionally equipped to do so, and that there are thus limits on
what and how we can learn, especially when it comes to basic
culture-crossing norms. In any event, not everyone will sit by
passively while the state declares thousands of permanently unconscious persons to be dead, so that they can be removed from
life support systems and their remains properly dealt with. Opponents of the new regime will claim that the lives of these legions of victims are being taken without due process in both the
substantive and procedural senses. Why would this be without
due process? Because killing an innocent, nonthreatening living
person (as they view her) by removing her life support, falsely
claiming that the person is already dead, is an exemplar of unconstitutional state action. Of course, the proponents of the
transformed definition of death will say that no life has been or
could be taken if death has already occurred.
The courts will then have no option but to consider their
proper role in understanding and redefining the concept of
death, which is now, by hypothesis, a material issue of "constitutional fact." Even if they ultimately defer, on whatever
ground, to legislative judgment, they cannot responsibly begin
with that deferential conclusion (although some courts might
do so). They will have to confront the claim that the definitional/conceptual issue of the meaning(s) of "death" cannot be
preempted by a legislative declaration that henceforth, all per179 Assuming

a standard's formulation remains reasonably constant, its op-

erational requirements will differ among courts, legislators, executive and administrative officials, and the citizenry.
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manently unconscious persons are dead as a matter of law. 180 If
it is part of a court's function in enforcing the rule that life cannot be taken without due process, shouldn't the court be able to
say what being alive and being dead are, and what the nature of
the phase change from life to death is?
If courts ultimately tend to these issues, they will soon see
that, when placed alongside historic baseline understandings of
life and death, the idea of a forever-unconscious-but-livingperson (or entity) is hard to categorize. There is no clear "fact"
of the matter about whether such entities are really alive or
really dead because the baseline concepts "run out."
In this light, one might argue that courts should defer to the
legislature's choice on the value issues involved: if an issue is
difficult because it is not a matter of clear principle, decisions
on such imponderables should be made by the usual black boxes
supplied by our political and legal system, including legislatures, juries (where litigation arises), administrative agencies of
certain sorts, and so on. (If we could isolate the criteria these
black boxes use, or should use, we probably wouldn't need such
boxes in the first place.
Happily for supporters of endless deliberation, one might
also argue the exact opposite. On the one hand, legislators, at
least in the aggregate, are the true "proxies" for the people in a
republic, and are the only parties to which we delegate certain
normative decisions and factual determinations. On the other
hand, why should the possibly transient views of a legislature
decide matters of constitutional principle, fact and value? On
the third hand (these are complex times), to say that courts
should instead be bound by the historic, traditional value attitudes of the community-norms that transcend short-term
variations-is not fully apt here because there are no such relevant community attitudes: we don't know what to think, and
never did. Whatever new or old views on these issues that one
might encounter in searching out community values would be at
uselessly high levels of abstraction. (The "Life is sacred" tradition meets its rival, "That's not life.") Moreover, such community attitudes cannot reliably be inferred through "what-if' exercises: the problem of distinguishing permanently unconscious
180Compare legislative efforts to declare that fertilized ova, embryos, or fetuses are persons. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 2000) (providing that
a human ovum fertilized in vitro is a "juridical person" until implanted in a womb).
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persons from dead persons is too far out of our common frameworks of thought. (This holds despite accounts of persons
coming out of years-long comas. Think of Sleeping Beauty, but
not Rip van Winkle, who just had a really good night's rest that
got away from him, and not zombies, who remain dead. The
situation is further complicated by the view that irreversibility
is not part of the concept of death.)
It is not clear, then, which way the relative novelty of the
permanent-unconsciousness-as-death problem cuts-toward
novel issues being left to the legislature as is fitting or even required in a republic; or toward viewing this very novelty as
freeing the courts from bondage to a history and tradition no
longer relevant under radically changed circumstances. Courts
might absorb emerging, technology-driven community views
(and help them fully emerge?), or do their own independent
moral analysis-a possibility recounted earlier.181
Here again, the normative/constitutional problems generated by the technological separation of "personhood" life from
"mere organic life" press our understanding of permissible
routes of constitutional interpretation. We again face the basics-the multiple axes of interpretation-and their accompanying question of how we should use and (possibly) rank them
in constitutional adjudication. Should courts take the stance that
(pace Justice Blackmun) they do not have to settle the issue of
who is alive and who is not-of when "death begins"? 182 Could
they legitimately do so?
(b) The opinion and outcome
The first and well-known challenge presented by Cruzan is
to figure out what the Court held. The task was made more difficult than usual by a really confusing majority opinion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist is well known for his sense of humor and for
his (related?) lack of interest in the (non-)appearance of logical
progression and (in)completeness of legal argument structures.
He obviously wrote the opinion to befuddle us, and, in this respect, it is a highly skilled and effective opinion.

181See supra text preceding note 93 (discussing independent moral decisionmaking b courts).

The reference is to Justice Blackmun's statement in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 159 (1973): "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins."
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To figure the opinion out, think first of the rights-claimants'
positions-initially taking both Ms. Cruzan and her parents as
such claimants-and how they should be formulated and established. (I will return to the issue of identifying rights-holders
below.) This stage of analysis, admittedly difficult to manage,
seemed at some points to stump the majority. The problem, not
a novel one in law generally, is to identify someone who might
have a threshold right or interest, whatever the ultimate outcome. The obvious first candidate here is the patient, but the
idea that a permanently unconscious patient really has interests
of any sort poses serious challenges. (Assume a zero chance of
any return of consciousness to any degree, as the Court seemed
to do.) 183 Nevertheless, in a kind of secular ritual, 184 we insist
that these patients are rights-holders-a view I am not out to
dispatch, at least insofar as it informs everyday thought; ritual
has its uses. Talk of rights-at least of certain rights-and their
implementation serves to reinforce notions of individual autonomy and respect for persons. In ordinary thought, we don't rationalize carrying out a testator's instructions simply on the
ground that doing so encourages saving and brings satisfaction
during life. We also, and more prominently, say (or think)
things like "This is what Homer wanted, and his preferences
endure and bind us as if he were still here-and maybe he is."
Why we defer to prior expressed or inferred preferences of
permanently unconscious persons and of the dead bears much
more discussion, but not here.185 It seems clear that custom and
tradition not only do not exclude Nancy Cruzan as a rights
holder, they may affirmatively include her, although this is far
from certain. The life-process fragmentation that accounts (in
part) for the difficulty of dealing with the permanently unconscious suggests a "tradition-gap" leaving the rights-holding issue indeterminate. But even if there are analytically better ways
183

There remains some controversy over the nature of vegetative states and of

the permissible range of actions in managing them. See generally Marcia Angell,
After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1524 (1994) (discussing social, ethical, and legal problems in caring for persons in persistent vegetative states).
184 On the idea of "secular ritual," see generally Sally F. Moore & Barbara G.
Myerhoff, Introduction,Secular Ritual: Forms and Meanings, in SECULAR RrruAL 324 (Sally F. Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoff eds., 1977).
185 See generally Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients:
Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 404
(1986) (criticizing reliance on a determination of the patient's past preferences).
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to deal with the permanently unconscious, we will probably
keep talking, both in ordinary language and legal discourse, as
if the permanently unconscious-perhaps even the dead-continue to hold interests.1 86 The implementation of this view is, of
course, not simple, and remains subject to certain rules that
sometimes compete with each other, and pose intricate conceptual problems. (Think, for example, of the "substituted judgment" standard that requires us to follow the rights-holders
probable preferences, and compare it with the "best interests"
standard.)
The Cruzan Court did not clearly explain how it identified
the supposed rights holder(s). This does not mean, however,
that the Court illicitly jumped to a later argument stage, where it
seems to have chosen some mid-level form of heightened scrutiny: the standard of review might be the same whether the patient or her parents or both were viewed as rights-holders. It
thus need not in all cases unambiguously designate the rights
holders (although any standard of review that fails to do so is
quite incomplete). This impenetrability, as we saw, exists because alterations in the technological terrain have pushed us beyond simple conceptualizations of life and death. We didn't always have the capacity to keep organic human shells alive after
their inhabitants have departed.
But the Court in fact did in its own way address the whoholds-what-rights question. It seemed to conclude (perhaps reluctantly) that competent persons have liberty interests in refusing medical treatment. ("Conclude" may be a better term
than "held" because Ms. Cruzan was obviously incompetent,
and what the Court said about the rights of competent persons
was technically "dictum.") The Chief Justice said: "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferredfrom our prior decisions."187 Dictum or no, the statement
is fairly straightforward, so it seems provisionally reasonable to
186Perhaps

another account would concede that the permanently unconscious

person has no interests, but that other parties may have continuing interests in her
body, in managing information concerning the person, and in promoting her memory
in certain ways, both for themselves and for others. Such a path, however, might
seem to jeopardize norms of autonomy and respect for persons, as noted in the text
above. This is part of the more general problem of choosing among conceptual systems even when they lead to similar outcomes.
187 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).
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think Cruzan recognizes a significant liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment generally, even if the majority opinion's
author didn't seem overjoyed about saying so.
The Court spent little time explaining how it derived the
liberty interest, but this was not inappropriate here. If there are
any unmentioned liberty interests at all, the right of a competent
person to refuse medical treatment seems to be one on most interpretive paths. Spending lots of time on showing this convergence may in some ways be counterproductive, raising doubts
among readers about whether the liberty interest exists after all.
The Court's principal maneuver was to mention the fairly uniform course of the common law in describing and enforcing
such a 18
right of refusal, and went on to other, more complex
matters. 8
Although it came through less clearly in the opinion, the
general idea that we have a tradition of constitutional dimension
in protecting liberty as personal security against physical intrusion (beneficial or harmful, medical or nonmedical) seems plausible. In this area of conduct, we do not have the kinds of
clearly Janus-faced practices and seriously fractured traditions
we find in, say, matters of sexual orientation, where we keep
laws that formally denounce certain conduct, but rarely enforce
them, or even care to do so. 189 Still, the area of "competent refusal of medical treatment" is not entirely uniform, and the
common law is not the sole (or depending on the circumstances,
even the dominant) determinant of tradition. Some individual
patient refusals may not be highly regarded by families, friends,
and physicians, who may pressure or even fool reluctant patients into accepting a proposed treatment. In this light, Cruzan
is a vivid illustration of our interpretive postulate that there are
important constitutional rights that should be recognized by the
Court, despite the absence of texts no more specific than "nor
shall any State deprive any person of... liberty.., without due
'" See id. at 269-73 (observing that, at common law, everyone had the right
to control her own body).
189 But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (reflecting the occa-

sional-and in this case somewhat accidental-exception). On maintaining clumsy
institutions that are meant simultaneously to reinforce conflicting values and norms,
see Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy
Institutions, 61 S. CAL.L. REV. 1555 (1988) (suggesting that the judicial election
process is a clumsy institution because it seems to pit the idea of law as principle

against democratic values).
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process of law." 190 In theory, that recognition must impose serious burdens of justification on states bent on limiting these
rights, at least beyond some (de minimis?) threshold of impairment.
The protest that one cannot "find" such liberty interests in
the Constitution's text is, on its own, too crude to be of much
use, despite the reckless language of some who protest that because asserted rights X and Y do not appear in haec verba in the
text, they cannot exist. (The First Amendment, after all, "says"
nothing about protecting sign language, which isn't "speech,"
and if the Framers had meant "communication" rather than
"speech," they would have said it.) One often hears this hyperbolic objection from many quarters, including the Justices,
partly because it expresses an important and often articulated
idea: we promote republican democracy by deferring to legislative judgments and avoiding officious interference with them by
courts. Moreover, one may ask, if some interest is so important
that it bears mention in the constitutional text (speech, religion,
and-why not?-property), why aren't all these nonexplicit but
supposedly very important rights and interests themselves specifically mentioned? The Framers, after all, didn't set things up
as an elaborate scavenger hunt for their general amusement.
But there are obvious, well-rehearsed counter-ideas, which I
mention in passing. "Liberty" is an abstract term that of course
fails to specify any particulars at all. It's not supposed to be
specific-indeed, it can't be, if we really prefer our default rule
to be that we are free to act unless rightfully prohibited, instead
of being barred from doing so until we get specific permission.191 To insist that a liberty interest must be "presented" in
the text in haec verba (more or less) is analytically indefensible
on any known interpretive theory-at least given the assumption that the liberty/due process clauses are not redundant and
are not there simply for show. The more respectable critique of
an "implied fundamental rights" case lies in saying that there is
no warrant for selecting one particular claim of right (say, to
refuse medical treatment) for serious protection and rejecting
another (say, to drive an unsafe vehicle), unless the selection is
founded on long-standing views, attitudes and behaviors. That
§ 1.
are, of course, particular realms of conduct in which different re-

190 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
191There

gimes hold-for example, we are generally not permitted to use, on our own, certain
self-locomotion devices, such as cars and airplanes, unless we first secure licenses.
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investigation, in turn, requires attention to overlapping factors
such as history, customary lexical understandings (perhaps both
then and now), and authorial states of mind that in turn may
require confirmation by reference back to traditional beliefs and
understandings. The axes of interpretation are locked into a
continuing renvoi.
Of course, we cannot rest with general formulations such as
"liberty interest" or "fundamental right" (a term being used less
often by the Court, at least where nonexplicit rights under the
liberty clauses are concerned). Despite the general acknowledgement of a global right of some sort to refuse medical
treatment, we cannot live with every application of it across the
board, and the right is often couched-as here-in terms that
express the major presupposition 192 of competence.
But here we need to return to the Cruzan opinion because
we are still far from grasping the full "holding" of the case (assuming we can do so at all), and major questions remain in determining its conclusions generally. First, does the refusal right
extend to lifesaving medical treatment? It is one thing to refuse
an antibiotic for a bacterial sinus infection, and quite another to
refuse it for generalized sepsis, which can easily be fatal if untreated (and sometimes even if treated). We have traditional
strictures against familiar forms of suicide, so why should we
tolerate it in the form of protecting even competent refusals of
lifesaving medical treatment? The question is all the more
pointed if the lifesaving measures are not strictly "medical," but
are "medically administered" substitutes for food and water.
This last consideration seems to have been among Justice
Scalia's points in his concurrence, and, given his general views
on how (not) to infer the existence of fundamental rights or liberty interests, his argument is in tension with his own interpretive canon, which relies heavily on tradition and history. The
decisive consideration for him, absent specific textual protection or evidence about Framers' intent, is limited to whatever

192 The

exact status of such "qualifications" suggests the familiar questions
about the distinction between exceptions and defining features. Recall battles over
whether to view some factor as an "element" of a crime rather than to treat its absence as a defense (e.g., problems in "locating" an insanity defense or a claim of
diminished capacity). See generally Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 871 (1991) (discussing the concept of exceptions in the law).
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traditionand history turn out to be. 193 He mentioned our strong

traditions against committing or being complicit in suicide, but
neglected to note the strong possibility that by tradition, we do
not generally say that refusal of lifesaving or life-supporting
treatment or care is necessarily a form of suicide. Perhaps an
otherwise healthy person's refusal of treatment for an otherwise
lethal infection is suicide, at least if not religiously based (as
with Christian Scientists). Even more clearly, his refusal of food
and water, as ordinarily ingested by oneself or a caregiver,
would be analogized to deliberate starvation, which is dead
certain to result in death, if more slowly than a death blow. But
this is not necessarily so for persons who are terminally ill or in
such a chronic painful and debilitated state that they decline
further treatment, and further care (such as artificial nutrition
and hydration), knowing that this is likely, perhaps certain, to
advance the time of death. I do not claim anything near a universal consensus on this, but it is reflected in many decided
cases. 194 If Justice Scalia believed that this was not a widespread traditional understanding, he should have said so because
the issue is critical to explaining his Cruzan position, which
otherwise seems to run counter to his own tradition criterion.
More specifically, Justice Scalia attacked (as applied here)
the action/inaction distinction, which is regularly offered to
"explain" why refusing lifesaving treatment is not necessarily
suicide; he apparently thought the distinction senseless in that
context. But the constitutionally material point here is that by
tradition, we don't generally hold that refusing lifesaving
care-whether classic medical treatment or "artificially" administered nourishment-is ipso facto suicide, and indeed we
seem to presume that it's not, at least when we are dealing with
some categories of very sick persons. Moreover, whatever strain
of "tradition" that distinguished between deliberate starvation
and refusal of medical treatment doesn't have much purchase
where nutrition and hydration are administered via medical
193 "It is at least true that no 'substantive due process' claim can be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a right
historically and traditionally protected against state interference." Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
194 See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App.
1983) (stating that "medical" nutrition and hydration is more like other medical procedures than like "typical" ways of providing nutrition and hydration; the court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition against continuing homicide prosecutions
against physicians for allowing the death of a permanently unconscious patient).
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contraptions. Although Justice Scalia rightly observes that the
focus should be, not on action versus inaction, but on comparing different forms of inaction, 195 he fails to credit the widespread (though not unanimous) view that artificial nutrition and
hydration have been generally lodged in the "medical" category,
rather than the one for feeding-as-natural nurture, which there is
in general no right to refuse. His opinion is thus an impressive
example of an ad hoc departure from his own tradition-oriented
system of thought, whether the tradition-including its underlying rationales as part of that tradition-is sound or absurd. He
was not free to discard the findings of a tradition inquirywhich he helped initiate-by segmenting a portion of the found
tradition and dismissing it as ridiculous because, in his view, it
involves an indefensible distinction between actions and omissions in the situation at hand. This is far more Brennan-like than
Scalia-like.196 On his own interpretive scheme, then, the supposed irrationality of the distinction is simply immaterial.
But this commentary on Justice Scalia's concurrence has
brought us somewhat ahead of ourselves; the majority opinion
still requires attention. Although one has to hunt about in the
majority opinion for nuggets that may be holdings, the exploration reveals that the Court not only held that there was a liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment, but that this interest extended even to lifesaving medical treatment. As the Chief Justice put it: "It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing lifesustaining medical treatment." 197 That's a holding-although
why it as stated in more apodictic terms than the earlier holding
about medical treatment generally is unclear.
Even at this stage, however, the Court is still not done with
the task of characterizing rights and interests. We saw earlier
that the life-maintenance technology used in Cruzan had "fractured" human personhood, creating a situation in which "personality-life" is irreversibly disjoint from "physical-organismlife." But the question now is whether this life-maintenance
technology, which "artificially" delivers nourishment and liq'

95

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

196See Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491

U.S. 110 (1988). See generally Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitutionand
the Family, 93 HARV.L. REV. 1156, 1178, 1180 (1980) (arguing for rational limits on
tradition analysis).
1' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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uids to patients, is rightly called "medical." After all, it occupies the place of ordinary nurture in providing food and drink to
patients (or anyone), and, if appropriate, even feeding them by
hand. The point of the distinction is that patients have no common law right to refuse such (non-medical) care, 198 and so an

incompetent person's proxy arguably could not demand an end
to providing food and drink to the patient.
It thus seems quite plausible to say-for any patient-that
much of what is done for them is not medical, despite the clinical surroundings. The care that the sick receive isn't all in the
form of treatment administered with the backing of a disorder
model. Intravenous infusions of antibiotics to clear an infection
are obviously medical care. Feeding a person by. hand (which
obviously could not be done in Cruzan) is not medical care,
even if administered by health care personnel when the patient
can't feed herself. Thus, if a patient doesn't want to be fed, she
cannot invoke the common law or the liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment. This does not necessarily mean that she
will-or can legally be-force-fed. (To do so might be battery.)
She may be asked to leave the hospital, or to be transferred to
one that promises not to feed her, or her physician may dismiss
her as a patient. (To be sure, these measures pose risks of liability for abandonment or patient-dumping.)
The particular problem in Cruzan was of course that no one
was "feeding" Ms. Cruzan in the ordinary sense of the term. She
received nourishment from what look like medical devices attached to her body, not through the use of dining utensils
wielded by health care personnel or family members. The Court
was thus faced with having to compare intravenous nutrition
and hydration first with ordinary feeding, and then with the use
of medical contraptions to infuse the body with various medicinal substances. We have yet another example (perhaps a small
one) of category straddling induced by technological changes.
This argument stage is where the issue of "holdings" arguendo becomes pertinent. This assumption-for-argument's-sake
198
For purposes of comparison, see Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (Ct. App. 1986), where the California Court of Appeal ruled that a competent but
physically impaired woman with cerebral palsy could refuse forced feeding via a
nasogastric tube. Note also that the California Supreme Court ruled in Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Ct. App. 1983), that there was no material
difference between artificial nutrition and hydration, on the one hand, and fullfledged medical treatment, on the other.
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device enabled the Court to (properly) avoid having to definitively assign artificial nutrition and hydration to either the
medical or nonmedical categories or to a tertium quid. The
Court said (my interlineations are bracketed):
Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our
cases, the forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of artificially-delivered food and
water essential to life, would implicate a competent person's liberty interest. Although we think the logic of the
cases discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest [this is perilously close to "holding" language],
the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such
treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the
deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible. [Of course. Who said the right was absolute?] But
for purposes of this case, we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hy1 99
dration and nutrition.
The last-quoted sentence is the Court's only arguendo conclusion or holding. If it is integrated into the non-arguendo conclusions, the Court's overall statement is that competent persons
have a constitutional liberty interest in refusing all medical
therapy, including life-sustaining
treatment, and all care, in2 00
measures.
lifesaving
cluding
There are also some problems in sorting things out beyond
the issue of identifying a holding. If the right to refuse treatment is a reasonably well-protected constitutional interest, then
' Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
Taken as a true holding, the Court's assertion of a competent person's
right to refuse treatment would seem absolute, comprehending all reasons for refusal,
however questionable. The patient, for example, could refuse lifesaving treatment
because she viewed her life as worthless, or for religious reasons. In neither case
would the welfare of minor children (or other survivors) be material, although the
point is arguable. But taken as an unnecessary conclusion (given Ms. Cruzan's incompetence), one might question the solidity of the right's absoluteness, and speculate about whether the Court would ever uphold a state's disallowing a competent
person's refusal of lifesaving treatment, where the refusal is based on the patient's
view that her life is worthless (to her, or others, or both). In Cruzan, the Court said
that Missouri was free to disallow quality-of-life considerations from entering into
decisions about withholding life-sustaining treatments. See id. at 262-63. Might it be
free to discount it in cases of competent refusal?
200
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it must impose a serious burden of justification on government
action that intrudes upon it. (Again, there is a possible de minimis threshold.) But this burden of justification-captured in the
particular but unnamed standard of review in fact applied-was
not specified in the majority opinion. It was, of course there, as
part of the (hidden) infrastructure of the case, and there may be
reasons for being non-explicit about standards of review in
various circumstances, if not in the Cruzan situation. Nevertheless, the lack of an explained connection between interest characterization and standard of review selection is confusing. This
is illustrated by the Court's statement that "the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the
inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible." This is true and is not trivial, and encapsulates an obvious point about recognition of non-absolute liberty interests and the justifications for burdening them. But we
are not told by this terse announcement just what is meant by
"dramatic consequences" beyond the obvious and fundamental
consequence that someone-or something-dies when a permanently unconscious patient's still-operating organism finally
ceases to function, whether from inanition or any other cause.
Nor are we told how to assess these dramatic consequences, or
what other considerations determine whether the breach of the
person's interest is permissible.
Again, one should ask whether the Court was being properly circumspect: was it necessary to extend the discussion?
After all, for those who think that permanently unconscious persons are already dead, thus permitting closure for all concerned,
then "death" may be for them a less "dramatic consequence"
than for others. But perhaps it is enough that many persons,
family included, would perceive the result of withdrawing care
as catastrophic because it clearly up-ends existing and dominant
views.
Turn next to another aspect of the majority's comment
that "the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of such
treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation [my italics] of that [liberty] interest is constitutionally permissible." On the surface, this is not about the initial recognition of a liberty interest, but about the results of impairing it
once recognized. Yet one could argue that the Court's tone
melded matters of rights-recognition with countervailing government interests. In this sense, perhaps it was suggesting in its
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subtext that if government interests are strong enough, there is
no threshold presumptive right-at least for incompetent persons-at the start.This is in theory quite different from saying
that there is no bottom-line right under particular circumstances
that might be taken to justify impairing a conceded threshold
right. Settling on the best way of putting it is not a minor question of labeling, but may involve serious questions of legal
philosophy generally and constitutional law in particular that
have real-world payoffs. The distinction between what one
might see as threshold rights and as bottom-line rights may not
always affect the outcome of constitutional adjudication, but it
can, and the two conceptual systems represented are quite different, as has long been understood by rights theorists.
Return now to the issue of who holds what rights and what
difference it makes. The Court's remarks about the role of
(in)competence seem to suggest that the liberty interest in refusing care, whatever its scope, extends in some form both to
competent and incompetent persons:
Petitioners go on to assert that an incompetent person
should possess the same right in this respect as is possessed by a competent person. They rely primarily on
our decisions in Parham v. J.R., [442 U.S. 584 (1979)],
and Youngberg v. Romeo, [457 U.S. 307 (1982)]. In
Parham, we held that a mentally disturbed minor child
had a liberty interest in "not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment," 442 U.S., at 600, but we
certainly did not intimate that such a minor child, after
commitment, would have a liberty interest in refusing
treatment. In Youngberg, we held that a seriously retarded adult had a liberty interest in safety and freedom
from bodily restraint, 457 U.S., at 320. Youngberg,
however, did not deal with decisions to administer or
withhold medical treatment.
The difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it
begs the question: An incompetent person is not able to
make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right.
Such a "right" must be exercised for her, if at all, by
some sort of surrogate. Here, Missouri . . . has estab-

lished a procedural safeguard to assure that the action of
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the surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. Missouri requires that evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to
the withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The question, then, is whether the
United States Constitution forbids the establishment of
this procedural requirement by the State. We hold that it
does not. [This is a true holding, resolving the narrow
issue in the case concerning the constitutional validity
of the clear-and-convincing-evidencestandard.]
Whether or not Missouri's clear and convincing evidence requirement comports with the United States
Constitution depends in part on what interests the State
may properly seek to protect in this situation. Missouri
relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of
human life, and there can be no gainsaying this interest.
As a general matter, the States-indeed, all civilized
nations-demonstrate their commitment to life by
treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the
majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit
suicide. We do not think a State is required to remain
neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death.
But in the context presented here, a State has more particular interests at stake. The choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this
choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary
requirements.2 ° '
The unsurprising gist of these passages is that we seem to
have a liberty interest held by incompetent persons, but one that
must be exercised by a proxy, if at all, as the Chief Justice observed. (It is not clear whether the Court would say this about a
person who had never been competent, but I do not deal with
this here.) But what does this mean? How can one have a right
20!

Id. at 279-81 (citation omitted).
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to choose but be entirely unable to exercise it oneself because of
a failure of the very capacity to choose (or to choose with some
degree rationality)? If an interest is defined by reference to
choice, one might well urge that no one who is entirely able to
make a present choice can have that interest. A reference to
temporality thus seems required to rescue-or reconstruct-the
idea that the permanently unconscious have choice rights right
now. We posit a continuing competent being who once had
preferences, and these preferences-express or not-comprehended matters arising in the future, which has now arrived.
This seems consistent with the opinion's emphasis on "safeguard[ing] the personal element of this choice," and its endorsement of the state's efforts "to assure that the action of the
surrogate conforms as best it may to the wishes expressed by
the patient while competent."
This is not a complete "rescue," to be sure, and one may
still view askance the application of a liberty-interest-as-achoice-right to a patient as she is now-and now is when the
decision is to be made. The idea that a liberty interest in decision making can be held by permanently unconscious persons
remains odd, at least if one thinks that such persons do not have
interests in any commonly understood sense. (Even if an interest is defined by reference to some events or conditions not involving choice-e.g., being pain-free-how can an utterly insensate patient hold the interest?) Nevertheless, it displays in an
intuitively (if partially) understandable way the link between a
permanently unconscious patient who was once conscious, and
the notion of autonomous choice (or autonomous choice "delayed").
But what question was "begged" by petitioners? It doesn't
seem to be the question of what the patient's preferences were
while competent-or what preferences she would have expressed had the problem been called to her attention. There is
also the possibility that the begged question is whether incompetents can indeed hold liberty interests at all. °2 Still another
possibility is that the begged question concerned whether Ms.
Cruzan's parents could, on their own, exercise "her" choice for
her, without attending to the specifics of her prior competent
preferences; or, if the liberty interest is not a choice right but an
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interest in not being treated or violated, her parents could decide
to vindicate that interest by their own lights.
These speculations simply confirm the point that the disjoinder between organic life and personhood-life makes it difficult to talk sensibly within our present frameworks of discourse.
Let's push on, however, accepting the characterization that unconscious incompetent persons have (present) interests involving choice, but that this choice-right can only be exercised by
proxies. The Cruzan decision allows something far stronger
than the traditional "substituted-judgment" test, which demands
that proxies adhere to the patient's preferences, but does not
necessarily impose a rigorous standard of proof to be applied to
discerning those preferences. The Court explicitly rejected the
idea that states were stuck with the unadorned idea of "substituted judgment" and couldn't
require that test to incorporate
203
proof.
of
standards
rigorous
The question now is whether it is indeed permissible, or
even obligatory, for the state to skew the risk of error by making it significantly more difficult for proxies to find a patient
preference for non-care (and thus for almost certain death in the
usual sense) than for continuing care. Does this invade the supposed threshold liberty interest of incompetent persons?
Perhaps not. Consider again the proper designation of the
liberty interest: is it about not being treated-or,instead, about
choosing whether to be treated? It is not clear how this question
can be answered even with a more explicit account than the
Court provided about the constitutional value of the liberty interest "in not being treated" (choice aside)-particularly as held
by permanently unconscious patients. It is well and good to say
that when the patient is incompetent, doubts about her preferences should be resolved in favor of life, without which there is
neither competence nor incompetence. But Ms. Cruzan wasn't
merely transiently incompetent-temporarily indisposed until
another day. By most accounts, she was to remain forever incompetent and insensate. What doubt was there to resolve?
Whether she was indeed permanently unconscious, or utterly
insensate while unconscious? The main doubt was about what
she (would have) wanted, but it remains unclear why this should
or should not be the main question. And because this issue203

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-87 (stating that the determination of a pa-

tient's prior preferences may be subject to a clear and convincing standard of proof).
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framing matter remains unclear, one might argue that federalism
requires deference to a state's resolution of a still-imponderable
normative/conceptual quandary. Unless we construct a definitive account of a liberty interest in choice that a state clearly
violates, the indeterminacy arguably ought to be resolved by the
state. There is, so far, no sufficiently complete or coherent account of a liberty interest in choice that Missouri violated,
whether or not one concurs with its policy.
(c) Further comments on the Court's decision: matters
awaiting resolution (or illumination)
e More on who holds rights to what? The petitioners, as the
Chief Justice observed, argued that incompetent persons have
"the same right" as competent persons in this context. As we
saw, he responds by saying that "in a sense this begs the question." I suggested earlier that this might refer to the very possibility that permanently unconscious persons hold liberty interests in refusing life-sustaining care, or simply in not having
such care ("refusal" and other matters of choice left aside). It
might also refer to the view that whatever kind of liberty interest the patient holds, her proxies may exercise it "for her."
Did the Court in fact say that all persons have a liberty interest in refusing medical treatment or that only competent persons have such rights? If incompetent persons don't have such
rights, 0 4 then, as things stand, there is no right held by anyone
that requires exercise via a surrogate. In this case (no parental
or familial rights were asserted independently of the rights of
the patient), and the surrogate's right is parasitic upon the patient's rights-and if the latter has no rights, neither does the
former.
The problem with the petitioners' claim that both competent and incompetent persons have the same rights is not that it
begs any questions, but that it is either incompletely specified or
incoherent. What does "the same rights" refer to? Are we talking about the same threshold or presumptive right held by all
persons? (Incompetents are obviously legal persons, although
204 See

Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "a
competent individual's decision to refuse life-sustaining medical procedures is an
aspect of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). However, he immediately added that "upon a proper evidentiary showing, a
qualified guardian may make that decision on behalf of an incompetent ward." Id.
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some-such as the permanently unconscious-may fall short of
personhood in the prevalent philosophical sense.) 20 5 If the incompetent patient does not have this threshold right, choicebased or not, what is Cruzan all about? The opinion, as we saw,
offered no rational reconstruction of the way we talk about what
incompetent people and dead people would have wanted, or
what some incompetent persons might "really" want right now
but can't articulate.
If, however, the claim is not about the premise that someone holds a threshold right of a certain sort (say, to speak
freely), but about whether a person holds a bottom-line, end-ofthe-argument right to do this particularthing she wants to do in
these particularcircumstances (say, to suggest to a crowd of
enraged, mayhem-minded persons that storming a globalization
meeting might be a good idea), then no question is begged-the
question is simply being argued. If someone says that incompetents hold rights exactly like those of competent persons
(even if this is an odd way to talk, many do talk this way), what
does this mean, conceptually and operationally? The government can plausibly agree that all persons do indeed hold a presumptive right to refuse medical treatment or lifesaving care,
but under certain circumstances the threshold claim is defeated.
Which circumstances, established when and how? There are
many examples of "having a right" in one sense (i.e., at the
threshold, or "prima facie," or "presumptive") and not having a
right in another sense (at the end of ihe day, when the situation
has been examined). The state could argue that parents cannot
refuse lifesaving medical treatment for themselves when this
would endanger their minor children. It could argue that anyone
who has critically important information vital to the survival of
the Alpha Quadrant of the galaxy cannot refuse lifesaving
medical treatment. It could also say that persons who are incompetent cannot exercise this right directly because their incompetence renders such immediate exercise inconsistent with
the very foundations of the autonomy-based right. (Is "having a
right that one can never exercise or implement for oneself' a
coherent notion? Only if it is not a choice-right?)
Perhaps this talk of permanently unconscious patients
holding rights that must be "exercised" by others involves a
category mistake. Incompetence is not a "circumstance" that
205 See Crosby, supra note 177.
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defeats an otherwise plausible kind of claim; it goes to the heart
of who can rightly be said to have the claim. Moreover, even if
incompetence might be a "circumstance" in some cases-in
particular, where there is a nontrivial possibility that the incompetent can recover some or all of his former competence-it
can't be one here because the patient has no possibility of recovering anything at all.
So, we have a problem-not in "labeling," but in choosing
alternative conceptual systems which, even if they lead to the
same bare outcome (X wins or loses whatever), reflect somewhat different normative attitudes. It is one thing to assert that
all persons hold a certain right, but certain contingencies require that the claim of right is in that instance defeated. It is another to expressly fragment humanity into different parts and
divide the set of persons into those who hold rights of a certain
sort from the start and those who don't. It appears to embrace
exclusion rather than inclusion, and although matters of appearance are not always part of explicit constitutional doctrine, appearance counts for quite a bit. (Think of Establishment Clause
cases dealing with whether government action appears to endorse particular religions or their branches, or-more controversially-religion over non-religion.) 2°6
There is a continuing open question that links the issue of
who holds what rights with many other matters implicated in
Cruzan. If we avoid speaking of interests currently held by the
permanently unconscious, how do we re-characterize the current
modes of both ordinary and constitutional talk? Should we
speak solely in terms of liberty interests held by others-nextof-kin, friends-to act on behalf of themselves, not the patients?
(What if a patient's identity is unknown?) And what are the
sources and contents of those rights? To be sure, this maneuver
of bypassing talk of patients' rights does not avoid the difficulty
of dealing with them. From the next-of-kin's perspective, there
remains the moral question of how she should exercise her
right. One then has to deal with the moral pull, such as it is, of
attending to a patient's prior or supposed preferences and/or to
her best interests. In our world, black boxes may have no block
boxes for their own use, and need to develop their own criteria
for choice.
206 For

a review, see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at 978-81 (dis-

cussing neutrality and symbolic endorsement criteria in Establishment Clause cases).
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Non-choice rights. This topic, mentioned earlier, is
closely related to the preceding one about possible rightsholders. Perhaps we have been talking about the wrong sorts of
rights. Suppose we separate different circumstances involving
incompetent persons. One person may be temporarily incompetent-say, a hockey player who suffers a concussion, along with
a large, bleeding gash caused by an encounter with someone's
skates. It makes sense to say he has a right to refuse treatment,
and if the treatment involves a blood transfusion and he is
known to be a rigorous Jehovah's Witness (he believes he will
suffer in the afterlife even if the transfusion is forced upon
him), there isn't much strain in acknowledging that giving him a
transfusion would intrude upon his right not to be treated,
whether his right is a choice right or a non-choice right.
But it's much harder to say something like this for someone
who has never been competent, such as a person profoundly impaired from birth. This is no fleeting indisposition that renders
him temporarily incompetent. Talking of a right to refuse or accept treatment-or to decide anything that goes beyond elemental childlike choice ("I'll fun now and rest later"; "I won't
touch this wire because it will hurt me") for such persons seems
to be pushing it.
Of course, this person does have rights of certain sorts. All
creatures capable of feeling pain arguably have rights both to
choose to be free of pain, and to be free of pain. Perhaps this
turns on the difference between preferring something (freedom
from pain) and choosing it; incompetent conscious persons certainly have preferences. (Some unconscious persons may feel
pain in some sense, but those in permanent vegetative states
probably do not.) The point is that being free of pain is not
solely the subject of a choice-right-of "choosing to refuse
pain"--where that choice is part of a more complex decision to
avoid one therapy or another, or anything else that risks pain.
The incompetent person simply has a preference and a right not
to suffer, unless there is some good reason (necessary
or appro20 7
priate medical treatment, for example) to risk it.
e
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An incompetent person has a personal right to be dealt with in ways that

promote her interests reasonably efficiently, and this means reducing avoidable costs
such as pain and suffering. If it were thought that permanently "unconscious" patients
were very likely to be suffering in some way, then it would be sensible to say they
held various non-choice rights to avoid suffering. Indeed, if recovery was utterly
beyond hope, one might well say that looking to her prior expressed preferencessay, to continue being cared for despite having to endure pain-would usually be ill-
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We are, however, dealing with the particular situation of
the permanently unconscious, not all incompetent persons. As
we saw, it is thought that there is a class of patients who are indeed irreversibly unconscious and utterly insensate: they feel
nothing-from their "viewpoint," it is as if they were dead. One
might then argue that they therefore have neither choice rights
nor other kinds of rights. Still, as suggested, we might try to
reconstruct the choice right to reflect and honor the person's
prior status as a competent, autonomous person.
But we do not always-or even often-talk this way about
such persons. If their prior preferences have been adequately
expressed, we still talk of vindicating their choice. And although they presumably feel no pain, we speak of their continuing rights to have their bodies dealt with as they wish
(within limits) and, more generally, to their interest in closurefor themselves or others or both. Of course, this normative/conceptual difficulty is not a recent arrival on the scene.
But it has become more pressing because biomedical technology now enables us to divide formerly integrated features of our
lives-organic life, and life as a functioning, sentient personfor extended periods. Perhaps the precise situation in Cruzan
didn't require the Court to press the analysis of who holds what
presumptive rights that can be defeated in what ways, and perhaps no situation will ever arise that requiresthe Court to better
explain what it thinks it is doing. (Looking for a "full" explanation is at least remotely akin to looking for the boundaries of the
universe.) For the rest of us, however, constitutional analysis
can't stop with the contents of a judicial opinion.
e State interests in life and in its citizens' interests in
choice. The Cruzan opinion, in reviewing possible government
interests in regulating non-treatment decisions, referred both to
a "commitment to life" and the protection of "the personal element of this choice" -referring to a patient's choosing whether
to remove lifesaving care in any form. One might argue that
neither is even a legitimate government interest because there is
no abstract value in life beyond the value of particular lives, and

y, to continue being cared for despite having to endure pain-would usually be illconsidered. Why allow someone to suffer when that suffering cannot be part of a
treatment/care regime that could assist in her recovery-or promote national security
or serve some other public purpose?
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those lives are the responsibility of their livers. 208 Sorry-I
meant of those who live them.
As for safeguarding "the personal element" in life-or-death
choices, I assume the Court was referring not to literal choice
by the permanently unconscious patient at the present decisionpoint, but to the ideal of deciding the fate of incompetent persons by deferring to the preferences they had while still competent, and which in some sense still define them, even as permanently unconscious. But it remains a contested issue whether
we should deal with incompetent persons on the basis of the
outcome of this investigation into prior preferences-which to
be sure appears to reinforce autonomy norms-or to devise
some notion of how to promote the incompetent person's best
interests. (If the person is permanently unconscious, it is, as I
said, especially difficult to assign meaning to "her best interests.")
In any case, referring back to the patient's prior preferences
might colorably be said to preserve "the personal element" in
decision making, although that element-construed to embrace
the present need for decision-is exactly what has been compromised or even fully annulled by the patient's condition. In
this sense, preserving the personal element may serve norm reinforcement functions, though this depends on what the "audience" members "see." ("The personal element" can't refer
merely to the proxy's current preferences; it refers, at most, to
her reconstruction of the patient's past preferences, for the patient's sake.) A "best-interests-of-the-patient" standard may also
promote some of these norm reinforcement functions, but it
omits (on its face, at least) any specific reference to the patient's individual autonomy. (There is an obvious overlap between the substituted judgment and best interests standard that
we need not address here.)
The reference to the patient's views ex ante of course requires some procedures for confirmation and implementation of
these views. Even if there are clear written documents that
soundly evidence these preferences, someone or some entity
technically must serve as a "proxy," even if it is the court itself.
Having said all this, we still face the question of why a
particular resolution of the issue of nontreatment of permanently unconscious is a matter of interest to the state?
208

See supra note 204.
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Here is one responsive line: There is a conceptual and a
rhetorical difference (if not always an operational one) between
claiming that, as a proxy, one is following one's own preferences, as opposed to deciding matters on the basis of either the
patient's preferences or her best interests. (The concept of best
interests may or may not take account of her probable prior
preferences or probable present preferences, if she could make
them known during a fit of competence.) At least for purposes
of value reinforcement, why can't a state choose one substantive standard for proxy decision making over another as its official state policy, and choose one rule of evidence over another
to promote that policy? Perhaps the state is more attuned to the
possibility that the prior expressed preferences of the patient
would not endure, or might not be applied in the particular
situation at hand. People write down all kinds of rubbish to describe anything, including their present views of what their future views might be on any given subject. I know of no generally accepted theory of what counts as a legitimate, important,
or compelling government interest that would, as a matter of
constitutional law rather than of a particular political philosophy, 20 9 disallow Missouri's claims in this case, which seem devoted to determining the patient's previously held preferences,
and thus may serve to promote the idea of personal autonomy.
On the other hand, perhaps this works best only if one
doesn't look too closely at the situation, which most of us don't.
Some social learning mechanisms may rest on the average observer's lack of perceptual acuity. Autonomy has multiple, often
competing aspects, and one can discern disrespect for autonomy
(in one aspect) in Missouri's scheme, as well as respect for it (in
another aspect): most persons might well say they would prefer
non-care if they end up in Ms. Cruzan's condition. Moreover, if
we asked what the reasonable person would prefer, the likeliest
response would be that such a person would prefer non-care under the assumed circumstances. From this standpoint, Missouri
is impairing autonomy ideals by keeping Ms. Cruzan's parents
from doing something overwhelmingly likely to have been what
their daughter wanted. Why weren't studies introduced about
what most people generally prefer in this sphere of decision
making? Because the information presented isn't individuated
*20 This is not a false opposition, despite the conceptual connection between
text interpretation and philosophical views of various sorts.
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to Ms. Cruzan? In the first place, why should this make a difference? In the second place, taking well-grounded empirical
findings about matters of fact concerning a well-defined set of
persons and applying them to persons within that set is a form
of individuation, though obviously far short of rendering the
person distinctive. The upshot, however, is simply that the
phrase "X would have wanted life-sustaining to because of her
permanent unconsciousness" is probably true, even without
knowing further individuating traits. This is not, however, a
song either in denunciation or praise of Missouri's inclinations
on how best to favor "personal choice" in this area. If the right
to refuse medical treatment is a really important liberty interest-which is an interest in choosing-then, as already argued,
it must be seriously protected by imposing a significant burden
on government to justify invading it. This burden defines the
core of (and perhaps is fully constitutive of) a given standard of
review.
Assuming that decision making for the permanently unconscious has something to do with protecting personal choice in
some sense, does Missouri indeed further or impair this personal choice ideal by requiring a careful showing of prior preference? The dissenters' position suggests the deep irony here:
Missouri's preference for promoting personal choice may accomplish exactly the opposite: By insisting on clear proof of
how she would choose, given findings about her prior express
or implied preferences, her choice right is likely to be annulled,
as one might argue. Of course, this is not done for nothing:
there is in general no moral symmetry between choosing to live
and choosing to die, and we often resolve doubts in favor of life
in order to avoid the lesser of two errors.
This particular risk-of-error analysis of course bears much
more probing, but not here, except to note a difficulty implicit
in what has already been said about the status of patients like
Ms. Cruzan: If unconsciousness is truly permanent, why isn't
the asymmetry between proving non-treatment and treatment
decisions morally and legally irrelevant on the ground that from
the "perspective" of the patient, there is morally and legally no
difference between being really dead and being permanently
unconscious? If there are no such differences, the state's interest would seem to rest entirely on selecting the best way to enforce value norms, perhaps by acting as if the moral analysis did
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establish some difference between death and permanent unconsciousness.
Then again, perhaps the asymmetry is "oppositely" relevant-i.e., the greater error here is not in mistakenly ending life
but it mistakenly requiring it, in some form, to endure. Despite
the assumption of permanent unconsciousness and the total absence of any capacity to sense or to feel, many may look upon
the permanently unconscious patient (or her soul) as suffering,
and thus enduring a needlessly painful life. Perhaps this has
"brutalization" effects on our norms, helping to shape our future
selves as pitiless drones. On the other hand, note the weasel
words I used when referring to maintaining "life in some form."
Even if life "endures," who is enduring it? The permanently unconscious, insensate person endures nothing. The "it" that "endures" (now in the sense of "continuing" rather of suffering) is
not the life of a person but of a biologic casing. Keeping permanently unconscious patients on life support thus, rightly
viewed, does not teach us to be harshly indifferent to suffering.
Moreover, this casing is clearly of considerable moral significance because of its direct link to deep human emotions. That
may be, for some, enough to sustain describing and dealing with
it in ways that seem inconsistent
with certain
moral/philosophical concepts-e.g., autonomy, personhoodnarrowly construed, but which promote those very values
through norm reinforcement. More broadly construed, moral
and philosophical analysis generally might permit or oblige us
to pursue behaviors-even rituals-that promote basic values.
Arguments from symbolism are clearly not without force,
depending on the circumstances.
Suppose we now ask: Given the state's goal of promoting
the value of personal choice in life-and-death decision making,
what follows for how we decide about treatment for the permanently unconscious (but not all incompetents)? Perhaps not
much. In particular, Missouri's decision to require clear and
convincing evidence of a permanently unconscious patient's
prior preferences for non-treatment does not follow from its
own general premises concerning life and autonomy. The importance of a right to choose does not entail that the criterion
for dealing with the permanently unconscious must be their
prior preferences. The very assertion of the importance of a
choice right arguably demands that the person ultimately be capable of choice in the future, if not at the moment. If she is not,
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then the priority assigned to the choice right seems less applicable. The permanently unconscious, and perhaps some other
permanently incompetent persons, are out of the choice loop, or
so one might argue. There is thus no reason to demand clear and
convincing evidence of actual or hypothetical choice, socialeducative considerations aside. (Indeed, if one assumes some
slim chance of cognitive recovery, the better standard is the patient's best interests, not her prior preferences, in order to further the possibility of her being able to exercise choice in the
future by keeping her alive.)
e Choice of conceptual systems. The difficulty of choosing
a normatively satisfactory conceptual system for dealing with
permanently unconscious persons may explain in part the
Cruzan opinion's intermittent impenetrability. No one knows
how to do this to everyone's reasoned satisfaction. In working
with this case, we have again bumped against what seem to be
the present limits of how we think about constitutional adjudication. What we already know about dealing with permanently
incompetent patients -those afflicted with dementia or other
severe mental impairment-only carries us so far because, as
we saw, incompetence has reached its "maximum" where there
has been a complete and permanent
break between organic life
21 0
and life as a functioning person.
This technological possibility of a permanent fracture between "mental life" and "physical (organic) life" roils our basic
values. Because we have embedded these values in the Constitution, and because standards of review implement them as
high-ranking constitutional values, we come to reexamine the
idea of standards of review as foundational (because they reflect
our basic values) and as practical implements (because they direct the courts' job of handling constitutional disputes). In doing this re-evaluation, we have had to review how we identify
constitutional rights and rights-holders, and to inspect how we
choose alternative conceptual systems. When we are outside the
realm of those technological effects our current conceptual systems cannot easily track, we are less likely to bump against the
As we saw, this is not wholly unprecedented, in light of the occasional
story of someone who has been in a coma for years and then "awakens." But the
neurological condition of comatose persons is apparently distinct from that of persons
in a persistent or permanent vegetative state, which seem not to be generally classified as comas. See generally Multi-society Task Force on PVS, supra note 177, at
1502-03.
210
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limits of constitutional templates as we now know them. But
when we are deep within new technological contexts, the constitutional limits close in on us.

CONCLUSION
The aim of this essay was to learn more about constitutional adjudication by watching it when it is pressed by biomedical technology. We may, in doing so, also learn more about
technological impacts, but this is, for present purposes, gravy.
The sequence of the commentary is pretty simple. After citing
some general points about text interpretation and applying them
more specifically to constitutional interpretation, I suggested
that all interpretational axes converged in recognizing that the
Constitution establishes hierarchies of legal relations. The existence of such hierarchies entails the existence of standards of
review that, used properly, implement these hierarchies, and
thus are critically important in furthering constitutional values
and reinforcing them as community ideals. (I made no separate
investigation of issues concerning the Constitution's authoritativeness.)
I then focused on standards of review as constituting the infrastructure of constitutional decision making, and argued that
issues in biomedical technology often raise under-recognized
questions about the nature and use of standards of review-and
thus about constitutional analysis and adjudication generally.
And if we are driven that far, we are necessarily driven to reinspecting the basic values embedded in the constitution, and
enlarging our understanding of them.
The historic complaints about standards of review2 1 1 are
understandable but overdone. Invoking these standards is said to
encourage-or reflect-question-begging and tendentiousness,
and their use as integral parts of constitutional argument structures is thus condemned as a kind of judicial and advocative
fraud. Related complaints include the objection that the standards are vague-to-meaningless, formalistic, and extraconstitutional judicial frolics having no textual or other constitutional foundation.
It is bootless to deny that some (perhaps many) uses of
some standards of review by some courts are clumsy, mislead211

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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ing, incomprehensible, or simply mistaken in some respects.
Nevertheless, the broader view that standards of review rightly
don't get no respect at all is wrong. Deficiencies in constitutional decision making by courts reflect the Peter Principle
more than terminal infirmities in standards of review. These
standards are entailed by any interpretive scheme that yields a
hierarchy of legal relations. If there are no standards of review,
there are no constitutional hierarchies, at least as far as actual
constitutional adjudication is concerned. But such hierarchies
do reside in the Constitution, and inevitably so, although one
can imagine situations where they are very primitive. However
seriously they are misused-and what constitutes "misuse" may
be contested-they are there, and we had better learn to use
them properly.
Technologies will continue to arrive and to thrive, and
some of them may import ideas and effects that do not fully cohere with long-held assumptions about the properties of life and
the extent to which we can precisely control its processes,
whether of behavior, mental functioning, or any human characteristics. This "shape-shifting" of life confounds constitutional
adjudication. We will have to refine and even revise some of
our main tools of constitutional decision making-our standards
of review-because they are the structures that mediate and
carry out the value orderings we implanted into the Constitution.

